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i	  
Abstract	  
 
Governance theory emerged in the early 1990s. Since then, it has been seen as an 
approach to unveil the existing relationships in systems of management with two 
often-conflicting governing systems, namely formal and informal. Governance 
theory attempts to understand the implications of decisions made by formal and 
informal institutions in order to find suitable ways of management. 
The theoretical problem this thesis responds to embraces water institutions 
governing and managing the DWSS. This thesis contributes to conceptualise 
drinking water governance as the rules, decision making and the plurality of actors 
interacting to provide the DWSS and recognising customary water institutions and 
authorities in the management, operation and maintenance of the DWSS at 
community level.  
This research uses the concept of governance defined by Chhotray and Stoker 
(2009: 3) as ‘the rules that guide collective decision-making in settings where 
there are a plurality of actors or organisations’. This concept is systematically 
applied in an analytical framework taking into account three main components of 
governance namely rules, collective decision-making, and plurality of actors to 
analyse water governance with a focus on the drinking water supply service 
(DWSS) in three peri-urban communities in Mexico’s central highlands: San 
Mateo, San Francisco and Santiaguito. 
The principal research question this thesis aims to answer is how do customarily-
organised institutions address water governance to manage the DWSS at 
community level? Using qualitative methods and techniques this research explores 
the interactions between formal and informal institutions and actors when 
managing drinking water at community level. Informal institutions and actors are 
water committees, water vendors, and domestic water users. Formal institutions 
are decentralised water institution and well proprietors. 
This research highlights the importance of legal plural institutions involvement in 
the governance and management of drinking water and its interaction at 
community level. This thesis contributes to better understanding of rules, decision 
making and the plurality of actors interacting within the governance and 
management of the DWSS. It highlights the importance of the legal plural 
institutions involved in the governance and management of water and the way in 
which they are legitimised either by formal or informal institutions. This thesis 
also contributes to recognising customary water institutions in the governance of 
water resources. I approach water governance and analyse society participation, 
water markets and customary and official institutions involved in the DWSS 
provision. Theoretical insights are also provided into the on-going dynamic of 
drinking water access by domestic water users and actors. Finally, the thesis is 
also rich in contributing with substantial empirical information collected through 
semi-structured interviews, deep interviews, focus groups, observation and 
informal talks with domestic water users and vendors. 
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“The right to water is an indispensable element of human dignity” (Fauchon, 
L., 2006) (4th world water forum, Mexico). 
 
“The infrastructure coverage of the water service does not necessarily mean 
drinking water is available or delivered” (Guardiola et al., 2010). 
 
“When the well is dry, we know the worth of water” (Ben Franklin, 1746) 
 
“(…) todos los pueblos, cualquiera que sea su etapa de desarrollo y sus 
condiciones economicas y sociales, tienen derecho al agua potable en cantidad 
y calidad acordes con sus necesidades basicas” (Mar del Plata conference, 
1977). 
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   dedicated	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CHAPTER	  1.	  Introduction	  
1.1	  Introduction	  
Governance theory emerged in the early 1990s as a new approach to 
understanding social and political changes. In natural resource management, 
governance theory helps to unveil existing relationships in systems of 
management with two, often-conflicting, governing systems, namely formal and 
informal. Through governance theory, this thesis attempts to understand the 
implications of formal and informal institutions’ decisions in their search for 
suitable ways of management. 
This research explores governance through the analysis of formal and informal 
institutions governing natural resources, with a specific focus on customary 
institutions’ governance of the drinking water supply service (DWSS) in three 
peri-urban case study Mexican communities. In these cases, the informal 
institutions are community institutions organised by custom or convention to 
assume control over water governance and manage the distribution of the DWSS. 
Special focus is applied to the wide array of customary institutions and their roles 
in the DWSS in the communities. This research calls formal institutions those 
governed by State-based institutions. Formal institutions are involved in the 
DWSS at national, state and municipal level. In this thesis I distinguish State 
institutions as those governing at Federal level from state institutions, which are 
those institutions comprised at state of Mexico (county) level. 
This study provides important insights into water governance and the ongoing 
dynamic of domestic water users’ access to drinking water. Its theoretical 
contribution is its investigation of the administration of informal institutions that 
provide the DWSS to community households. 
My analytical framework is based on three elements of the governance concept 
defined by Chhotray and Stoker (2009), which involves: rules, decision-making 
and the plurality of actors. This analytical framework is also complemented with 
community management approach, which takes into account the involvement of 
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community members and customary institutions in the control of water resources 
to provide the DWSS at community level.  
Each of these three governance components is analysed in a separate chapter, with 
each chapter answering a specific research question about the governance and 
management of the DWSS at community level. The analysis carried out 
throughout the thesis aims to answer the main research question that guides this 
research: how do customarily-organised institutions address water governance to 
manage the drinking water supply service at community level? I further explain 
the research questions that guide every chapter in section 1.4 and chapter 3. 
The analytical framework is designed and applied through the thesis to understand 
water governance of the DWSS in three peri-urban communities in Mexico’s 
central highlands: San Francisco Tlalcilalcalpan, Santiaguito Tlalcilalcali and 
San Mateo Otzacatipan. Here after, these communities will be called San 
Francisco, Santiaguito and San Mateo respectively. Each concept obtained from 
governance definition shapes the analytical framework that will be theoretically 
and empirically analysed by chapters. For example, chapter two theorises the main 
concepts and each concept is empirically analysed in a different chapter. In this 
sense, chapter four characterise and analyse rules and legal pluralism. Chapter five 
characterise and analyse main actors involved in governance of the DWSS. There 
is a plurality of actors in all three communities who continuously interact to 
manage, operate and maintain the DWSS and its infrastructure. The main actors 
involved in water governance at community level include customary institutions, 
local private markets, official institutions and water users. Then, chapter six 
elaborate about decision making, and chapter sever analyse the main struggles 
faced by the actors as well as their capacity to adapt and bring solutions to 
drinking water-related problems. 
The characteristics that make the chosen communities particularly interesting for 
the study of DWSS governance are as follows: first, while water is not naturally 
scarce, there is strong evidence of water insufficiency related to DWSS 
management problems; second, the communities obtain water from the region’s 
aquifers, rather than from a surface source; third, the three communities are 
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classified as peri-urban areas and are similar in terms of population growth; fourth, 
all three have a customary water committee that is responsible for the governance 
and management of the DWSS for providing drinking water to community 
households; and finally, the communities own property rights of the wells from 
which they extract the underground water that feeds the DWSS. Nevertheless, 
each has its own particular way of managing the financial resources collected 
from users’ payments for the DWSS. More about these characteristics are detailed 
in chapter three section 3.3.3.4, called: choice of research site. The selection of 
these three communities takes into account the need to fill a knowledge gap in 
studies related to community management of the DWSS and water governance at 
community level. 
Peri-urban communities are located outside or near to large urban areas. The 
definition of ‘peri-urban’1 has not reached a strict consensus. Though, the concept 
is used when rural and urban characteristics coexist within and beyond city limits 
(Allen, 2003). Population growth in peri-urban areas and the changes in 
population size of its communities are mainly created by urban expansion and the 
reduction of rural space, also because of a decrease in agricultural activity and 
employment reduction in rural activities. The outcome of this process is the new 
‘peri-urban’ space. There have been inadequate planning to deal with 
environmental and development processes in spaces characterised by the urban-
rural dichotomy. Peri-urban areas do not always receive appropriate public 
services, even where a large number of inhabitants coexist there (Torres Lima 
2006). In the communities studied, inadequate and insufficient provision of the 
DWSS are the main and persistent problems that affect domestic water users. This 
research investigates the DWSS at community level. 
This research involves the extensive collection of primary and secondary data 
during the fieldwork stage. The empirical data include qualitative information 
about written law governing water resources in Mexico, with specific emphasis on 
the DWSS as provided by water institutions; the involvement of private actors in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Other explanations of peri-urban regions describe them as ‘new’ emerging small towns and 
intermediate-size cities that are the result of either the deconcentration of a metropolis or migration 
from rural to more urban areas. The character of peri-urban growth is the creation of polycentric 
urban spaces and fragmented landscapes in which agricultural activities, industry, residences and a 
variety of other land uses coexist uneasily (Eakin et al., 2010). The growth or expansion of large 
cities towards the periphery is also associated with flows coming from the metropolis to smaller 
urban areas and with immigration from other peri-urban areas or other states or provinces (Aguilar 
and Ward, 2003). 
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the sells and distribution of drinking water; and domestic water users’ efforts to 
deal with an insufficiency of drinking water. The thesis also analyses qualitative 
insights into the disjuncture between official and customary governance systems 
and domestic water users’ difficulties in receiving the DWSS and/or paying for it. 
The conceptual and empirical insights gained and the methodological approach 
seeks to better understand the governance and management of the DWSS in 
customarily-organised communities, and how legal plural institutions interact 
within the drinking water supply system. 
1.2	  Governance	  and	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
Governance has been explored from different perspectives in the literature on 
legal anthropology, political sciences, economics, international relations, and 
development studies. However, governance concept has not reach a strict 
consensus to define it. Topics about the governance of natural resources, legal 
pluralism and who should manage the provision of the DWSS are also addressed 
in the governance literature. In some Mexican cities the DWSS is administered, 
organised, allocated, distributed and delivered by official water institutions, while 
in others, self-organised communities have adopted responsibility for providing 
this service. However, not only formal and informal water institutions but also 
private local actors, such as well proprietors and water vendors, also participate in 
the provision, management and sometimes administration of the DWSS. The 
interaction of this wide array of actors and individuals creates a complex scenario, 
which explains why governance serves to explain the outcome of institutions and 
actors performance in decision-making, operation, and management of provision 
of the DWSS, especially to communities and households. A better understanding 
of informal governance can serve to a better water management according to the 
sensitivity of community context. 
The question of who should manage water resources is the subject of considerable 
academic discussion in the field of development studies. Some authors suggest 
that Federal government should be the one responsible for administering natural 
resources, including water, through its set of official institutions (Whittington et al. 
2009). Other perspectives support the increasing participation of multiple actors 
Chapter	  1.	  Introduction	  
6	  
	  
such as civil society, the private sector and individuals in the governance and 
management of natural resources, specifically water resources (Kyessi 2005; 
Mukherji and Shah 2005; Vásquez et al. 2009). Some scholars claim that social 
actors such as individuals and institutions at community level know what their 
communities need and are therefore best placed to manage their own natural 
resources, including provision of the DWSS (Bah 1992; Doe and Khan 2004; 
Ferguson and Derman 2005; Derman and Hellum 2007; Harvey and Reed 2007). 
The present research uses governance theory and legal pluralism approach to 
understand water governance; the research includes insights about institutions and 
issues of legal pluralism (Von Benda-Beckmann 1995; Von Benda-Beckmann et 
al. 1998; Zwarteveen et al. 2005).  
One of the characteristics of water governance is the way in which decisions are 
made and legitimised, and who is responsible for doing this. This study sheds 
light upon the complex interactions between the different legal actors involved in 
the provision of the DWSS, particularly those that take place between formal and 
informal institutions. It offers understanding of how community institutions and 
individuals are involved in these interactions and how their participation is 
affected by water institutions’ decisions and operation of the DWSS. 
Community involvement in the governance and management of the DWSS has 
been observed through three main institutions: water committees, community 
members and local private water vendors. The water committee is the main 
customary institution responsible for governing and managing the DWSS at 
community level. Private water vendors may or may not have official permission 
to extract underground water and sell it for profit. Community members are the 
householders or domestic water users in a community; some of them are involved 
in the water management of their community. Besides community institutions, 
formal water institutions are also involved the management of the DWSS. In the 
communities studied there is financial involvement of formal water institutions. 
Community management has mainly been studied in small communities rather 
than in medium-sized and large ones. Studies about community management are 
characterised by the presence of customary institutions within the provision of 
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water (Doe and Khan 2004; Nyarko 2004; Kyessi 2005; Harvey and Reed 2007; 
Nyarko et al. 2007). This study investigates medium-sized peri-urban 
communities in Mexico with a strong customary system for providing the DWSS. 
Issues about rules, decision-making, actors, and struggles of community 
institutions are empirically analysed in Chapters 4 to 7, each of which also 
answers a research question displayed in section 1.4. 
1.3	  Research	  aim	  
This research aims to analyse water governance and community management to 
understand the way in which communities are organised to governan and manage 
the complexity of the DWSS at community level. This research aims to 
understand the multiple actors involved in the water governance process and the 
legitimacy of actors to make decisions. This study investigates the difficulties 
faced by of domestic water users because of an insufficient drinking water supply 
service.  
1.4	  Research	  questions	  
The analysis of water governance and the management of the DWSS in the three 
case-study peri-urban communities in Mexico provides insights into the 
interaction of different actors involved in the delivery of the DWSS at community 
level. I explore the difficulties faced by customary water institutions in providing 
the DWSS and investigate through this main research question how do 
customarily-organised institutions address water governance to manage the 
DWSS at community level? 
To answer the main research question above, this thesis proposes four secondary 
questions, which are based on the three main elements: rules, actors, and decision 
making emerged from the analytical framework and Chhotray and Stoker’s (2009) 
conceptualisation of governance. The following questions guide the structure of 
this thesis, and each is addressed in a separate chapter: 
1) What are the disjunctures between official and customary water 
institutions governing the DWSS? 
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2) How and why does the wide array of actors influence the governance of 
the DWSS in Mexico? 
3) What is a property rights system, and why is this important for decision 
making about the provision of or use of ground water for the DWSS? 
4) What difficulties do domestic water users and water institutions encounter 
regarding provision of the DWSS? 
Chapter 4 addresses the first question. It seeks to understand the main differences 
in terms of rules between two legal systems of different origin, the official and the 
customary – also called formal and informal respectively –. This question also 
seeks to understand how formal and informal water institutions frame the 
provision of the DWSS. It investigates the differences between these plural legal 
systems in the governance and management of the DWSS and explores the extent 
to which official and customary water institutions adopt formal law in addressing 
the dynamics and the rules currently governing this service or implement a 
customary law to manage drinking water. This question also looks at the 
disjuncture between official and customary water institutions in charges for the 
DWSS according to the area and householders’ economic status. 
The second question, addressed in Chapter 5, deals with the array of actors 
interacting in the governance of the DWSS and explores how they work within 
the water governance and management system at community level, and the level 
of involvement of each one. This chapter analyses the different actors 
participating in not only the governance of water but also the management of the 
DWSS in the three case study communities. It explains how each actor involved 
influences the DWSS.  
The third question, discussed in Chapter 6, analyses decision-making issues of the 
actors interacting in the water governance system. Decision making is analysed 
according to the property rights and water rights of actors within the property 
rights system, which enables them to access water either through direct ground 
water extraction or through the provision of the DWSS. 
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Finally, the last question analyses the main difficulties faced by customary actors 
such as water committees and community members with the DWSS. These 
difficulties are addressed in Chapter 7. Water committees face specific difficulties 
in providing the DWSS and collecting community householders’ payments. 
Householders’ community members have to deal not only with water 
insufficiency but also with their payments for the DWSS. There are two main 
difficulties to pay addressed in this research: householders’ willingness to pay and 
ability to pay. Some householders are not willing to pay for the DWSS they 
receive. However, some others find difficult to pay; this means, even when some 
community householders are willing to pay they are not able to pay because they 
do not have the financial resources to pay with. Both difficulties cause serious 
effects in the quality of the DWSS. The following section addresses the structure 
followed in this thesis. 
1.5	  Thesis	  outline	  
The analytical framework developed for this research outlines the structure of the 
thesis. Chapter 2 is a theoretical chapter that defines the concept of governance 
and then applies it, with a focus on water governance, to explain the processes 
through which the DWSS is provided. The rules, decision-making and the 
plurality of actors that shape the governance concept are conceptualised in 
Chapter 2 and analysed in the empirical chapters of the thesis.  
Chapter 3 explains the methods and techniques used to carry out this research. 
Empirical information from the case studies was gathered using a wide array of 
research methods and techniques including semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, field observation and analysis of secondary sources. The respondents 
included decision-makers and representatives of water institutions at national, 
state, municipal and community levels, as well as domestic water users, local 
water-well proprietors and water vendors, academics and professionals working 
with water-resources.  
Chapter 4 analyses the rules governing access to and management of the DWSS 
using a legal pluralism approach to highlight how both formal and informal rules 
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govern the use of ground water resources. These formal or informal rules are 
followed by the actors involved in the governance of the DWSS and by domestic 
water users. Water institutions’ implementation of rules and domestic water users’ 
participation in following the rules are important processes in water governance 
and improvement of the DWSS. 
Chapter 5 analyses the wide array of actors interacting in water governance and 
the management of the DWSS. The main actors are formal and informal water 
institutions, local private well proprietors and water vendors, and domestic water 
users. Together they represent the different politico-legal institutions in the water 
governance process. These actors participate in the management, operation, and 
distribution of the DWSS and in maintenance of the water infrastructure. In the 
communities’ case study, customary water institutions are involved in the 
management, operation and maintenance of the DWSS, official water institutions 
in the financial management of payments collected, while local private actors are 
involved in the sells and distribution of drinking water. The actors interact 
through rules to make and implement decisions. The main focus of this research is 
the interactions between politico-legal water institutions and domestic water users 
regarding provision of the DWSS. 
Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on water institutions’ and actors’ decision-making in 
the governance and management process of the DWSS. Decision-making in this 
case study associates the property rights system with the socio-legal position of 
the actor, also called holder, to the legitimate property rights that have been 
conferred to them. According to Schlager and Ostrom (1992), a property right 
holder may be classified as an owner, a proprietor, an authorised claimant, an 
authorised user and/or an authorised entrant. However, some may be classified as 
unauthorised entrants. Each position gives the actor a right to benefit from water. 
The types of rights to obtain drinking water analysed in Chapter 6 are access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. The interaction between water 
rights holders and the types of rights available are defined as the property rights 
system (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2001). 
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Chapter 7 discusses domestic water users’ and water institutions’ struggles related 
to the provision of the DWSS. Three main struggles were identified: water 
institutions’ difficulties with collecting domestic water users’ payment for the 
DWSS; community members’ difficulties paying for the DWSS; and the 
community’s difficulties in trusting the water institution. These struggles hold 
back improvements to the governance and management of the DWSS at 
community level.  
Chapter 8 includes the main findings of this research and sets out the conclusions. 
I found that the emergence of water committees, that are informal institutions, 
depends on the creation of a historically-contingent process in which informal 
structures are the product of specific conflicts or particular governmental 
decisions. 
This study provides important insights into how the concept of governance is 
applied to governance of the DWSS at the community level. It offers significant 
theoretical insights into water governance and the on-going dynamic of domestic 
water users’ access to drinking water, and contributes to understanding the role of 
informal institutions in the management of the DWSS at community and 
household levels.  
Finally, I propose some policy recommendations that may be useful to decision-
makers seeking to improve not only the governance and management of the 
DWSS by the water authorities involved at different administrative levels but also 
the quality of the DWSS at community level. 
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CHAPTER	  2.	  Theoretical	  Framework	  for	  Understanding	  
Water	  Governance	  and	  the	  Drinking	  Water	  Supply	  Service	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
This chapter addresses the main governance literature and applies Chhotray and 
Stoker’s (2009) governance concept to analyse the problem of water governance 
in the drinking water supply service (hereafter DWSS) in Mexico. Governance 
theory is becoming increasingly important for better understanding of the 
governance of the DWSS and its transport, delivery, and administration, not only 
in urban but also in peri-urban and rural settings. 
To understand water governance at community level it is necessary to engage with 
the precepts of legal pluralism, which recognise the plurality of actors interacting 
within the same governance system. Each actor follows its own rules and settles 
the norms that regulate what is or is not allowed at the point of providing the 
DWSS. 
Based on the analysis of the relevant literature and theoretical approaches to 
governance and legal pluralism it was elaborated the analytical framework that 
guides this research. The analytical framework outlines the methodology and the 
empirical information that is required about water governance in the DWSS. This 
information was collected during the fieldwork. The structure followed within this 
thesis is based in the analytical framework developed.  
The theoretical contribution of this chapter focuses on the conceptualisation of 
water governance and how this is applied to the DWSS in three Mexican 
communities. The research also contributes to understanding water governance 
and the ongoing dynamic of domestic water users’ access to drinking water. This 
study provides important insights about the administration of informal institutions 
that provide drinking water to community households. The current chapter mainly 
focuses on customary governance of the DWSS in medium-sized communities. 
This chapter contains seven main sections. The first introduces the chapter; the 
second reflects on the main approaches of different disciplines regarding 
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governance theory and the conceptualisation of governance; beginning with 
Chhotray and Stoker’s (2009) concept of governance, which includes three main 
elements: rules, decision-making and plurality of actors.  
Rules, decision-making and plurality of actors are used in the fourth section as the 
axis to elaborate the analytical framework of this thesis. The analytical framework 
is explained in subsections. Each subsection analyse one of the following 
elements: rules, decision making, and actors, which were obtained from 
governance concept. 
The first subsection analyses legal pluralism and the rules governing water 
resources. Through the legal pluralism approach it is acknowledged there are rules 
governing water resources and the way these are differently legitimised by 
specific institutions. One of the most important issues that this section tackles is 
the recognition of formal and informal institutions in the conceptualisation of 
governance of water resources. Though, this thesis gives special attention to 
customary community institutions involved in water governance. 
According to the literature, relatively little is known about the institutions 
governing the DWSS and the policies that govern the use of groundwater. The 
analytical framework section illustrates how understanding issues of legal 
pluralism in the governance of water requires that the governance concept expand 
its frontiers beyond formal administration. It explores the informal or customary 
rules and laws adopted by water institutions at community level and the 
mechanisms generated to govern those resources. Through this section, this thesis 
identifies and acknowledges there is interaction of State, traditional-customary 
and private institutions in a governance system focused on providing the DWSS at 
community level.  
In the second subsection of the analytical framework, the chapter theorises about 
the multiple actors involved in the water governance and management of the 
DWSS. Actors in this thesis are classified as politico-legal institutions and water 
users. The third subsection focuses on decision-making to access and obtain water; 
decision-making of actors is based on the property rights system. Communities 
Chapter	  2.	  Theoretical	  framework	  for	  understanding	  water	  governance	  and	  the	  DWSS	  
15	  
	  
need to have and to recognise property rights over the water they manage to 
provide the DWSS. In this sense, governance can also be developed under a 
multiple normative construction of property rights. The characterisation of rights 
proposed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom (2001) is key to recognising 
that different actors have specific rights according to their possession of the 
resource. These rights are embedded in a property rights system (PRS) that 
determines access to a specific natural resource – in this case, drinking water, 
therefore a discussion about water rights is also relevant in this chapter.  
The fifth and sixth section analyse the importance of water governance and 
community management in the DWSS. A deep literature review found that more 
is known about technical aspects of the distribution of ground and surface water 
and the pipes and pumping system infrastructure than about the social aspects of 
water management (Mukherji and Shah 2005; Kumar and Managi 2010). By 
contrast, little is known about the performance of customary institutions that 
assume responsibility for providing a DWSS.  
There are not many studies about the social organisation of communities to shape 
water committees. Neither is deeply studied the social aspects of the provision of 
drinking water, pricing, payments collection, and customary community 
management. There are more studies about formal institutions managing water 
services. There is little in the water governance and community management 
literature about the performance of water committees (see Nyarko 2004; Harvey 
and Reed 2007; Whittington, Davis et al. 2009; Nayar and James 2010). For these 
reason this chapter emphasises the importance of water governance and 
community management in the DWSS. Finally, governing and managing water 
resources are not easy; therefore, last section (2.7) ends with an analysis of the 
difficulties faced by customary institutions in DWSS provision. 
2.2	  Theory	  of	  governance	  
Governance theory emerged in the early 1990s in the public administration and 
political sciences disciplines (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). It was a new way of 
thinking derived from the changes experienced in governing. The growing interest 
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in governance issues mirrors social and political changes; governance theory 
attempts to understand the implications of these changes and find an appropriate 
way of managing them. Researchers from different disciplines adopt different 
perspectives to governance to explain the social, environmental, political and 
economic problems that they observe (Neaera Abers 2007; Biswas and Tortajada 
2010). In order to define a working concept of governance that can be applied to 
water governance at community level it is first necessary to engage with notions 
of governance and the ways in which different disciplines approach it.  
Governance is a concept that has been studied from a wide array of disciplines 
such as political science, economics, international relations and politics, 
development studies, geography, and socio-legal studies (Benda-Beckmann et al. 
1998; Liverman 2004; Batterbury and Fernando 2006; IEEM 2006; Bobbio 2009; 
Chhotray and Stoker 2009) and has been influenced by literature related to 
environmental management, participation and corporate governance (Falkner 
2003; Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Chhotray and Stoker 2009).  
Within the political sciences discipline it is possible to find the work of Camou 
(1993); González-Villarreal et al. (2006); Solanes and Jouravlev (2006); Allouche 
(2007); Franks and Cleaver (2007); González-Villarreal (2008); Roy (2008); 
Alvarado-Pechir (2009); Duit et al. (2010); Tortajada (2010); Van de Meene et al. 
(2011). The works of Falkner (2003) have emerged from the international 
relations perspective. 
Development studies has engaged with governance issues since the early 1980s 
(Biswas and Tortajada 2010b). This discipline benefits from the approach of other 
disciplines to construct its own governance approach. Development studies 
focuses on the way in which organisation and decision-making push development 
projects to achieve specific goals (Roy 2008; Biswas and Tortajada 2010; Biswas 
and Tortajada 2010b). Despite the continuous discussions within these disciplines 
there is not yet a consensus on a single definition. However, development studies 
adopt the principles of participation, accountability, transparency, management 
and budgetary practices suggested by the World Bank to achieve ‘good 
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governance’ (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2007; Tortajada 
2010).  
Good governance seeks greater autonomy for community institutions from the 
bureaucratic apparatus and enable communities to organise and control their 
property rights (Roy 2008; Tortajada 2010). It involves the participation of civil 
society and community institutions participation for proper allocation and 
management of resources in order to solve collective problems according to what 
is good for people and the environment (Biswas and Tortajada 2010; Tortajada 
2010). 
Despite the World Bank’s efforts to define governance and the inclusion of formal 
institutions in the concept it does not refer to alternative ways of governing 
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2007: 6). Most of World Bank 
literature about governance centres its attention on the wide precepts of 
governance limiting it towards formal administrative levels. This literature mainly 
takes into account governance at international, national, state levels or even local 
(municipal) level. However, it does not centre attention on governance carried out 
at community level where different legal plural institutions participate and set its 
own laws and rules. 
Currently, governance approaches still shape many studies of political science and 
public administration. Bobbio (2009) highlights it is important to take into 
account the collective decision making and the continuous governance challenge 
to allow governments to mediate through a complex net of institutions and 
networks. Institutions attempt to cope with the complex political and socio-
economic changes observed in governance as well as the multiplicity of governing 
institutions’ interests and decisions. This complexity is addressed by, among 
others, Allouche (2007); Franks and Cleaver (2007); Roy (2008); Tortajada 
(2010). For Camou (1993), governance is a set of rules that determine who 
governs in a system where there are real elements of power that guarantee stability 
as well as the institutions uncertain profiles that are still emerging and growing. 
The following section addresses the concept of governance used in this research to 
understand water governance at the community level. 
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2.2.1	  Defining	  a	  working	  concept	  of	  governance	  
As discussed above, governance has been defined from differents disciplines. 
Though, there is not a single concensus to integrate all elements involved in this 
concept in one definition that embrasses the variety of interests from different 
institutions and actors. The concept of governance is concerned with the way 
people construct and practice collective decision-making to reach outcomes that 
benefit society, the economy and the environment. This conceptualisation is found 
in contributions from Neaera-Abers (2007); Lozano González (2009); Biswas and 
Tortajada (2010); Kurrild-Klitgaard (2010); Larson and Petkova (2011). Usually, 
governance is associated with a government system where an authority or a group 
of people work together to come to common decisions as mentioned in the 
literature of Batterbury and Fernando (2006); González-Villarreal (2008); 
Alvarado-Pechir (2009); Duit et al. (2010); Van de Meene et al. (2011). 
Chhotray and Stoker defines governance as ‘the rules that guide collective 
decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organisations 
and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship 
between these actors and organisations’ (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 3, 228). This 
is the concept I will use in this research. This concept denotes there are more legal 
plural institutions and actors than only formal actors. Plural actors are especially 
identified in decision making regarding the governance of natural resources. 
In governance the commitment of institutions is the key element to reach 
consensus among the main social and political actors, resulting in agreed 
collective decision making (IEEM 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2010). However, 
reaching a consensus is not easy. The concept of governance itself poses the 
problem that in governance there are conflicting agendas, different priorities of 
actors and thus actions and institutional interventions cannot be carried out 
straightforwardly (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 218; Wilder 2010). Instead, 
informal institutions face community problems that require a quick solution, such 
as provision of the DWSS. These become part of a customary governance system.  
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The entire governance process requires continuous improvement to deal with the 
changes, challenges, experiences and problems faced in social, political and 
economic environments (Solanes and Jouravlev 2006). According to Rogers 
(2002), governance embraces the relationship between a society and its 
government. The governance process is not restricted to enforced laws or rules 
when the reality follows different legal rules legitimised through informal 
institutions (González-Villarreal 2008). 
At the community level, informal governance and management systems – called 
customary systems – also play a relevant part of decision-making, the election of 
authorities, legitimacy and the participation of civil society (Kyessi 2005; Roy 
2008; Bobbio 2009). This kind of governance usually exists at community level. 
Community governance is being recognised as an increasingly important aspect of 
the provision of infrastructure and the management of natural resources in urban, 
peri-urban and rural areas (Kyessi 2005). Nevertheless, sometimes, a customary 
governance system may be merged with an official governance system and may 
work together as a hybrid system.  
Self-governance such as community governance tries to maintain its autonomy 
despite pressures from the globalised economic system that support formal 
institutions, processes, and decisions. In some communities self-governance may 
have the acceptance of a legitimate and valid government, which might not be a 
formal one (Falkner 2003). This concept of governance entails a change of 
management approach from official to non-official governance systems to allow 
permanent re-evaluation of collective decision making and actions (Sandoval-
Minero 2007). Thus not only local but also community institutions seek to 
strengthen the ways they organise themselves to face the challenge of governance 
at local and community levels (Kyessi 2005; Mukherji and Shah 2005; Roy 2008; 
Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet 2010). This section focused on broad governance 
concepts. These concepts are relevant to find key elements that can be applied to 
define water governance at the community level. See section 2.5. 
Governance frequently implies the interaction of a plurality of actors and 
institutions that are not necessarily formal; thus, it is necessary to engage with 
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legal pluralism approach in order to understand different ways of governing and 
legitimating decisions and where authorities and institutions might not be formal, 
but informal or hybrid. The following section defines and explains legal pluralism. 
2.3	  Legal	  pluralism:	  taking	  into	  account	  customary	  law	  to	  manage	  
natural	  resources	  
In nearly all contemporary rural areas in less economically developed countries 
that were colonised it is possible identifying some form of legal pluralism in terms 
of the management and exploitation of natural resources. Legal pluralism refers to 
different legal (valid) rules and laws emerging from different origins (i.e. State, 
custom, convention, religious, etc.) and legitimation in historical usages (Benda-
Beckmann et al., 1998), community meetings recognition or a payment. Legal 
pluralism has been also identified in some of those rural areas that grew in 
population and become peri-urban areas or those rural areas planed and 
transformed into part of the urban landscape but in a rural-urban area. This means 
that in these kinds of communities the rights to maintain political and 
administrative control over natural resources and those rights to use and transfer 
them are not only regulated by State institutions and applied by courts. By 
contrast, there are customary institutions creating and applying their own 
customary law. 
In colonised countries it is common finding there are prior colonisation and after 
colonisation legal systems. Prior colonising powers ruled less economically 
developed countries and established colonial States communities had their own 
political and economical structure, their own organisation and laws, as well as 
their own procedures to manage conflicts. Communities and some local 
institutions had, and some of them still have, a plural legal system ruling the 
management of natural resources. On the one hand, the State ruling system in 
colonised countries establishes the rights over those natural resources colonial 
rulers intended to exploit (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). These rules are settled 
in a written formal law. On the other hand, there is an unwritten customary law 
generally orally transmitted in public ceremonies (Ibid). Legal plural communities 
mainly use this customary law. 
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In Latin American countries, as colonised territory, for decades, government 
interventions approved policies that looked for the substitution of customary legal 
and management systems by a ‘modern’ State law and resource management. In 
colonised Latin American countries this legal transformation was to be achieved 
by declaring natural resources, such as land, water, forest, State property. For 
example, Mexican government declared that land and water located within 
Mexican territory is State property (Cámara de Diputados, 2010). Since water 
resources in Mexico were declared as national property the State has the rights to 
control them through a State law. Though Mexican State has formal rights to 
control national waters there are still communities that under a customary regime 
control waters located within their community. Nevertheless, scholars have 
identified that for State government local and traditional customary laws, if 
recognised at all, were catalogued as an obstacle to achieve economic 
development because it is thought property regimes with a strong community and 
customary characteristics are the cause of inefficient resources exploitation and 
use (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). Therefore, the more the State was involved in 
the control and exploitation of natural resources, in colonised countries, the more 
traditional legal systems (also called customary or indigenous) were officially 
substituted by State law.  
Opposite to neoliberal thinking, scholars (Lynch and Talbott, 1995; Benda-
Beckmann et al., 1998) have studied and concluded that communities, 
community-based rights, and communities customary law is a positive element in 
resource management because these approaches support that community norms 
and rules are an expression of people values and needs. These scholars suggest 
that any formal legislation should avoid measures that weaken or contradict 
people’s way of organising, ruling and managing its resources. The validity and 
recognition of non-State laws may have limited influence in official law. However, 
people’s law – either in community or as individuals – are still an important part 
of rural life and some peri-urban areas. These customary laws continue existing in 
most of less economically developed countries. 
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In some communities from colonised countries there are multiple legal plural rules 
that may be interacting at the same time. Therefore, researchers, individuals, 
communities, and State institutions are not only confronted with a single legal 
system but with a co-existence and the complexity of multiple normative legal 
systems and rights over control, management, and operation of specific natural 
resources, especially when it comes to water resources. 
2.3.1	  Customary	  law	  
Customary law, also defined as customary rules or traditional rules, is used in two 
meanings. The first meaning only refers to ‘rules’; those customary rules that have 
been accepted and used by communities for a long time. The second is to refer to 
a system of rules that is called ‘customary law’ not only by local people but also 
by law makers, judges, and law experts. There is more than one construction of 
‘customary law’. In my research, customary law refers to the rules created and 
enforced by community population through their customary institutions and that 
have been used for a long time. 
In customary communities there may be more than one legal law ruling the water 
management system. Customary law may not be the only one applied within the 
community. Customary law probably has always been combined with other legal 
laws and norms derived from other sources of power and authority generated 
outside the community; for example, State and government agencies law, 
religious groups law, project law, and organizational law (Benda-Beckmann et al., 
1998). The coexistence and interaction of multiple laws within a social 
environment is the so-called legal pluralism. In a legal plural domain these 
different legal orders interact and influence each other rather than isolated from 
each other. The same happen with government institutions that manage water 
resources. Sometimes also happen that State law may be combined with 
traditional leadership and councils. These mixed law are known as ‘compound 
law’ (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1983; Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). In the three 
case study communities there is a customary and an official legal system ruling 
the governance and management of water resources used to provide the drinking 
water supply service. The main legal system in the three communities is the 
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customary. However, State law becomes part of the legal elements used by water 
committees to obtain water rights and property rights to access ground water. 
Scholars also argue that in communities ruled by tradition there are older and 
newer versions of traditional or customary property relations and laws co-existing. 
However, not all customary laws account the difference between the various kinds 
of practical norms exiting within every community. This means that the 
customary rules that are used at community level are far more complex and 
dynamic than it is expected because each community, each customary system 
have its particular characteristics and social dynamics and each community might 
have its own particular norms adapted to their practices which are sensitive to 
their context. Therefore, in order to differentiate the multiple levels and sources of 
rules in a social process it is also necessary to understand the concept of ‘local 
law’.  
Local laws are not customary law/rules. Local laws are the locally dominant 
interpretations and transformations of legal plural rules. And mixtures of 
interpretations of those legal rules might integrate local laws. Local law refers to 
those used rules that guide daily customary practices; it constitutes the present 
reality shaped by actual social relationships (Spiertz, 1992). The practical use of 
local law does not mean that customary law could be replaced. However, many 
elements of the local law may be customary in terms of the continuity of a legal 
tradition. Local law might but not necessarily need to be incorporated into the 
customary law.  
By contrast, “customary law, or different constructions of customary law, is part 
of the legal pluralism which constitutes the environment in which local laws are 
generated in different localities” (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998: 60). It depends of 
the context and place in which people deal with elements of the customary law 
that become part of the particular and dynamic local law. Therefore, according to 
Meinzen-Dik and Pradhan (2005) the way in which these different legal orders 
interact and influence each other in specific social contexts depends on social and 
power relationships between holders/possessors of different laws. The following 
section analyses power relations. 
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2.3.2	  Social	  and	  power	  relations	  in	  the	  use	  and	  coexistence	  of	  different	  laws	  
The coexistence of multiple laws does not mean all of them are equally powerful. 
State law is usually, in most of contexts, more powerful than customary law or 
other laws. In terms of water resources State law is used in allocating water from 
rivers, aquifers, and other reservoirs not only for agricultural but also for non 
agricultural activities. Government institutions, powerful outsiders or weaker 
community groups supported by external agencies usually use State law for 
claiming rights over natural resources that are denied to them by other powerful 
groups. Though State law is used to claim rights it does not mean it is accepted, 
legitimised, or implemented by all users. In legal plural communities, individuals 
or groups of people can make use of more than one law or parts of different laws 
adapted to their particular context to legitimise their decisions. According to 
Meinzen-Dik and Pradhan (2005) the law that is accepted and enforced at 
community level mainly depends on power and social relationships between the 
different claimants. 
According to Zwarteveen et al. (2005) water topic is about power and interests, 
power and ideologies, water is politics and it requires a deep analysis because the 
nature of water is very contested. The dynamics around water politics, including 
water rights and laws, cannot be understood without analysing the power 
relationships, discourses, and practices that guide the perception of problems and 
likely solutions (Ibid). It is not just about rights and laws in a narrow sense. It is 
also necessary a broader analysis of water rights and laws that includes resource 
access and control because these mirror social relationships and power of actors. 
The analysis has also to take into account not only water capture, but also 
technologies, organisation, culture, economy, and ecology. 
2.3.2.1 Understanding water rights to distinguish power relationships 
Water rights, like property rights, are understood not as a single right to use a 
resource but as a ‘bundle’ of rights that includes several types and levels of rights. 
The first classification of water rights proposed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
offered a main division into three broad categories: rights of use, decision-making 
rights, and the right to generate a profit. Into these main categories are contained 
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the five types of rights included in their ‘property rights system’: access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
The rights of use include access and withdrawal, while decision-making rights 
‘regulate and control water uses and users’ (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1997;	  Roth et 
al., 2005: 240; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992) such as management and exclusion 
rights. To these broad groups of rights may be added the right to earn income or to 
generate a profit from the resource even without using it directly; for example, 
through selling water or collecting water fees. This is the case of government, 
private, or customary institutions that collect revenue from water users or 
communities that also collect a fee from others water users.  
The type of right that every actor holds depends on the position they have within 
the property rights system; for example, each actor hold a different right if they 
are owners, proprietors, authorised claimants, authorised users, or authorised 
entrants (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Water rights and laws are also seen as 
expressions of social and economic relationships between people. Thus, changes 
in laws and rights will happen if there are changes in those socioeconomic 
relationships (Boelens and Zwarteveen, 2003). Though there are rights conferred 
and hold by different users it is also possible finding, in practice, there are users 
that have not been allowed by any authority to access, withdraw, and use water. 
However, they have access to water and use it. These non-authorised users have 
no rights over water. Instead they have a tolerated access to water (Meinzen-Dik 
and Pradhan, 2005) but not water rights. In communities where there are conflicts 
over water it is not clear who has rights and who does not. In legal plural 
communities it is especially difficult because “what may be considered tolerated 
access according to one law may be considered rights according to another” 
(Meinzen-Dik and Pradhan, 2005: 242). 
The recognition of this complex set of interactions and relations do not only 
involves those individuals or groups with formal powers of legislation, decision 
making, and management but recognition also involves dialogues and social 
struggles of different actors with different interests, perspectives, needs and 
powers. As previously mentioned water issues, especially water rights and laws, 
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are political and contested; Zwarteveen et al. (2005) identify four main ways in 
which they are contested. First, water rights are contested because they deal with 
decisions about distribution and allocation. Decisions about how water is 
distributed, and how access is negotiated and obtained, are not only the result of 
how norms, rules, and laws from different origins and different degrees of 
legitimacy interact but decisions are also influenced by economic and political 
power. Some individuals or groups get less water than others. Frequently happen 
that those receiving less water are those inhabitants from rural and peri-urban 
areas. In this sense it is necessary to redefine water laws and rights but sensible to 
the context. 
Second, not only access to water but also conflicts and disagreements for water 
use are contested. Disagreements occur over the content of rules, norms, and laws 
that determine water distributions and allocation in terms of how water should be 
proportionally distributed. Criteria for allocation are definitely contested because 
answers cannot be unilateral. Answers should not be only based on economic 
interests and power positions, neither on technology efficiency. It should also take 
into account communities history, cultural values and traditions dealing with 
water. 
Third, water rights and laws are contested because there are struggles over who 
decides about water distribution and who is entitled for decision making. Decision 
making spaces are often exclusive of some actors. Exclusion to participate on it 
may depend on gender, ethnicity, or caste. This means that some people are 
allowed to participate on formulating rights and laws but not everyone. 
Individuals allowed to speak, to make decisions, and to influence decisions are not 
necessarily formally designated. The ones allowed, at community level, are 
mainly determined as by social relations of power and dependency as by cultural 
norms that associate specific behaviour with knowledge and authority. At 
community level “gender is one important axis around which attribution of 
powers of speech and norms of behaviour often occurs” (Zwarteveen et al., 2005: 
258). In many communities gender relations are imbalanced; these are determined 
according to rights to land and water. Gender inequality in customary 
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communities is mainly based on the fact that decision making over control of 
management, operation, and maintenance of water and its infrastructure which is 
related to water rights of access is mainly lead by males. Therefore, when there 
are conflicts and disputes related to water women are in a weaker position because 
men tend to be the intermediaries in terms of communications and interaction with 
external institutions to the community (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). 
In the communities studied gender is one of the variables that attributes power to 
specific community members responsible of legitimating water rights of users as 
well as allocation and distribution of the drinking water supply service. 
Nevertheless, these gender variables are not often seen as part of the customary 
law governing and are therefore usually neglected (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). 
Therefore, it is important questioning how are power positions around water 
governance and management given and legitimised by local law. And who profits 
from the existing arrangements to manage drinking water in the communities 
studied. According to diverse studies, people from rural communities are regularly 
oppressed and economically exploited (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998; Boelens, 
1998) because they end up paying more money in order to receive drinking water. 
Their payments are not necessarily paid to one actor, or to the water authority, but 
to different actors because they additionally have to buy bottled and tanked water; 
therefore, they have to budget not only the monthly payment for the drinking 
water supply service, but for those extra payments to obtain water. 
In addition, at community level, public meetings to make decisions have 
historically served to symbolically differentiate powerful from powerless actors. 
Powerless have definitely far more difficulty in mobilising law and legal 
institutions, either or both State or other community institutions, than powerful 
groups (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). In the three case studies it is in public 
meetings where the main decisions are done involving community members 
participation. In public meetings are established the main responsibilities and 
activities to be carried out as well as the agreement to charge and collect users 
payment to legitimate their water rights. 
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One more element that attributes specific rights over water depends on the 
property rights of actors according to their status as right holders. This mean that 
owners, proprietors, claimants, users, entrants have different rights according to 
the status they hold and the payments they have done to legitimize their property 
rights. However, if someone belongs to a higher or more powerful class they may 
obtain more rights because they may be able to pay more for these rights to obtain 
more drinking water. 
The fourth contested area is expressed in the discourses and specific language 
used to articulate water problems and its solutions. There is relation between the 
way in which water problems and solutions are defined and conceptualised and 
the political agendas they promote. Specific language stresses specific water 
realities, and not others, in terms of technology, cultural, and normative content. 
Language represents the water reality of specific groups, interests and their 
purposes. At community level and in indigenous movements individuals prefer 
using terms that express the need for collective action and reciprocity. Opposite, 
State institutions prefer currently using a neoliberal water discourse. In both cases 
specific language is required to shape their own water law (Zwarteveen et al., 
2005).  
Legal plural communities are usually more interested in other forms of power and 
sources of law and legitimacy than only the formal power. At community level 
where water resources are frequently governed and managed by custom having 
access to and control over drinking water is an important source of power and 
influence. Conflicts, fights, and struggles over water resources expose its 
importance in people’s livelihoods and in determining their influence and status 
according to their possibilities to control and access water. This behaviour has 
been observed in the three case studies where water committee members, 
integrated by male members, have won power over, control, and distribution of 
groundwater through the drinking water supply service provided to members of 
their community.  
Though legal plural forms of power authorise some community members to voice 
people interests and make decisions, there is also evidence that communities often 
Chapter	  2.	  Theoretical	  framework	  for	  understanding	  water	  governance	  and	  the	  DWSS	  
29	  
	  
face situations of unequal power relationships (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). 
These situations affect the way in which water resources are distributed and 
managed because those with power may bring more advantages to community 
members that support the water committee or those that give them compensation 
money because of the work they do. 
In the case studies it has been identified there are facts of social life that need to 
be taken into account to understand how water is allocated, distributed and 
managed at community level. In the three Mexican case study communities’ local 
law and norms and social stratification combined with differences in economic 
wealth and social power, rather than political, influence the possibilities of 
householders to access water and participate in the distribution of the drinking 
water supply service. It has also been identified that differences in water 
ownership according to the property rights system of Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
define differences in access to drinking water at community level. Rights to water 
in legal plural communities are closely related to the socio-political organisation 
rather than to the formal law. This topic will be further analysed in section 2.4.3. 
The following section addresses and analyses the analytical framework leading 
this thesis.  
2.4	  Analytical	  framework	  
In rural and peri-urban communities in Mexico it is common for the population to 
consume drinking water from different sources such as bottled water, boiled 
water, filtered water, or water bought from water tankers (Guardiola et al., 2010). 
This happen because of the insuffient water domestic water users frequently 
receive through the DWSS. The drinking water consumed from different sources 
is independent to the DWSS water institution provides to householders. Domestic 
water users have to pay not only for the DWSS but also for the water they buy 
from local private actors. Using and managing drinking water involves multiple 
actors differently legitimised. Therefore this research uses governance and 
community management as the main theoretical approaches to understand how 
groundwater is governed and managed at community level to provide the DWSS. 
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The analytical framework this research is based on takes into account the three 
main components of the governance concept defined by Chhotray and Stoker 
(2009): rules, collective decision-making and the plurality of actors. This also 
addresses community management concept to contribute with to understand the 
way in which customary institutions are organised to provide the DWSS, rule it, 
and manage it and situate my work on community-managed drinking water 
systems in Mexico. This analytical framework is applied throughout the thesis 
considering the three components; each component is defined and analysed in a 
separate chapter to understand water governance, which can then be applied to the 
governance and management of the DWSS in the case study communities. Figure 
2.1 shows the analytical framework that encloses the main theoretical postulates 
on which this research is based. 
Figure	  2.1	  The	  analytical	  framework	  
 
The existence of a wide variety of governance concepts facilitates identifying 
common variables, such as rules, decision-making, actors, government, legitimacy, 
that can be adapted, in this research, to define water governance and governance 
of the DWSS. Wilder (2010) suggests as necessary to generate a coherent 
governance strategy that is sustained over time and place to generate local 
participation and bring about consensus. This analytical framework is designed as 
the axis leading this research and to integrate these concepts into a useful 
definition according to the main objectives of this research. 
The concept of water governance from the Global Water Partnership (GWP) 
(2003: 2), complement Chhotray and Stoker’s (2009) governance concept that I 
have used in this research to understand the governance of the DWSS at 
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community level. Both concepts contributes in this research to define governance 
of the DWSS as the rules, decision making and plurality of actors and institutions 
– i.e. public sector, civil society, private institutions, customary authorities, and 
individuals – involved in the development and management of the DWSS, 
recognition of water institutions and its authority, and their decisions about the 
management, operation and maintenance of drinking water and its infrastructure 
to provide a public service, specifically the DWSS.  
Governance of the DWSS concept highlights the importance of legal pluralism in 
governing water resources because formal institutions and actors are not 
necessarily the ones assuming the responsibility of ruling, making decisions and 
controlling drinking water resources to provide a service; instead, there are 
informal actors involved. In the governance of water there are legal plural 
institutions interacting within customarily organised communities to provide the 
DWSS. 
At the community level three main issues require special attention: 1) the rules 
that govern, 2) the property rights system that enable decision making, 3) and the 
actors: politico-legal institutions and domestic water users interacting in the 
governance system. The importance of these three components and the way in 
which they work in the water governance and community management systems 
are addressed and analysed in the following subsections.  
2.4.1	  Recognition	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  rules	  interacting	  in	  a	  customary	  water	  
governance	  system	  
The rules of governance are related to legal pluralism approach. As mentioned in 
section 2.3, legal pluralism refers to different legal (valid) rules and laws 
emerging from different origins (i.e. State, custom, convention, religious, etc.) and 
legitimation in historical usages (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998), community 
meetings recognition or a payment. For example, there are customary social 
norms and institutional norms as well as official laws (Boelens and Zwarteveen 
2005; Boelens 2008). These norms and rules might coexist within the same 
locality where a plurality of actors also interacts within the same system.  
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Scholars (Von Benda-Beckmann 1995) have studied the precepts of legal 
pluralism to understand different ways of governing and have distinguished 
governing bodies from formal, informal, private and market-based institutions. 
Formal rules mean the official rules established by official or State authorities and 
institutions, including written law, and government structures at the international, 
national, state and municipal administrative levels (Welch 2002). Other official 
institutions such as private or market-based institutions interact within the same 
formal regime and rules. By informal rules, I mean customary rules and 
agreements settled by custom or convention by a group of individuals, community 
members, community or traditional institutions that do not necessarily take into 
account the mandates and regulation of official institutions. This research mainly 
focuses on informal institutions and their rules and agreements.  
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) affirm that informal institutions emerge for three 
main reasons. The first is that formal institutions are incomplete and cannot cover 
all contingencies, so informal rules are created to address the problems not 
covered by formal rules. The second is that informal institutions may be a ‘second 
best’ way of solving problems that cannot be achieved by formal institutions. 
Formal institutions may be recognised in a written document; however, this does 
not mean they are able to solve all problems these institutions were created for; so, 
they might be ineffective in practice for bringing solutions to specific problems. 
In such scenarios substitutive informal institutions exist because of the limited 
achievements of formal institutions and because formal institutions rules and rule-
making process lack of authority and effectiveness to implement solutions, lack of 
commitment to do their job, and therefore they are ineffective to succeed and 
achieve positive outcomes, and lack credibility of people. The third reason is 
based on the pursuit of specific goals and activities that are not considered 
acceptable by the population but are legitimate by formal institutions. Therefore, 
instead of following formal institutions rules population prefer organising 
themselves through the creation of an informal one to set informal rules to control 
what is or not allowed within society (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).  
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In this research it has been found that informal institutions have also emerged as 
part of the customary organisation of the community. At community level, 
informal institutions have emerged to govern and manage specific natural 
resources. This is the case of the DWSS. This organisational structure represents 
the customary traditional participation of community members to maintain the 
management of the drinking water supply service and the wells owned by the 
community. With community members’ participation, the customary system has 
been strengthened by the custom and convention of community members. 
Due to the absence of written law in informal institutions, the rules and activities 
that govern the DWSS are learnt and communicated by example and oral 
communication. Social learning related to water governance is also learnt by 
observation and experience. Experience is obtained through trial and error. Thus it 
is social networks that transmit informal rules. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) 
affirm that informal rules evolve into sets of shared expectations. Therefore, the 
governance and management of the DWSS by informal institutions is a process of 
learning by example in which a plurality of actors continuously interacts. 
Analysis of governance of the DWSS through the lenses of legal pluralism is 
relevant to understand the wide array of legitimate institutions interacting within 
the same governance and management system. Analysis of formal and informal 
institutions provides a better understanding of the ways in which legitimate legal-
plural institutions organise themselves to govern a space or a specific natural 
resource such as water. 
Scholars of legal anthropology suggest that legal rules, institutions and socio-legal 
relationships are part of a context in which any interaction occurs within a plural 
legal regulation. This means that local legal systems themselves may be plural 
(Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995). Legal pluralism in the field of property pays 
attention to how individuals and institutions distinguish or merge elements of 
different normative subsystems, attempt to impose their own constructions on 
others or defend themselves against others (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995). 
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In order to adapt to the different requirements of the actors, Chhotray and Stoker 
(2009) suggest, governance should take into account three questions: how should 
the power2 be distributed? Who should be involved in decisions? And how should 
the rules be enforced? In a customary system, the power is not only distributed but 
also rotated among community members to administrate the DWSS. In this case 
participation of as many of the community members as possible is expected to 
legitimate decisions. Collective decision-making, then, is relevant to legitimate 
the rules to follow when governing DWSS. 
On the one hand, a formal governing system, for example, is shaped by legal or 
statutory rights and regulations elaborated and enforced by official institutions, 
mainly of the State, through statutory law. An official State authority governs by 
shaping the rules, elaborating public policy and providing agreed public goods 
and services to different social sectors (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; Cristobal 
Pérez, 2006; Wilder and Romero Lankao, 2006; Alvarado Pechir, 2009; Bobbio, 
2009). By contrast, at community level, customary institutions take on the 
responsibility for providing public goods and services. 
On the other hand, customary governance involves the participation of community 
authorities or groups within a community that is organised, recognised and 
legitimised by its members. Customary water authorities play an important part in 
community organisation of the provision of the DWSS. The population 
democratically elects customary institution representatives at community meetings. 
Community members can also inherit the leadership from the previous governing 
group if there is consensus among community members. Scholars (Doe and Khan, 
2004; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Harvey and Reed, 2007; Miranda et al., 
2011) find that the customary authority is frequently represented by a community 
leader such as a major or by members of a religious group. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Power here is understood as the socio-legal explanation of the nature of the law (Chhotray and 
Stoker: 134, 135). The law is the instrument of the state power. This power may be ideological or 
actual, and may be held by the State or the law. The law, whether official or unofficial, is a form of 
cultural expression that operates as a potential socio-economic and political force of power, 
constraining and enabling social practices (Ibid). 
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Water resources and water services operated at community level are often 
managed, protected, allocated, used and distributed by customary or local private 
institutions. This management is legitimised by society through social rules, 
mechanisms of action, or infrastructure (Welch, 2002; Boelens and Zwarteveen, 
2005; Franks and Cleaver, 2007; Matsinhe et al., 2008). 
Local private actors usually follow market-based rules (Boelens, 2008) to assign 
prices to water and commercialise it. They are allowed to use waters for which 
they have a formal concession. Water formally authorised to private actors, such 
as local well proprietors, has to be necessarily used for businesses purposes; and 
according to the permission they hold they have specific rights to make use of 
specific amounts of water and decide where to allocate it, how to sell it, and how 
to distribute drinking water. For local private actors, the grant to hold private 
property rights over water set the rules they will follow to use groundwater. 
Grants are still provided by an official national institution. Thus interactions and 
relationships among rules, actors and level of involvement continuously occur 
within a water governance system. Nevertheless, interaction among official, 
customary, private, and individual rules may recurrently create friction in the 
management of the DWSS; specially, when two or more actors use the same 
source of water (Gupta et al., 2010). 
In societies where plural legal institutions interact, access to natural resources 
continuously involves conflicts at multiple administrative levels (Sikor and Lund, 
2009) because opponent institutions are trying to dominate the administration and 
management of natural resources; for example, the drinking water.  
Scholars dealing with community-based institutions agree that in some 
communities the State-based government is losing power, and with it, its ability to 
govern society (Moser, 1989; Linares, 2000; Doe and Khan, 2004; Harvey and 
Reed, 2007; Matsinhe et al., 2008; Bodin and Crona, 2009; Duit et al., 2010; 
Farrelly and Brown, 2011; Van de Meene et al., 2011). Instead, customary 
government is taking its place in settling or choosing the rules that legitimise the 
exercise of their authority. This shift additionally suggests that problems of 
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governance are becoming so complex that it is difficult for only one government 
to solve them alone (Duit et al., 2010). 
The difficulties in solving water governance problems are caused by the lack of 
authority to bring about consensus on who should manage water resources, who 
should make decisions, who should collect users’ payments, how the governance 
system should be organised and by whom, and then how to enforce the rules. Bell 
and Hindmoor (2009), scholars of legal pluralism, explain that in customary 
communities, society-centred actors, rather than local formal institutions, are 
assuming this governance responsibility. Alternatively, community institutions 
can assume the roles of organising, bringing consensus, decision-making and 
promoting participation and inclusive resolutions to the problems inherent in the 
management of water resources. This occurs with water committees providing the 
DWSS. 
2.4.1.1 Mechanisms to govern: legal plural institutions governing water resources 
In water governance, institutions are mediated through mechanisms which are the 
‘particular context specific arrangements for organising access to water’ (Franks 
and Cleaver, 2007: 295). Community governments are often the actors responsible 
for the care of these natural resources (Sikor, 2008). The governance will depend 
on the community organisation and the distribution and use of natural, 
technological, economic and social community resources. Nevertheless, the 
conventional notion of formal governance remains firmly rooted in the majority of 
countries with the idea of a state-centric location and insistence of State 
authorities, as key elements, in implementing international regimes (Falkner, 2003: 
76). Though, State-based notion is not always the solution for providing drinking 
water to communities. Repeatedly, communities prefer organising themselves for 
governing groundwater and managing the DWSS.  
Governance should not be restricted to official government or enforced laws and 
rules, it may be based in a different system (González-Villarreal, 2008). 
Governance is moving towards a more decentralised system aiming to distribute 
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power to share it with lower governmental levels or to informal water institutions 
(Romero Lankao, 2001; Wilder and Romero Lankao, 2006).  
Some scholars (Ostrom, 2001b; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2010) support the idea that 
there should be a plurality of governance centres that interact. This might 
strengthen the governance system and diminish negative effects when a policy has 
not been adopted well. Therefore a multiplicity of centres is expected to deal with 
the inconsistencies of centralised government and to create a stronger and resilient 
governance system. Other perspectives suggest not multiple centres but 
community-based systems capable of managing and administrating the provision 
of services around a specific resource such as water (Doe and Khan, 2004; Kyessi, 
2005; Harvey and Reed, 2007).  
It is common to find customary institutions participating in the governance of 
water, forests, mining and so on. They use mechanisms considered legitimate by 
the community to make the resource available for the local population; for 
example, community meetings to decide schedules of pumping, timing, and 
pumping directions. These mechanisms that the domestic water users consider 
legitimate do not necessarily involve formal legislative authorities at the national 
level, statutory legislation, or official institutions (Boelens, 2008). The following 
section discusses about the actors that access water and governs the DWSS. 
2.4.2	  Actors:	  politico	  legal	  institutions	  and	  water	  resources	  users	  
In this research, actors are classified as politico-legal institutions and water users 
participating in the governance of drinking water. Those most involved in the 
water governance process are official, customary and private water institutions. 
The actors involved in the water governance process are connected at a number of 
horizontal and vertical governance levels. They all working and interacting to 
achieve development (Chandhoke, 2003; Mukherji and Shah, 2005). On the 
horizontal level official governance interacts with actors such as civil society and 
the market, and the vertical level involves hierarchical interaction between 
transnational and self-government institutions (Mukherji and Shah, 2005; Roy, 
2008). 
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The politico-legal institutions such as water committees and AyST as 
decentralised water institution, and resource users, specifically, domestic water 
users and local water vendors, are the focus of this research. These actors are 
involved in the management, operation, distribution and maintenance of water; 
and they interact following either formal or informal rules to make decisions. In 
this way formal and informal water representatives exercise authority in the 
governing of water resources to provide a service such as the DWSS. 
Once a water authority – represented by the water committee – is elected and the 
period of governance is defined, the customary water committee assumes full 
responsibility for enforcing the rules and bring consensus for common decisions. 
These rules become legitimate through community agreement and by gaining 
community members’ trust in the water authority (Leahy and Anderson, 2008). In 
order to continue understanding the relation of rules, decision-making and actors 
the following section analyses the importance of politico-legal institutions as 
components of the water governance system. 
2.4.2.1 Politico-legal institutions 
In a governance system there is a plurality of actors with different origin and 
degrees of legitimacy, power and authority (Bobbio, 2009). According to Bobbio 
(2009) the institutions represent the legitimate power. The actors in the 
governance system, such as domestic water users, water committees, community 
groups, local water sellers, and decentralised water institutions, represent the 
different politico-legal institutions. The different politico-legal institutions need to 
be recognised by society in order to allow them making decisions that benefit 
community members. In the recognition and legitimacy of these politico-legal 
institutions by social actors it is based their autonomy to make decisions. 
Community members or groups of individuals emerge from the society or from 
specific groups within it to constitute informal customary groups that are 
traditional, or community-based institutions – though they are not formal 
institutions because official institutions do not legitimise them. Franks and 
Cleaver (2007) found that community-based institutions frequently come from a 
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religious group, a women’s group, or a youth group backgrounds. The main 
characteristic of individuals from a community and group members is that they 
are connected and engaged in collective labour in their communities and 
participate in the decision-making process (Nyarko, 2004; Kyessi, 2005; Franks 
and Cleaver, 2007; Roy, 2008).  
Institutions involved in the DWSS and the way the service is administered play an 
important role in the interactions among actors involved in water governance. For 
example, governance of customary and official institutions generate a series of 
channels through which people can make their claims and to some extent gain 
access to water resources. In this way people can legitimise their claims to water 
rights with different politico-legal authorities (Franks and Cleaver, 2007). 
Recent studies of institutions and the participation of actors under a drinking 
water context-specific claim the importance of promoting the devolution of 
authority to the lowest government level in managing water resources (Gregersen 
et al., 2007; Boelens, 2008). However, the lowest level of government is not 
necessarily the lowest hierarchically-constituted institution able to make claims. 
Self-governments still make decisions in their own communities, such as occurs 
for the DWSS. According to Ferguson and Derman (2005), at the local level water 
is better managed by local representatives and politico legal institutions than by 
state and national central government. This could also be applied to community 
level institutions. The following subsection considers water users in the 
governance of drinking water. 
2.4.2.2 Water resources users 
Water resource users interact as part of the plurality of actors in a governance 
system. Drinking water users are important actors involved in DWSS because 
they frequently enable or obstruct the implementation of decisions. This is 
because water users’ payment for the DWSS might enable or not the 
implementation and operation of decisions related to this service and the 
improvements of the service through the infrastructure maintenance. Also, water 
users are key actors because they are the ones who legitimate decisions made in 
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community meetings and they are the actors who will consume drinking water and 
will face the advantages and disadvantages of the service and related decisions. 
The users considered in this research are domestic users of drinking water, also 
referred here as householders. They are members of the case study communities 
whose rights and duties allow them to participate in the decision-making about 
election of water representatives and sometimes maintenance of the drinking 
water infrastructure.  
As part of the involvement of domestic water users in the DWSS it is relevant 
investigating domestic water users’ ability and willingness to pay for the drinking 
water service because payments are a central element to enable working the piped 
water network and then the service; and the measures carried out by domestic 
water users to adapt when there is insufficiency of water resources.  
At small scales; for example, at community level, water users as community 
members participate in the organisation to keep control over ground water. They 
organise themselves to govern and manage its drinking water resources that are 
provided to community households. This water is only used domestic 
consumption rather than for irrigation or industrial production because for these 
last activities actors have special water concessions from different wells. 
Governing and managing water resources at community level make the decision-
making process faster and easier for community members who are also water 
users. Decision making, through the property rights system that allows specific 
actors and users to access water and governs the DWSS will be analysed in the 
following subsection.  
2.4.3	  Decision	  making	  and	  the	  property	  rights	  system	  
According to the natural resource management literature, local institutions in 
postcolonial countries seem to be more involved than upper administrative levels 
in the administration of local natural resources. However, following the thinking 
of Sikor (2008), giving this responsibility to lower levels of government is not 
enough. A coordination of effort and responsibility by the customary and official 
institutions involved is required to make and implement decisions (ibid). 
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Governance implies collective decision-making, especially in customary 
governance where community institutions take into consideration the plurality of 
actors involved in the DWSS − for example householders, domestic water users, 
well proprietors, water vendors, official water institutions and water committees − 
in order to better govern and manage the distribution of the DWSS. This 
characteristic is common in post-colonial countries. Customary governance 
legitimises these actors’ decision-making and actions. Customary community 
governance of the DWSS aims to benefit water users through good service 
coverage, service provision, flexibility in its collective decision-making and 
implementation.  
Although governance implies collective decision-making, there are struggles that 
make this process vulnerable. Conflicts emerge when there is not consensus in the 
decisions making and these are exacerbated by competition for the distribution of 
natural resources among actors coexisting in the same area. The main problem of 
governance, as perceived by the different disciplines, indicates that ‘enfor[c]ement 
and regulation failures mean that agreements when reached cannot be 
implemented’ (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009: 224; Wilder, 2010). The solution may 
lie in strengthening the authority without excluding the voices and participation of 
individuals and stakeholders (Bakker et al., 2008; Roy, 2008; Bobbio, 2009).  
Individuals who come together to make decisions in customary communities are 
not usually members of official institutions and they are not necessarily state 
representatives. Customary authorities rely on their autonomy and custom or 
social convention to solve community problems such as the provision of the 
DWSS. Customary institutions are recognised as legitimate by the members of the 
community to which they belong, and their decisions are recognised and validated 
by the community. 
In communities organised by custom, water authorities usually work under a 
governance system that is frequently characterised by autonomy and plurality. 
This means they make decisions without waiting for the approval of an official 
institution. Decisions are made according what is required and approved by a 
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majority of community members. Despite this autonomy, some customary 
communities additionally maintain managerial agreements with the municipal 
decentralised water institution, or even a local private water well proprietor. 
In Latin American countries from the Andean region; for example, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Peru and also Mexico, customary institutions hold the rights to manage 
and provide the DWSS at community level (Boelens, 2008; Hoffmann, et al., 
2003). These institutions are frequently recognised by community members as the 
main authority in the community with the power for carrying out DWSS projects. 
This thesis claims as important the recognition of communities’ power to maintain 
control over water resources and their administration. To understand the 
legitimacy of these customary institutions it is important considering not only the 
rules encompassed within legal pluralism but also the legitimate recognition of 
their water rights. 
Decision-making, also related to the way in which a customary community is 
organised – in terms of authority, credibility, and legitimacy – is related to the 
property rights system, which associates holders’ positions with their property 
rights either legitimate or not as well as their right to access water even when they 
do not hold any of the property rights proposed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). 
The position a water user or any other actor holds range from owner, proprietor, 
authorised claimant, authorised user and authorised entrants. Each position gives 
the actor a right to benefit from water: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion 
and/or alienation to sell water. The interaction between rights holders and types of 
rights is defined as the property rights system (PRS) (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; 
Ostrom, 2001). This PRS is analysed below. 
2.4.3.1 Property rights systems 
‘Property is part of a larger picture of access to resources, whether legally 
recognised or not’ (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 2). Property refers to those claims that 
are considered legitimate by legitimate social actors. Actors are linked through 
social relations, and property is shaped by enforceable claims to the use or benefit 
of something (ibid). Property relations involve different types of social actors such 
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as individuals and social groups or institutions (Von Benda-Beckmann, Von 
Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006; Sikor and Lund, 2009). 
There are two main struggles related to property in this context: first, the 
constitution of authority; and secondly, access to resources. In postcolonial 
countries, whose organisation usually involves the participation of legal plural 
institutions, water users and water institutions attempt to ‘secure rights to natural 
resources by having their access claims recognised as legitimate property by a 
politico-legal institution’ (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 1). Property is recognised as 
such if socially legitimate institutions sanction it. The recognition of water users 
and institutions property involves the institutions that recognise its property and 
its authority over water (Sikor and Lund, 2009). In addition, customary politico-
legal institutions are legitimised to govern or to manage water if social institutions 
perceive they are able to interpret the social norms − for example the property 
rights.  
Rights are the ‘legitimate social and economic interests’ regarding control over 
and access to specific resources (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995). In this sense, 
property rights are seen as the normative and actual conceptualisation of property 
relationships between groups of persons and property holders (Von Benda-
Beckmann, 1995; Agrawal, 2001; Roth et al., 2005). In the case of DWSS, the 
main dynamic of water users is securing their access to natural resources by 
claiming recognition of their water rights and the service management as 
legitimate property. This recognition of property is sanctioned by a politico-legal 
institution which consequently recognises water users’ authority (Sikor and Lund, 
2009).  
To understand property rights, I consider the Property Rights System (PRS) 
proposed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom (2001), which provides an 
understanding of the function of five types of rights − access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation. These are associated with diverse rights 
holders including authorised entrants, users, claimants, proprietors and owners in 
a plural legal system (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992: 249). Table 2.1 shows the types 
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of property rights granted to right holders regarding the use and management of 
DWSS. 
Table	  2.1	  Types	  of	  rights	  associated	  with	  holders’	  positions:	  the	  Property	  Rights	  
System	  (PRS)	  
Positions 
PRS Owner Proprietor 
Authorized 
claimant 
Authorized 
user 
Authorized 
entrant 
Access X X X X X 
Withdrawal X X X X  
Management X X X   
Exclusion X X    
Alienation X     
Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992); Ostrom (2001). 
This scheme is used to understand and analyse property rights over DWSS at 
community level. According to the literature, the PRS included above has been 
identified in official water institutions structure. However, in customary 
institutions there are also rights in action that are not included in table 2.1 neither 
legitimised by water authority but that let unauthorised users access water in 
reality. This point will be explained and proved later on in chapter six of this 
thesis. Thus, it is relevant to recognise there are rights in action of community 
members and water committees to use water, which are differently recognised by 
customary institutions, as it was explained in section 2.3.2. Holders/actors can 
exercise these rights according to their position. This property rights scheme 
offers different terms to use for analysing the realities of rights in use in 
customary communities that manage and govern drinking water. 
Property rights over water resources and water rights issues have gained attention 
in governance discourse generated at international conferences about water 
resources (Rogers, 2002; World Water Council, 2005; Smets, 2006; Wilder and 
Romero Lankao, 2006; Yuling and Lein, 2010). The World Water Council and 
WHO consider that the world population should have right to water (World Water 
Council, 2005; WHO, 2007). There is also discussion about the economic and 
human aspects of water. These international institutions wonder whether water 
should be considered a human right, an economic resource, or an economic and 
social good to make DWSS available to the households (Gleick, 1996; Briscoe, 
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1997; Brikké and Rojas, 2001; Gleick, 2003; Biswas and Tortajada, 2010; 
Tortajada, 2010). This section theorised about property rights system; thus, the 
following subsection theorises about water rights. 
2.4.3.2 Water rights 
In order to conceptualise water rights it is necessary to first explain that rights are 
actions authorised by a legitimate water institution or acknowledged by water 
users (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). A right is also defined as the product of rules. 
Rights involve actions supported, enforced or condoned by the government or by 
society through law, custom or convention (Ribot, 1998). Linking the definition of 
rights to water resources, water rights are conceptualised as the ‘right or 
permission that provides its holder with the authorization to take water from a 
particular source’ (Beccar et al., 2002: 11). Water rights also define the authorised 
right to use water and/or the water infrastructure. This also includes the right to 
the system of water allocation (Roth et al., 2005; Boelens, 2008). 
For authors working with concepts of common property or legal anthropological 
perspectives, water rights can be seen as ‘bundles of rights’ that include several 
types of rights (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995; Agrawal, 2001). Water rights 
diverge across property regimes, legal orders or mechanisms, and cultures with 
specific meanings and values regarding water resources (Roth et al., 2005). Water 
rights are also defined as the ‘claims to use, derive income from, or control water 
by individuals or groups that are recognised as legitimate by a larger collectivity 
than the claimants and that are protected through a form of law,’ either official or 
customary (Roth et al., 2005: 241). Based in the definitions of previous concepts, 
this research acknowledge water rights as the claim or permission that authorises 
holders rights to take water from a particular source, to use it, or to obtain 
economic benefits from it. 
The rights, rules and duties related to drinking water are linked to a diversity of 
socio-legal frameworks at the community, local, national and international level, 
which are embedded in a plurality of local and community organisational forms 
for regulating and distributing the DWSS (Boelens, 2008). In this sense, water 
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rights are not necessarily regulated by a written law; some actors have gained 
water rights through the continuous physical labor they have provided or through 
historic use of the water (Boelens, 2008).  
Water rights have emerged over many years of negotiations about the historical 
use of labour investment (Boelens and Zwarteveen, 2005; Boelens, 2008). 
Nevertheless, in neo-liberal thinking, water rights are closely associated with 
discourses of privatisation, which consider that drinking water should be 
transferable and marketable in order to be economically efficient. These market-
based demands allow water to be priced. According to these neoliberal trends 
water rights are gained through payment for those rights rather than through many 
years of labour or negotiations between the society and the authority (ibid). In 
countries like Mexico the political and economic power structure has an important 
influence on the allocation of rights; specially, formal water rights. However, 
there are also legitimate property rights accepted at community level. It will be 
important analysing the types of water rights accepted in communities (Boelens, 
2008). 
There are communities where socio-legal institutions legitimise community water 
rights. The water rights of a community are generally recognised by the politico-
legal institutions related to water governance, allowing customary institutions and 
users to manage water either to provide the DWSS or to irrigate their lands. 
Holding water rights does not mean that the same institution is always allowed to 
adopt full responsibility for organising, managing and collecting user payments. 
By contrast, differently legitimised institutions might share some activities. 
Scholars have found two main types of rights that legitimate the mechanisms to 
govern; first, territorial rights, which are related to the organisation of water users 
and the distribution of water amongst them (Beccar et al., 2002); for example 
community sense, water committee organisation, and proprietors of a water well. 
Second, historical and cultural rights gained through labour investment and 
cultural resources in the construction of the water infrastructure; for example 
knowledge, skills, self-esteem, property arrangements, power relations and 
obligations (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995; Beccar et al., 2002; Chimhowu and 
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Woodhouse, 2006; Boelens, 2008; Sikor and Lund, 2009). Labour investment, has 
been helpful in many cases for identifying who in a community has the right to 
use water and who can influence the decision-making process (Boelens and 
Zwarteveen, 2005; Boelens, 2008). With this differentiation and when dealing 
with water governance, it is possible to refer to an alternative classification of 
rights: collective and individual – or household – rights. Collective rights refer to 
the rights of a group of users. By contrast, individual rights denote the rights held 
by single householder water users (ibid). 
Water rights holders may be individuals or groups of people, who obtain 
legitimacy from a variety of legal plural mechanisms such as official permission 
or concession title to withdraw water from a natural water body, payment for the 
water they consume as users, or community meetings to legitimate rights of a 
water institution member; such as a water committee member. When a community 
member is a legitimate one s/he agrees to work for the community as water 
committee member. The community population through customary or religious 
law or through social and political law recognise and accepts water committee 
members or external suppliers as individual water providers. Though, when there 
is no recognition it is difficult for an individual or an external group of suppliers 
have access to water resources to provide a community service because 
community members prefer keeping water rights under community control rather 
than open it to external inhabitants. This is because community members care 
about the ownership sense and property of water, wells, and the infrastructure. 
In many contexts, water rights go beyond ‘formal’ practices (Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004; Boelens, 2008; Matsinhe et al., 2008). This means, there are also 
‘rights in action’ that could be classified as the unauthorised use of water 
resources. Such rights are not usually legitimated by either customary or official 
authorities but may be legitimated by community members. Rights in action are 
the ‘actual’ or ‘real’ social relationships and particular contexts played out in a 
territory not connected to official permission. The institution that authorises rights 
to water does not usually regulate rights in action, which are socially accepted by 
custom or convention (Boelens, 2008: 486).  
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The following section discusses the concept of water governance and its 
relationship to decentralisation, community management issues and difficulties in 
governing water. 
2.5	  Water	  governance	  
With the increasing use of notions of governance, the governance concept has also 
been applied to the water sector through the conceptualisation of water 
governance. The Mexican president Vicente Fox, in the period 2000-2006, stated 
in his inaugural discourse at the Fourth World Water Forum that water should be 
considered a public good (Fox-Quesada, 2006a). According to the official and 
water experts’ perspective (Savenije, 2002; Savenije, 2002b; Mugabi and Njiru, 
2006; CONAGUA, 2008b), providing drinking water as a public good may be 
achieved not only through allocation and distribution of DWSS but also through 
water governance, which implies coordination, decision making and the operation 
of institutions at different hierarchical levels. 
Diverse attempts have been made to define water governance. However, there is 
no agreement on a single definition. Water governance concepts vary according to 
the institutions and scholars working with water resources. Nevertheless, they all 
have common variables such as rules, decision making, the plurality of actors, 
management, water resources, provision of water services and hierarchical levels. 
Water governance emerged to meet the challenges of management and 
administration of water resources faced by the State (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 
2000; Martínez Omaña, 2002; Mukherji and Shah, 2005; Allouche, 2007; Franks 
and Cleaver, 2007; Alsharif, Feroz et al., 2008; Biswas and Tortajada, 2010; 
Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 2010; Tortajada, 2010; Wilder, 2010; Biswas and 
Tortajada, 2010b), which was conventionally recognised as responsible for the 
provision of public services. The Global Water Partnership (GWP) states that 
‘water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, 
and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society’ (GWP, 2003: 2). 
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The GWP concept of water governance involves the participation of different 
actors who shape the roles and responsibilities of the public sector, civil society, 
private sector and individuals in the management and development of water 
resources at different levels (Sandoval Minero, 2007). In the concept of 
governance of the DWSS used in this thesis there are also actors from the public 
sector, i.e. AyST -the decentralised water institution; civil society are those 
community groups that organise and govern the provision of drinking water, i.e. 
water committees and community members organised in groups; private sector is 
represented by local water vendors and well proprietors; and individuals are those 
domestic water users. The reason to name differently the actors identified by the 
GWP and those identified in my fieldwork depend on the precise actors identified 
at community level that can also be labelled and located in a category of those 
proposed by the GWP. The actions carried out by the different actors should be 
adapted to specific political context, laws, regulations, institutions, rules, financial 
mechanisms, civil society development and consumer rights (ibid).  
As defned governance and water governance concepts involves the participation 
of multiple actors. Mukherji and Shah (2005) propose a scenario in which every 
actor should have a specific level of involvement within the water governance 
system to achieve positive outcomes. This proposed scenario suggest the 
recognition and allocation of more power to small communities and the reduction 
of power to large institutions; this perspective is also shared by Gregersen et al. 
(2007) who suggest governing by giving and recognising more power to lower 
levels. Rogers (2002), by contrast, sees governance as part of the physical and 
institutional infrastructure without considering the level of involvement of official 
and customary institutions at community, state, or national level. 
Thus, based on the local governance perspective, Mukherji and Shah (Ibid) 
illustrate that local governments, civil society and markets might have more 
participation in the water governance to obtain positive governance and 
management results. By contrast, they suggest central government should reduce 
its functions and share some responsibilities with other actors. The same scenario 
could be applied to the governance of the DWSS taking into account the 
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particularities of individual cases (Mukherji and Shah, 2005). The following 
figure shows the recommended involvement for the DWSS at community level. 
Figure	  2.2	  Desired	  water	  governance	  for	  the	  DWSS	  at	  community	  level	  
 
Source: Adapted from Mukherji and Shah (2005: 340) taking into account those actors related to 
the water governance and management of the DWSS at community level within the case studies. 
Figure 2.2 is useful for understanding current relations in the governance of water. 
The dotted circle lines show the present relationships between the actors in water 
governance. The unbroken circles denote the desired level of involvement of 
every actor interacting at any hierarchical and horizontal level of water 
governance. This figure suggests an alternative way of involving the institutions 
governing the DWSS with a reduction in decision-making and management 
responsibility at the international and national level and a greater level of 
involvement by civil society, local government, community self-governments and 
markets for better outcomes (Mukherji and Shah, 2005). In addition, it suggests 
greater level of involvement and communication between civil society and 
community self-governments. Civil society and markets need to relate to national 
central government, and central government and community self-government 
need to relate to each other. 
There are two main problems constraining the interaction of the actors involved 
and limiting the possibility of reaching the desired scenario framed in figure 2.2. 
The first limitation is the strong hierarchical structure currently governing water in 
most Latin American countries, where international and national governments 
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have a greater level of involvement in decision-making than local and community 
level. This is because national governments are required to fulfil international 
requirements of institutions such as the World Bank or the InterAmerican 
Development Bank as a condition of the budgetary loans borrowed by each 
country.  
In Mexico, the World Bank asked as a condition of a loan to elaborate a national 
water law complying with international policies in which water had to be 
considered an economic resource and therefore priced. Nevertheless, some 
Mexican communities decided to maintain free of price their water resources even 
when international policies asked for it. The communities studied decided to price 
and charge for the DWSS. And groundwater within them is entirely governed, 
managed and legitimised by custom. National institutions also looked for the 
installation of a piped water network. Though, the adapting capacity to a piped 
water network has been slow; not all Mexican communities were immediately 
adapted to this requirement because their structure and needs were different to the 
ones established at national and international level. Some of them seem to better 
manage their groundwater when community householders had their own water 
well at home. 
The second is the extent of involvement of community institutions in governing 
and making decisions. Community self-governments are frequently less 
incorporated than local and national governments in the water governance because 
there is no total recognition by the official-central government of their role in 
organising the DWSS. However, in Mexico there are cases where community self-
governments take the responsibility of the total or partial management of the 
provision of the DWSS to community households and to maintain a water 
committee legitimised by custom. From this perspective, self-sufficient 
community institutions need to be recognised as able to govern and control the 
water available and provide the DWSS. An important factor of water governance 
is the community management of drinking water. It is important to recognise the 
participation and decision-making of individuals, society groups and customary 
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institutions in order to achieving positive outcomes in the governance and 
management of it. 
In this way, water governance and water management discourses have emerged to 
facilitate different users and stakeholders’ understanding of the organisation, 
allocation and distribution of responsibilities for surface and underground water. 
Water governance has been proposed as a solution to multiple challenges to the 
organisational structures that define a community, a region, or a country and 
involves different politico-legal institutions. Governing water is not easy because 
there are as many interests as actors in a water system. 
Rogers (2002) sees water governance as just part of the physical and institutional 
infrastructure that is also part of the general aspect of social cooperation. 
According to this perspective the governance of water is part of a complex system 
of interactions among stakeholders, local actors and institutions. It is also part of 
the ability of these groups of actors to communicate with each other, classify the 
input and output of resources and energies and use their skills to make decisions 
that most benefit both the actors and the environment (Rogers, 2002). However, 
even with all the tools used in the governance process there can be overlaps or 
omission of information and activities among institutions (ibid).  
There is a wide range of conflicts related to the ways in which water is governed 
and managed, especially when national sovereignty, social values and political 
ideology interact and there is no consensus on decisions. These conflicts can have 
a significant impact on the achievement of good water governance. Good 
governance of drinking water, as understood in this research, takes into account 
not only appropriate decision making considering users participation but also fast 
institutional answers to users’ enquiries; for example, providing water with 
timeliness, quantity, appropriate infrastructure and methods for payments 
collection. The barriers to good governance usually grow when water rights are 
involved in the process of defining water allocation and distribution and when 
corruption is involved in the use of water resources (Gregersen et al., 2007). 
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Official, customary and private politico-legal institutions play an important role in 
water governance and water management responsibilities. Institutions at different 
administrative levels are responsible for water governance (Rogers, 2002). Water 
institutions make decisions, allocate responsibilities to specific individuals, 
institutions or people responsible at lower governmental levels, and customary 
institutions. They also organise water and financial resources to develop water-
related activities such as provision of the DWSS. Recent studies about politico-
legal institutions claim that analysis of the institutional context can enhance 
institutions’ ability to govern and promote the devolution of authority for 
managing water resources to the lowest government level (Gregersen et al., 2007).  
Gregersen et al’s (2007) Australian case study reports that official government 
does not determine how water is allocated or distributed. Instead, it allows local 
and community governments to organise how water is used and by whom, 
recognising that local and community actors have a greater understanding of the 
local context and particularities of the resource’s availability which allows them to 
allocate and use the resource accordingly. Thus recognition of customary 
institutions created by community members is relevant to understanding the 
governance of the DWSS at community level. 
It is important to take into account that in the governance of water, the proposal of 
decentralising water institutions and privatising has resulted not necessarily in 
decentralisation but quite often in the re-allocation of responsibilities to lower 
governmental levels and also to community level (Liverman, 2004; Wilder and 
Romero Lankao, 2006). In Latin American countries, decentralisation has not 
necessarily been achieved in most of the cases even when it was proposed as part 
of national public policies and decentralisation discourses. Instead water 
institutions have been decentred. This means that water institutions maintain the 
official way of working and making decisions of central government but at 
different hierarchical levels and decentred institutions keep the same 
organisational structure.  
In the 1990s some Latin American countries from the Andean region, as well as 
Mexico, decentralised natural resources management and some of these countries 
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privatised them. This is the case of Bolivia that aimed to promote property rights 
as a way to protect scarce resources such as water, forest, land, biodiversity and 
fisheries (Boelens and Zwarteveen, 2005; Boelens, 2008; Lehoucq et al., 2005). 
The way these Latin American countries used to protect natural resources and 
justify decentralisation or privatisation was with the acceptance of neo-liberal 
models. The market was a priority; thus, pricing natural resources with the label of 
environmental sustainability was the approach used to utopically protect natural 
resources (Liverman, 2004). This section focused in water governance and 
decentralisation. The following section complements this chapter and focuses in 
the management of the DWSS by community institutions. 
2.6	  Community	  management	  of	  drinking	  water	  
‘Community management, a central part of community development, has gained 
wide acceptance among service providers as a result of the failure of the top-down 
approach to community development’ (Doe and Khan, 2004: 360). Community 
management is a bottom-up development approach where community members 
take the decisions and have control of the management, operation and 
maintenance of their community’s water system (Doe and Khan, 2004; Harvey 
and Reed, 2007).  
Boelens (2008) lists the main characteristics that influence the use of water 
resources as control of the technical, organisational or socioeconomic and political 
domains. Some scholars’ (Bah, 1992; Doe and Khan, 2004; Harvey and Reed, 
2007) support the view that community management may be the most convenient 
way to decentralise responsibility for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of 
the DWSS from central government to community management. Furthermore, 
these scholars argue, communities should own the water facilities and 
infrastructure for its O&M (Boelens, 2008). A relevant aspect in the recognition 
and encouragement of community management and adoption of responsibility to 
provide the DWSS is that community members should demonstrate a genuine 
need to and interest in assuming these responsibilities. According to this 
perspective, people should be motivated to organise themselves to manage their 
own DWSS (Bah, 1992). 
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Gregersen et al. (2007) suggest that the community management of water requires 
to be addressed by water governance studies to better understand the ways in 
which water resources are organised and distributed. In some communities the 
governance body, represented by a customary water committee, assumes total 
responsibility for DWSS itself and its management, infrastructure maintenance 
and repairs (Kyessi, 2005), and frequently the State government remains 
uninvolved in the service.  
At the community level, the legitimacy of the governance model largely depends 
on the quality of the DWSS provided to community members by the water 
committee, the frequency of this provision, and the way in which the service is 
supplied to cover the requirements of the population (Von Benda-Beckmann, 
1995; Welch, 2002; Roth et al., 2005). 
In community management legitimacy is important because it brings recognition 
of the water committee, as customary institution, by community members. If there 
is no representation and legitimacy it is difficult for the community governing 
institution to control and regulate the management of economic and non-economic 
water resources (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995; Welch, 2002; Roth et al., 2005; 
Bobbio, 2009). According to Welch (2002) better outcomes can be achieved at the 
local level if local governments are open to including participation and thus being 
inclusive of diverse groups or actors. This also applies at the community level. 
However, water governance at the community level has its own difficulties, as 
discussed below. 
2.7	  Difficulties	  faced	  in	  community	  water	  governance	  
Scholars have suggested that governments look for new governance strategies that 
challenge the new social, ecological and economic dynamics, especially regarding 
the provision of services around specific natural resources (González-Villarreal et 
al., 2006). In the provision of drinking water the challenges frequently faced by 
community institutions relate to social, economic, and sometimes political 
community dynamics, as well as the dynamics of the institutions that govern and 
manage the DWSS at state, municipal and community level. 
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One of the main problems related to water governance is associated with the 
extent of actors’ involvement in every administrative level as well as in the 
interaction among actors. The levels of involvement are conceptualised as vertical 
and horizontal (Chandhoke, 2003; Mukherji and Shah, 2005; Duit and Galaz, 
2008; Armitage, 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). In the institutional analysis of water 
governance of Ostrom (2005: 59), three levels of action are identified at 
community level: 1) operational, where individuals’ actions regarding water use 
have to be analysed; 2) collective choice, where groups of individuals collectively 
develop common rules and strategies of water use; and constitutional, where 
formal rules for the use of water become law (Ostrom, 2005: 59).  
Generally, central governments are characterised as being more important in terms 
of power and decision making than local and community governments. However, 
in practice power is not always held by central governments (formal) but by a 
community government (informal). A community government plays an active role 
in decision making. In this case, community members and its customary 
institutions assume responsibility for making common decisions and leading the 
operation of those decisions, especially when it comes to the provision of public 
services; for example, the DWSS. There are several cases in which not only the 
local level but also the community sphere is active in providing the DWSS to 
community members’ households. This is the case of San Francisco, Santiaguito, 
and San Mateo, where members of these communities are organised in customary 
community institutions to adopt the challenge for governing a networked piped 
DWSS. Adopting this challenge, customary institutions maintain the property 
rights over water resources and its management. 
Most water sector problems occur in the ‘misallocation of roles and 
responsibilities assigned to various organizations that are in the business of 
governing groundwater [and surface water]’ (Mukherji and Shah, 2005: 339). 
Good governance would consider the appropriate allocation of responsibilities, 
decision making, and the quick response to users’ demands. Unfortunately, when 
it comes to the provision of a quality DWSS the achievement of positive 
outcomes remains partially unsolved. A high-quality DWSS is understood as 
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offering water with enough pressure, volume, continuity and water-quality, 
making fast repairs to the system, when necessary, in order to quickly respond to 
users’ demands (Bourguett Ortíz, et al. 2007). Therefore, good quality operations 
include timeliness in the delivering process, maintaining the water infrastructure 
in optimal condition, maintain updated the system for pricing and bill collection 
for prompt recovery of water users’ payments which consequently improve the 
quality of the DWSS received by domestic water users (Bourguett Ortíz et al., 
2007). 
In addition, Babel et al. (2010) recommends taking into account the quality of 
water pipes, leakage reduction, penalties for illegal connections and keeping 
tariffs at a reasonable price to maintain or improve quality in the DWSS . The 
quality of the DWSS should not only benefit householders but also improve 
financial management of the water institution and then infrastructure maintenance 
of the DWSS. 
Quality of the DWSS usually implicates considering the allocation of quantities of 
water to cover users’ needs. Quality of the DWSS is not the same as water quality. 
Therefore, one more difficulty faced by customary water institutions is related to 
the quantity of water provided through the DWSS. A minimum amount of 50 
litres per person per day is recommended to cover basic needs (Gleick, 1996; 
Abrams, 2001). Kumar and Managi (2010) suggest considering the hours of water 
supply, sufficient water pressure, predictability of the DWSS and purity of the 
water (Kumar and Managi, 2010) as indicators that might affect the amount of 
water delivered and then the quality of the service. 
At community level, it is a challenge the DWSS because it requires both, quality 
and quantity. If there is quality in the service it means water is provided with 
enough quantity and maybe the necessary characteristics of pressure and 
timeliness. However, the provision of only quantity does not mean the service has 
quality. Generally, the communities’ case studies have sufficient groundwater 
resources; nevertheless, the provision might not be guaranteed everyday. In these 
cases quantity of water available and provided does not mean there is an 
appropriate provision of a quality and good DWSS. Thus, domestic water users 
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have dealt with this challenge (quality-quantity of the DWSS) buying drinking 
water or obtaining it from different sources. 
Low-quality of DWSS is exposed by cisterns and roof water reservoirs installed or 
built to store drinking water and make it available with enough pressure 
(Bourguett Ortíz et al., 2007). The installation of these reservoirs generates extra 
expenses for householders. Bourguett Ortíz et al. (2007) point out consumption of 
bottled water for drinking as another indicator of the low quality of the DWSS. 
All the extra expenses that domestic water users have to pay for water are 
therefore reflected in their willingness to pay for the DWSS. Thus, governance of 
the DWSS gets the attention of water institutions to organise and work towards 
appropriate allocation and distribution of drinking water to users. The analysis and 
discussion of the governance of the DWSS at community level is addressed in the 
subsequent empirical chapters. The following chapter explains the research 
methods and techniques used for the data collection and analysis. 
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Chapter	  3.	  Research	  strategy:	  Approaches	  and	  Methods	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
This chapter explains the methodology used in this research to collect and analyse 
data related to the governance of the DWSS in three case study communities. The 
chapter is divided into five main sections. First, it focuses on the importance of 
the use of multiple case studies as a research technique; next, it introduces the 
selected case study area, including the geographical location. It then describes the 
methods and techniques used for the primary and secondary data collection, 
followed by discussion of the data analysis; and finally some conclusions are 
drawn. 
The case studies focus on three communities − San Francisco, San Mateo, and 
Santiaguito − that are located in a peri-urban area. The reasons for choosing these 
communities were based on their customary organisation, operation, maintenance, 
management, and decision making in the governance of the DWSS.  
In these communities its members have entrusted their water institution with 
responsibility for organising how drinking water is supplied to every household. 
The customary authority, integrated in a water committee, has the community’s 
consent to govern and manage ground water. Even though customary authorities 
have domestic water users approval both actors maintain communication to agree 
basic topics such as the water tariff, periods of payment, days of service, and the 
period in which the water committee will be heading the DWSS that usually is for 
an average period of a year.  
3.2	  The	  research	  practice:	  use	  of	  a	  multiple	  case	  study	  approach	  
Case study research is a distinctive method for obtaining empirical data for social 
research (Yin 2009). ‘A case study is an in-depth description and analysis of a 
single bounded system’ (Merriam 2010: 456). This system might be a unit, a 
community or a government institution. A qualitative case study seeks to 
understand how individuals construct the meaning of an event or activity that 
occurs within their surroundings (ibid). Case studies of governance research have 
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been based on in-depth research into real-world events. Governance theory can be 
better understood when the research is based on detailed analysis of case studies, 
that can provide insightful evidence of relevant governance principles (Jentoft 
2007).  
On the one hand, doing case study research requires time and enough money to 
undertake the necessary visits, operations, and other required techniques. Jentoft 
(2007) suggests limiting the number of operation settings to be studied and 
compared in researches that use case studies. Case studies allow for the 
comparison of complex settings: for example, type of community organisation, 
the main authorities related to water administration, the availability of drinking 
water, problems with payment for a service, and the actors involved in a DWSS. 
Triangulation is an important way of comparing and contrasting different 
elements, environments, or realities (Lewis 1998; Pawluch 2005). Jentoft (2007) 
suggests an iterative triangulation where there is a large quantity of literature, case 
evidence, and intuition (Jentoft 2007). Triangulation of data allows refining 
conceptual definitions and strengthens the validity of the research and the 
testability of the theory under investigation. In this research triangulation was 
required to compare information provided by water representatives from an 
official institution, customary water committee members, domestic water users 
and small private vendors of drinking water.  
On the other hand, too specific and detailed analysis can lead to difficulties when 
generalising individual case studies. The consideration of multiple cases let 
identifying similar patterns and decisions in water governance (Pahl-Wostl 2009). 
Therefore, this research required multiple case studies to understand the 
governance of the DWSS at community level. I decided on a multiple case study 
analysis focusing on three communities in order to contribute with to understand 
the way in which customary institutions are organised to rule the DWSS, provide 
it, and manage it. The selection of three communities helps to collect sufficient 
information about the provision of drinking water to do an accurate analysis of 
information and additionally situate my work on community-managed drinking 
water systems in Mexico. 
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The advantage of doing case study research in qualitative studies is its ‘ability to 
deal with a full variety of evidence [sources] – documents, interviews, and 
observation’ that allow to data triangulation (Yin 2009: 11). Yin states that, ‘a 
good case study will…use as many sources as possible’ (Yin 2009: 101). As 
mentioned, in qualitative studies the case study technique is useful because it 
involves data collection from different sources. Before I explain the relevance of 
case studies to understanding governance, Table 3.1 shows the strengths and 
weaknesses of the sources of information considered in the development of this 
research. 
Table	  3.1	  Sources	  of	  evidence:	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  
Source of evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation 
Stable – can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
Exact – contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
event 
Broad coverage – long span of 
time, many events, many 
settings 
Retrievability – can be difficult to 
find 
Biased selectivity if data collection is 
incomplete 
Access may be deliberately withheld 
Overabundance of data 
Interviews and focus 
groups 
Targeted – focuses directly on 
case study topics 
Insightful – provides perceived 
causal inferences and 
explanations 
Bias due to ‘poorly’ articulated 
questions 
Response bias 
Inaccuracy due to poor recall 
Reflexivity – interviewee says what 
interviewer wants to hear 
Direct observations 
Reality – covers events in real 
time 
Contextual – covers context of 
‘case’ 
Time consuming 
Selectivity – broad coverage difficult 
without a team of observers 
Cost – requires hours of human 
observers’ time 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009: 102) 
Considering sthengths and weaknesses of data sources facilitate to take advantage 
of the time to obtain sufficient and reliable information from the considered 
sources, and to avoid or reduce inconsistencies in data collection. Using multiple 
sources of data to do this research let me find the evidence about governance of 
the DWSS and commnity-managed groundwater systems. In paralell, using 
multiple sources let me triangulate information in order to constrast, deny or 
accept the reliability of data.  
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3.2.1	  The	  relationship	  of	  governance	  to	  these	  case	  studies	  
Understanding community-managed water institutions dynamics to provide 
drinking water allows to contrast information and to comprehend how these 
institutions interact no only with society but also with other formal institutions. 
Through triangulation of information from these case studies it is then possible to 
relate water resources management, actors interacting, decision making and 
consensus in order to better understand governance of the DWSS. 
The methods used for this case study research were mainly qualitative. Four 
research techniques were used: interviews, focus groups, observation, and 
documentation. Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages 
depending, among other variables, on the research question. Data were collected 
from publications, official documents, and written reports. In this case study the 
researcher had no control over the events that occurred in the administration and 
distribution of water resources. The research focuses on contemporary real-life 
cases in a peri-urban context. 
The richness of the case study approach was provided by the variables used to 
analyse governance theory. The definition of governance was approached from a 
political sciences perspective. Specifically, the research focuses on customary 
governance of the DWSS provided to peri-urban communities. Information was 
collected from multiple sources to obtain a reliable understanding of the concept 
and problems of governance, and of community and government organisation of 
the DWSS. 
This study sought a wide understanding of the contextual conditions of the water 
supply service: how water is distributed, to whom, by whom, when, and for how 
long (Yin 2009). The methods used for data collection allowed me to understand 
the water authorities’ decisions about the DWSS they provide to the communities 
they represent and real-life decisions and behaviours of the actors involved. Also, 
data collected allowed me to understand domestic water users’ thoughts related to 
the quality of the DWSS that the water committee provides to community 
households. 
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The peri-urban research area is politically divided into municipalities – the lower 
administrative level –, which is further divided into communities. The three case 
study communities were San Francisco, Santiaguito, and San Mateo (see Map 3.1). 
The rationale behind the choice of these communities was that they: a) have 
similar domestic drinking water consumption practices; b) have similar 
organisation – through a customary water committee – of the administration, 
distribution and maintenance of their DWSS; c) obtain ground drinking water 
from wells; d) are settled in an the area characterised as hydrologically rich, 
allowing them to obtain enough ground water; and e) community members 
frequently do not receive the DWSS that covers their basic needs.  
Water resources are mainly contained in surface water bodies and underground 
aquifers, the latter being the main source of water extraction for human 
consumption. According to studies by DDF (1951); DGCOH (1992); and CNA 
(2001), ground water is of high quality and meets the required standards for 
human consumption and food production. 
There are differences among the three case study communities. In San Francisco 
and Santiaguito customary water institutions are responsible for the full 
management, operation, and maintainance of the piped water infrastructure, while 
in San Mateo a customary institution is responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of water infrastructure while an official decentralised institution 
manage prices and users’ payments collection. This difference is important to 
understand the interactions and level of involvement of formal and informal 
institutions and actors in the management and governance of drinking water and 
the authority to make decisions about the service they provide in the community 
they represent. Another difference is the level of community members’ trust in the 
customary water institution responsible for their DWSS. The inhabitants of 
Santiaguito and San Mateo trust their water committees more than those of San 
Francisco because their respective water committee better administer users’ 
payments. 
Analysis of a community context, using some statistics, makes it possible to 
comment on and analyse the dynamics of the regional context. This research 
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focuses on the analysis of DWSS dynamics at the community level, leading to an 
understanding of the main problems faced in the provision of the DWSS by 
governing water committees from customary communities. The following section 
explains the advantages of using different sources of information. 
3.2.2	  The	  use	  of	  documents,	  interviews,	  and	  direct	  observations	  in	  case	  studies	  
Data were collected from documents, interviews, and direct observations. The 
types of documents included were written reports about water extraction sources 
and the official concession titles granted by official government; minutes of 
decision makers and water committee meetings; administrative documents such as 
agreements between community members and their water committees; and 
scientific papers about water governance, community-management, governance of 
natural resources and water supply. The collection of accurate and reliable 
information from documental sources and from fieldwork would help as evidence 
to understand how theory about water governance, community management and 
legal pluralism are linked. Also, evidence gathered from fieldwork is useful to 
corroborate information published in documental sources. Data obtained from 
reliable interviews are useful to verify field observation, information found in 
documents, and to understand theory behind this research. 
Interviews are one of the essential sources of information from case studies 
because valuable information can be obtained through in-depth guided 
conversations, which are generally flexible, depending on the kind of open-ended 
or closed questions asked, and follow a specific line of investigation according to 
preset guidelines (Chase and Alvarez 2000; Myers and Newman 2007; Marvasti 
2010; Morgan and Hoffman 2010; Massey 2011). Interviews can be formal with a 
specific structured format, informal, or unstructured around a topic question (Frey 
and Fontana 1991). In the case study communities, semi-structured interviews 
with multiple actors – official representatives, community water committees, 
domestic water users, and local private vendors – were the main source of 
empirical data collection.  
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The snowball technique was useful for identifying key informants, with whom in-
depth interviews were essential to obtain not only the facts but also their personal 
opinions about specific events. They also provided relevant information about 
specific sources of evidence. To avoid possible biases or the personal influence of 
key informants it was necessary to corroborate and contrast their information with 
that obtained from focus groups and individual interviewees. Though, a bias that 
might influence this research is the limited quantitative evidence because, often, 
quantitative information is not either generated or up to dated by water institutions 
and users.  
Case studies research benefits from the theory that guide data collection. However, 
there is a concern attached to the use of case study technique: there can be a lack 
of rigour (Westbrook 1994) if the researcher misses systematic procedures that 
then generate equivocal evidence or biased understanding of the events, affecting 
the findings and conclusions. Therefore, triangulation is an important tool to solve, 
to reduce, or to avoid biases or misunderstandings because it allowed contrasting 
information from diverse useful sources.  
By contrast, case study research also presents advantages when information is 
obtained via formal to casual observation (Westbrook 1994; Bryman 2004; Yin 
2009). In this research I did casual direct observation on field visits and 
occasional fieldwork visits when I did interviews. I observed the quality of the 
drinking water supply infrastructure, the presence of cisterns, top reservoirs, water 
containers, bottled water, the quality of the DWSS provided and the traffic of 
water tanker containers.  
During the fieldwork period I collected evidence not only through formal and 
informal conversations but also though direct observation of households, 
infrastructure, the DWSS and community members’ activities in the three peri-
urban communities of San Francisco, Santiaguito, and San Mateo. Observation 
provided additional information and evidence about the DWSS. In order to know 
the relevance of each research questions to methodology I address the following 
subsection to characterise the useful techniques per research question. Research 
questions, methods, and techniques are the key to collect the evidence that will 
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help to understand issues about water governance in the three studied 
communities. 
3.2.2.1 Relevance of research questions to methodology 
As mentioned in chapter one, four research questions guide the development of 
this thesis. These questions are relevant to methodology because each one is 
applied to the three case studies and designed to collect qualitative information. 
Each research question required the use of a specific research technique to collect 
accurate and reliable information. In this sense, question one about what are the 
disjunctures between official and customary water institutions governing the 
DWSS? used research techniques such as: semi structured interviews, document 
analysis, focus groups, informal talks, community meetings attendance, and 
observation. 
The second question about how and why does the wide array of actors influence 
the governance of the DWSS in Mexico? used techniques such as: semi structured 
interviews, focus groups, and observation in order to collect information about the 
main actors interacting to provide drinking water at community level. The third 
question about what is a property rights system, and why is this important for 
decision making about the provision of or use of ground water for the DWSS? 
required information that was collected also using semi structured interviews, 
focus groups, and observation with the actors involved either in the management 
of drinking water or the use of it. Finally the last question about what difficulties 
do domestic water users and water institutions encounter regarding provision of 
the DWSS? was answered by collecting data through semi structured interviews, 
focus groups, informal talks, field observation and contrasting sources of 
information in order to understand the main problems faced by the main actors 
when it comes to the provision of the DWSS and the consumption of it. 
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3.3	  The	  selected	  research	  case	  studies	  
The communities selected to explore governance of the DWSS were San 
Francisco, Santiaguito, and San Mateo (see Map 3.1 for their location). All are 
located in peri-urban areas that share some characteristics. First, all three are 
characterised as having a customary water institution. This customary authority is 
the water committee responsible for governing and managing the DWSS. Three 
main individuals usually form this water committee: the president, the secretary, 
and the treasurer. The second common characteristic is that all three communities 
withdraw ground water from wells that they own. Thirdly, they are all responsible 
for basic maintenance of the drinking water supply infrastructure. 
One characteristic not shared by the three communities relates to water payment. 
Water payment is not necessarily collected and administered by the customary 
water committee but by an official water institution. In San Mateo, it is a 
decentralised institution called ‘Water and Sanitation of Toluca’ (Here after AyST) 
the one collecting and managing water payments; whereas in San Francisco and 
Santiaguito the customary water committee prices, collect, and manage the 
payment for the DWSS. Water tariffs in San Mateo are set by Toluca municipality 
city council that is responsible of water tariffs approval. Payments collection for 
the DWSS is responsibility of AyST. Analysis of these similarities and differences 
in the governance of the DWSS helps in understanding the strengths and 
challenges of customary institutions governing and providing this service to 
community households, and how these customary institutions are organised to 
prevail even in the face of pressure from formal institutions. Table 3.2 summarises 
the similarities and differences between the three communities. 
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Table	  3.2	  Similarities	  and	  differences	  among	  the	  community	  case	  studies	  
Community 
Characteristics Santiaguito 
San 
Francisco San Mateo 
Similarities 
Customary water committee 
governs and manages the 
DWSS  
Yes Yes Yes 
Water wells are property of the 
community Yes Yes Yes 
Withdrawal of ground water Yes Yes Yes 
Customary water committee 
assumes small and medium 
maintenance of water 
infrastructure 
Yes Yes Yes 
Differences 
Water tariffs and payment 
collection are responsibility of 
the water committee 
Yes Yes No 
Water tariffs and payment 
collection are responsibility of 
the official water institution 
No No Yes 
Official water institution 
assumes large repairs and 
maintenance 
No No Yes 
Community members and 
water committee assume large 
repairs 
Yes Yes No 
Source: Fieldwork 
As with other services, the DWSS is influenced by urban growth, water 
governance and the management of water resources. Frequently, urban areas 
under expansion have had to wait for decisions and economic support from the 
official water institutions to create or expand the infrastructure for provision of 
their DWSS. Unfortunately, the DWSS is not often considered as high priority 
while other public services receive greater priority (Unikel 1978; Anthony 2007). 
3.3.1	  Positionality:	  relation	  to	  the	  study	  site	  communities	  
One of the externalities this research takes into account is the positionality of the 
researcher. Positionality is a concern that might have special influence in the 
interpretation of the empirical evidence; hence, in order to achieve a better and 
more reliable information management is necessary to take into account the 
relation the researcher has with the research setting/community (Hillesheim, and 
Mechtel, 2013). My positionalitaly as a researcher is framed by my experience 
and contact with the studied communities.  
Taking into consideration that the research area is the place I lived since I was 
born and is the place my parents grew up I have a deep knowledge about social 
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dynamics and processes in the study site. I considered my positionality as an 
advantage to better understanding governance and management processes at local 
level. Also, I had access to obtain direct information from local representatives; 
especially from Santiaguito because this is the community I grew up. Additionally, 
I was allowed to easily enter to the community without major difficulties because 
I was a member of it. However, I faced a potential weakness as a female 
researcher because water committee representatives are get used to deal with male 
community members when it comes to discussions about water infrastructure and 
the specificities of the provision of the DWSS. This difficulty was faced by 
identifying myself in every interview and focus group as a student from a 
university. Also, justifying the objectives of my research and the dynamics I 
would carry out within the communities I was studying. 
I am aware that being a community member might influence my preconceptions 
and that value judgements might have biased data collection; however, I was 
aware of this position and I managed to avoid it through the theoretical analysis of 
the empirical information collected. As a consequence/consequently, this research 
generated novel and objective results. 
3.3.2	  Geographical	  location	  of	  the	  case	  study	  area	  
The case studies are situated on the periphery of the Almoloya de Juárez and 
Toluca municipalities in the state of Mexico. Santiaguito and San Francisco lie in 
the political territory of the Almoloya de Juárez municipality, and San Mateo is in 
the political territory of the Toluca municipality. Almoloya de Juárez municipality 
is located to the northwest of the Toluca municipality. Toluca is the capital city of 
the state of Mexico, which is one of the 32 states into which the country of 
Mexico is politically divided. Map 3.1 shows the geographical location of 
Santiaguito, San Francisco, and San Mateo.
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Map	  3.1	  Geographical	  location	  of	  the	  case	  study	  communities	  
 
Source: Self elaboration according to fieldwork information 
Santiaguito is to the northwest, San Francisco to the west and San Mateo to the 
northeast of Toluca city. San Francisco and Santiaguito are located on the north 
face of Xinantecatl or Nevado de Toluca volcano, a water-rich area due to its 
volcanic geology. San Mateo is northeast of the north face of this volcano. The 
geological and geographical characteristics of the locations of these communities 
cause natural ground water storage. The region has both surface and ground water 
resources, which are used not only by the ecosystem but also by the population 
and for industrial activity. The hydrological characteristics of the area let water 
institutions use ground water to provide the DWSS. The aquifers of the area are 
also used to cover the water needs of different actors; i.e local private proprietors 
and vendors – via ground water extraction –, and domestic users − via the DWSS–. 
Ground water is also used for economic activities.  
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The study area is in the Upper Lerma Basin.3 The Upper Lerma region begins in 
the headwaters of the Lerma River, east of the basin, near Toluca City and 55 km 
west of Mexico City (Wester 2008). Lerma River begins in state of Mexico 
territory and ends on the border between the state of Mexico and Guanajuato state 
(This border crosses the Solís dam in Guanajuato state). 
Contreras Dominguez et al. (1989) estimated that in the 1980s the state of Mexico 
had potential water availability of 3929.1 million m3. Of this, 18.06 percent (709.8 
million m3) is available in aquifers and surface-water bodies that are located in the 
upper Lerma region (GEM 1984), which also is water-rich. Underground water is 
the main source of drinking water for human consumption and industrial activity, 
while surface water feeds the ecosystem and unfortunately also receives industrial 
wastewater. In the Lerma region there are two main aquifers, Toluca and 
Ixtlahuaca-Atlacomulco, which receive their names because of the area around 
them. The main surface water bodies are the Lerma River, the Lerma Lakes, the 
Antonio Alzate reservoir and the Ignacio Ramírez reservoir. The study area is in 
the Toluca aquifer area, which receives water from the slopes of the Nevado de 
Toluca and also has underground water reserves. The following section describes 
the main geographical variables of the area.  
3.3.3	  Geographical	  variables	  
3.3.3.1 Geology 
The Toluca river basin is an important catchment area because of its geological 
structure and mountain-surrounded topography. Extrusive igneous rocks cover 
57.5 percent of the regional area and predominate in the region (Contreras 
Dominguez et al. 1989), 23.6 percent is covered by alluvial, residual and lake soil, 
and 18.9 percent by sedimentary rocks (SARH 1983). These characteristics enable 
the accumulation of surface and groundwater resources. The area is located in a 
volcanic system. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The whole river basin is called the Lerma-Chapala-Santiago basin and has been divided into 
three large regions: Upper, Middle, and Lower Lerma. The Upper Lerma flows through the 
highland region around Toluca city which varies from an altitude of 1900 metres above sea level 
(m.a.s.l.) to 2600 m.a.s.l. (Wester, 2008). 
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In terms of the topography, 40.8 percent of the region is mountainous, 34.5 
percent is flatlands, and 24.7 percent is hilly. The altitude varies from 2580 m.a.s.l. 
in the flatlands to 4680 m.a.s.l. at the summit of the Nevado de Toluca volcano 
(CNA 1992; IMTA 2002). 
The climate in Toluca region and along the Lerma river basin is semi-arid to sub-
humid, with 90 percent of the rain falling between May and October. The rainfall 
is variable. Statistics show an average rainfall of 722 millimetres per year 
(mm/year) between 1991 and 2001. The minimum registered was 494 mm in 1999 
and the maximum, 1022 mm in 1958 (IMTA 2002). Monthly temperatures vary 
from 14.6˚C in January to 21.3˚C in May (Wester 2008). This information shows 
that between May and October there is greater water availability due to the natural 
recharging of the aquifers. During the dry season from November to April there 
are frequent DWSS problems, which raise the price of water on the local private 
market.  
3.3.3.2 Social Variables 
Historically, the upper Lerma region has been densely populated and the Toluca 
valley less so. Population growth is an important variable when analysing the 
provision of DWSS, especially because water infrastructure requires frequent 
maintenance and continuous expansion to include new urban developments (DDF 
1951; DGCOH 1992; CCRECRL 1993; Albores Zarate 1995; CCRECRL, Aguilar 
Santelises et al. 1997; Wester 2008). Employability and income in the region vary 
according to area and the qualifications of the inhabitants. The quality of public 
services such as the DWSS also varies according to the water institutions’ level of 
re-investment in infrastructure maintenance, management and water institutions 
representatives training. 
3.3.3.3 Size of the study cases 
The case study communities’ populations and households have increased over the 
last decade, as shown in Table 3.3. The 1995 national census classified San Mateo 
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and Santiaguito as small localities4 with a rural population, while San Francisco 
was classified as a community with a mixed rural-urban population. In the next 
decade the populations of all three communities increased, there is population 
explosion in San Mateo, increasing its population by seven times, Santiaguito 
nearly doubling its population and San Francisco by 1.5 times by 2005 and double 
it by 2010. By 2005, Santiaguito was classified as a rural-urban community. 
Table	  3.3	  Population	  growth	  of	  the	  case	  study	  communities,	  1995-­‐2010	  
Community 
 
Variables 
San Mateo Santiaguito San Francisco 
1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 
Total 
population  2,253 18,871 22656 3,909 7,636 8761  8,797 13,721 16509 
Number of 
households 409 3,868 5455 741 1,229 1633 1,671 3,035 5869 
Average 
household size 5.5 4 4.7 5.3 5 4.5 5.3 5 4 
Source: INEGI (1996); INEGI (2005); INEGI (2011). 
By 2005, the urbanisation of the territory and the water requirements of these 
communities – classified in 2005 as ‘small cities’ because of their population size 
and mixed rural-urban population – had changed. By 2010, field observation and 
statistical projections had produced evidence of further population growth and 
urban expansion in these peri-urban cities (INEGI 2011a). Therefore, demand for 
natural resources increased. The population also required more infrastructures to 
provide public services such as the DWSS, drainage, electricity and roads. This 
thesis only focuses in the provision of the DWSS. Drinking water is an 
indispensable resource for human consumption (Gleick 1996; Gleick 2007) which 
requires the governance and management of water institutions according to 
population requirements.  
There were problems for formal and informal water institutions with supplying a 
drinking water service to these expanding areas due to the rapid population 
growth and urban expansion. Suppliers could not meet the increased demand and 
water committees and even municipalities were unable to adapt to external 
urbanisation changes fast enough (Aguilar and Ward 2003; Mulwafu, Chipeta et 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The terms locality and community are used interchangeably to name communities that share 
similar characteristics.  
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al. 2003). Urbanisation patterns were rapidly modified because of massive 
housing development. New housing development companies failed to meet their 
legal responsibility to ensure a DWSS to every newly-built house. These private 
developers should only be given building permission after demonstrating that they 
can ensure that the upcoming urban population will be provided with a drinking 
water service for at least ten years. They have failed in this through 
mismanagement and corruption. The municipal water authority recognises that:  
“There are illegal payments in urban residential developments. Illegal payments are 
offered by residential developers to government employees to get permission to 
continue building houses” (Municipal water representative (AyST), Toluca, May 
2009). 
Peri-urban communities have frequent and recurrent problems to receive the 
DWSS because of the inconveniences such as the above. There are also 
managerial problems in the provision of the DWSS that are directly related to the 
financial constraints and administrative procedures of the water institutions 
concerned. 
The number of houses in Santiaguito and San Francisco nearly doubled between 
1995 and 2005, resulting in further demand of the DWSS. In San Mateo it 
increased nine fold because of the attractiveness of its location close to the 
industrial area, not only for people working in the Toluca-Mexico industrial 
corridor and industrial parks in the area but also for construction companies 
(Martínez Omaña 2002). While the number of houses increased, average 
household size decreased in all three communities. The following section 
introduces the rationale to choice the case study communities. 
3.3.3.4 Choice of Research Site 
The study area is known for its variety of natural resources – water, soil, forest, 
grassland, and mountain vegetation –, and because its weather, soil, and water 
conditions make it a rich area for agriculture. It is located in one of central 
Mexico’s water-rich areas (SARH 1980; CNA 1992; Rudolph et al. 2006; 
Rudolph et al. 2007). Its water resources not only make it suitable for the 
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development of economic activities but also attractive for population settlement 
(Contreras Dominguez et al. 1989; Camacho Pichardo 2007). 
The main criteria for choosing this geographical space for my research include, 
inter alia, five relevant factors. Firstly, the aquifer formation and the mountain 
system surrounding the area facilitate the concentration of large quantities of 
water in the region. This is relevant to understanding that water supply problems 
are not always due to a natural water scarcity problem but can be anthropogenic 
(Mehta 2003) due to limitations in the management of the DWSS. The area’s 
geological structure and climate variables enable aquifer recharge, facilitating 
water availability and its withdrawal.  
Secondly, the area was chosen because it contains cities under expansion and 
urban growth requiring drinking water to sustain the population. The case studies 
act as samples in the quest to understand how the main components of the 
governance concept interact in peri-urban cities. In the study area actors, decision 
making and rules continuously interact in the governance of the DWSS. 
Thirdly, the site is attractive for research because of the governance systems 
currently in place for the administration, operation, and maintenance of the 
underground water resources. There is not only an official but also a customary 
water governance regime. Customary systems are particularly used for governing 
the DWSS at community level. They are responsible for drinking water 
administration and supplying to community domestic users. Official and 
customary water institutions maintain a managerial relationship, which varies in 
every community. Therefore, it is important to understand the extent of the 
involvement of both water institutions in community decision making. 
Fourthly, this study site is relevant because even when the area has enough water 
resources to supply drinking water there are still problems in providing the DWSS. 
Inhabitants of peri-urban communities frequently face non-provision of the 
DWSS and low water pressure, and consequently water insufficiency problems 
with multiple causes. The main problem is the economic constraints faced by the 
customary water committees to pay for expenses generated by the operation of the 
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DWSS to every household in the community. Additionally, every water 
committee have little experience of governing and managing the DWSS because 
they are changed in average once a year. Therefore, after one-year experience of 
water committee in providing the DWSS a new committee starts and it has to 
learn everything in one year. 
The problems described above are mainly related to governance and management 
of drinking water; specifically, to the rules and their enforcement. Additionally, 
the economic situation of the communities studied can stress water problems 
because of the low recovery of the payments for the DWSS. The communities 
chosen for this research have a customary water authority responsible for the 
provision of the DWS. Each water committee has their own rules to provide the 
DWSS. The water committee authorities governing the service make decisions 
based on population demand and the strategy they consider appropriate for 
providing this service. 
Finally, this research focuses on the community level to understand the processes 
of governance and social organisation dealing with problems in the DWSS. 
Therefore the research site selection is also based on communities facing DWSS 
problems caused, not by insufficient drinking water in their household, but by 
water administration problems. 
3.3.4	  The	  DWSS	  in	  the	  case	  study	  communities	  
In the case studies there is a relationship between community members and the 
authorities that govern the DWSS. In the first half of the 20th century, when the 
communities started to grow, domestic users freely collected water from the river. 
However, in the second half of the century the situation changed and the 
customary governance and management of drinking water began. In Santiaguito 
and San Mateo the drinking water management started with a common cistern in 
the centre of the localities from which householders were allowed to collect 
drinking water for domestic use. In Santiaguito, it had a one-inch tap and water 
was shared with a neighbouring penitentiary centre. This scheme worked four 
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years. San Francisco householders had their own private water-wheels from which 
to withdraw water. 
The use of common cisterns and water-wheels rapidly changed from the 1970s 
onwards because the Mexican government aimed to modernise the country and 
the DWSS become one of the targets to modernise. In Santiaguito, a drinking 
water infrastructure and taps system was installed by community members’ labour, 
sponsored by the state. Once the infrastructure was working it was governed by 
the community through a water committee, which has been governing the DWSS 
since January 1989. The other communities studied have a similar story.  
San Francisco has had a DWSS since approximately 1970. Before this, the 
majority of households had private water-wheels to obtain sufficient water to 
cover basic needs. Drinking water was used for food production, cooking, 
washing, cleaning dishes and floors, bathing, drinking, and sometimes watering 
animals. Houses without a water-wheel would collect water from neighbouring 
houses, usually those of close neighbours able to share. However, over the years 
this system changed. With the installation of drinking water infrastructure, 
common and private water-wheels fell out of use and were covered over by their 
owners, resulting in water supply problems later. San Francisco’s inhabitants 
started to face a lack of the DWSS due to repeated infrastructure and management 
failure. Water became an anthropogenically scarce resource, not because of the 
availability of the resource but because of managerial issues (Mehta 2003). When 
people realised that the DWSS was going to be intermittent they tried to restart 
their water-wheels. However, many had dried up because the water had found 
other courses to follow. 
In the 1960s, the area surrounding San Mateo began to undergo physical changes. 
This peripheral area of Toluca City was expanding due to industrial development 
and consequently population growth (Unikel 1978; DGCOH 1992). Toluca airport 
had also been built in this space. As part of the airport development, and to 
compensate for any likely impact, the airport provided San Mateo community 
with a well and the necessary material to install drinking water supply 
infrastructure for a community DWSS. San Mateo started receiving the DWSS in 
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the 1960’s. Before this, the majority of domestic water users had collected their 
water from a common well owned by the community or from private water-
wheels. The implications of these changes are relevant for water governance to 
understand the implications of decisions-made by water institutions to face urban 
growth and drinking water demands. The institutions responsible for supplying 
San Mateo’s DWSS are discussed below.  
The population of San Mateo sometimes lacks drinking water supply even though 
the community owns the well. Governance and managerial issues cause water 
delivery problems. San Mateo has two different legal water authorities interacting 
in the governance and management of underground water: a customary authority 
that plans how the water is distributed and schedules the delivery of the service, 
and a decentralised institution called Water and Sanitation of Toluca (AyST, 
Spanish acronym) responsible for collecting payments for the DWSS from 
householders. The money collected is generally used for major repairs but not for 
service delivery, maintenance, or minor repairs. These two differently legitimised 
governing systems interact in the community to manage the provision of the 
DWSS. 
The following table connects the community case studies to the main concepts 
emerging from the governance of the DWSS. These concepts form the basis of the 
research questions that guide the structure of this thesis. 
Table	  3.4	  Connecting	  the	  case	  studies	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  drinking	  water	  
Concept 
 
 
Community 
Formal 
water 
institution 
Informal 
water 
institution 
Governing 
water 
institution 
Owner of the 
water rights 
Actors/ 
Stakeholders 
Water users’ 
problems 
San 
Francisco No Yes 
Water 
committee Community 
Water 
committee, 
water users, 
local private 
vendors 
Water shortages, 
water insufficiency, 
debt, extra payments 
buying water, ability 
to pay 
Santiaguito No Yes Water committee Community 
Water 
committee, 
water users, 
local private 
vendors 
Water shortages, 
water insufficiency, 
debts, extra 
payments for 
drinking water, 
ability to pay 
San Mateo Yes Yes Water committee Community 
Water 
committee, 
water users, 
Formal water 
institution 
(AyST) 
Water shortages, 
extra payments for 
buying bottled and 
water tanker 
containers 
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Suitable research methods and techniques were selected to answer the research 
questions and establish the relationship between the method and the information 
obtained by the researcher. Also, multiple sources of data were used to answer 
each research question. The following section then addresses the methods and 
techniques used to collect data. 
3.4	  Research	  methods	  and	  techniques	  for	  data	  collection	  
This research used qualitative methods to collect information related to the DWSS 
provided to the peri-urban case study communities. Qualitative research allows 
the researcher to adopt a critical position, avoiding value judgements, when 
exploring a research topic in depth (Arzate-Salgado and Arteaga-Botello 2007). 
The qualitative methods implemented to collect primary data included techniques 
such as unstructured direct observation, snowball sampling to identify key 
informants, semi-structured interviews, and focus groups. The data collection in 
the three case studies took into account uniform criteria to classify general 
information about water governance and management in the peri-urban 
communities studied and then obtain particularities (Arzate-Salgado and Arteaga-
Botello 2007), such as the quantity of water supplied to domestic users, timeliness 
of the service provided and received, quality of the service, and water payment 
collection, as indicators of how the drinking water service is supplied.  
The use of multiple qualitative techniques such as interviews, focus groups, and 
observation allowed triangulation of information and helped to remove bias. 
Obtaining information from different sources made it possible to contrast different 
opinions and to corroborate information to support and validate arguments. The 
sampling techniques used to remove bias included not only random domestic 
water users but also key informants from government and water committees, 
community members and private water vendors in each community studied. 
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3.4.1	  Qualitative	  techniques	  
3.4.1.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used to interview government representatives 
and ex-representatives from different official water institutions at state and 
municipal levels as well as female and male domestic water users. The main 
topics were: the amount of water required to satisfy basic needs; main uses of 
drinking water; the quality of the service received; users’ willingness and ability 
to pay for the DWSS; their perceptions of the water committee’s performance; 
actions carried out by domestic users to deal with water inconsistencies; water 
prices; difficulties in recovering operation and maintenance costs, the extra 
expense of obtaining drinking water from water vendors and buying bottled water, 
proposals to improve the DWSS, and water authorities’ perceptions of the DWSS 
they provide. See annex 1 called: ‘sample of semi structure interviews design’ that 
guide the development of the interviews. 
In-depth interviews were carried out with some private well proprietors and local 
water vendors; well proprietors are local private businessmen who hold a 
concession granted by an official institution such as CONAGUA that allows them 
to open and manage water wells. These well proprietors and local private vendors 
were interviewed about the success of the local private market and the main 
problems they identify in the DWSS that communities and their water authorities 
face in providing the DWSS. They explained the reasons that prompted them to 
open a business selling drinking water to domestic users. The interviews also took 
into account the legal requirements that a water well proprietor needs to fulfil in 
order to obtain permission to open a well for business. Private well proprietors’ 
opinions were important, because they provided information about the advantages 
of developing a private water market to provide the DWSS.  
Based on the information obtained from interviews to private water vendors I 
approached a better understanding of the rules that govern the DWSS at 
community and municipal level. Through interviewing local private water vendors 
and well proprietors, it is possible to take a detailed approach to finding out 
information about the provision of this service that it was hidden or I had missed 
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in talking to members of formal and informal water institutions and domestic 
water users. Data obtained via this source was used to triangulate and validate 
information. 
3.4.1.2 Focus Groups  
Focus groups are a relevant source because they allow the collection of precise 
information from a homogeneous group of informants. I attended meetings of 
previously established discussion groups of stakeholders, academics, legislators 
and representatives from official institutions interested in main water sector 
problems, and I also organised small focus groups of four or five people from 
water committees or domestic water users in the case study communities. In these 
small groups women, as daily water users, were a key source of information. 
3.4.1.3 Field observation 
Observation is an important part of data collection. Very detailed observation is 
necessary in order to enrich research (Guthrie 1950). According to Bryman (2004); 
Arzate-Salgado and Arteaga-Botello (2007), research can include using not only 
structured but also unstructured observation. I collected information through from 
unstructured observation in the case study communities and the peri-urban area. 
Special observation was focused on each community and local private water wells; 
it was also important to carefully observe the drinking water infrastructure, and 
tap installations and their maintenance. Additional observation was carried out in 
the official institutions visited. Such observation allowed me to contrast the water 
management practices of water institutions governing the DWSS through detailed 
observation of daily life events. 
In case study research, observations and written and photographic accounts are 
used to document the evidence obtained. The information collected provided 
further arguments to support the thesis that there are customary water institutions 
governing the DWSS at community level. Using case studies revealed that less 
than 100 percent of households have a properly installed tap system, and not all 
have storage facilities such as a cistern, top or ground reservoir, metal water 
containers, 20 litres bottles, etcetera, in which to store the litres of water provided 
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by the water institution. I also observed that in peri-urban areas in expansion 
marginal support from municipality and state government is maintained, which 
affects the management of the DWSS and the quality of this service provided by 
community water institutions consequently affecting community development due 
to water insufficiency. 
3.4.1.4 Analysis of documents and secondary sources 
Information from secondary sources was collected in order to analyse official 
water institutions’ decisions and their implications for the governance of the 
DWSS in customary communities. Sources used included scientific reports, books, 
published and unpublished social, physical and environmental studies, official 
statistics on climate, underground water extraction and population growth, 
customary agreement documents and written laws. Data were obtained from the 
following institutions: the Mining and Geological Studies Institute of the State of 
Mexico (IFOMEGEM,), the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA), the 
National Water Commission (CONAGUA), the Engineering Institute from the 
Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM), the Faculty of Geography, 
the Faculty of Engineering and the Regional and Urban Planning Faculty of the 
Autonomous University of the State of Mexico (UAEMex). 
The secondary data, which for the purpose of this research are mainly qualitative, 
are used to support the primary evidence and arguments. In some cases it was 
necessary to include quantitative information for more accurate and precise 
analysis. This research required quantitative information about the number of 
houses that receive and do not received piped water, water tariffs, and the 
quantities of water received and consumed by water users.  
The following Table 3.5 connects the research questions to each analytical 
category together with the methods and techniques used for data collection. It 
shows how the key concepts, the actors, the methods and techniques used and the 
types of data obtained relate to one another. The table summarises how each 
research question, which is also linked to the analytical framework, was taken into 
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account in developing the thesis analysis. After the table, I explain how I collected 
the data. 
Table	  3.5	  Linking	  theory,	  research	  design,	  methods	  and	  techniques	  
Research	  
question	  
Key	  theoretical	  
concepts	  
Participants:	  
individuals	  and	  
institutions	  
Research	  
methods	  and	  
techniques	  
Categories	  of	  
analysis	  
Type	  of	  data	  
obtained	  
What	  are	  the	  
disjunctures	  
between	  official	  
and	  customary	  
water	  
institutions	  
governing	  the	  
DWSS?	  
(Chapter	  4)	  
• Legal 
pluralism 
• Formal 
(official) water 
institutions 
• Informal 
(customary) 
water 
institutions 
• Water 
governance 
	  
• Government 
institutions 
(AyST & 
CONAGUA) 
• Members of 
the water 
committees 
• Well 
proprietors 
• Water vendors 
	  
• Semi 
structured 
interviews 
• Document 
analysis 
• Focus groups 
• Informal talks 
• Contrasting 
sources of 
information 
• Observation 
• Community 
meeting 
attendance 
• Rules 
• Water tariffs 
• Operation and 
maintenance 
• Payment 
collection 
methods 
• Difficulties in 
collecting 
payments 
• Qualitative: 
interview 
notes, 
document 
information, 
• Fieldwork 
notes that let 
contrasting 
information 
from the three 
case studies. 
How	  and	  why	  
does	  the	  wide	  
array	  of	  actors	  
influence	  the	  
governance	  of	  
the	  DWSS	  in	  
Mexico?	  
(Chapter	  5)	  
• Plurality of 
actors 
• Politico legal 
institutions 
• Domestic 
water users 
• AyST 
• Water 
committees 
• Domestic water 
users 
• Well 
proprietors 
• Water vendors 
• Semi 
structured 
interviews 
• Focus groups 
• Documents 
• Politico legal 
institutions 
• Water users 
• Interview 
notes 
• Documental 
notes 
What	  is	  a	  
property	  rights	  
system,	  and	  why	  
is	  this	  important	  
for	  decision	  
making	  about	  
the	  provision	  of	  
or	  use	  of	  ground	  
water	  for	  the	  
DWSS?	  	  
(Chapter	  6)	  
• Property rights 
system 
• Water rights 
• Decision 
making 
• Water 
committees 
• Well 
proprietors 
• Water vendors 
• Domestic users 
• Semi 
structured 
interviews 
• Focus groups 
• Observation 
• Owner, 
• Proprietor 
• Authorised 
claimant 
• Authorised user 
• Authorised 
entrant. 
• Qualitative: 
• Interview 
notes 
• Fieldwork 
notes 
What	  difficulties	  
do	  domestic	  
water	  users	  and	  
water	  
institutions	  
encounter	  
regarding	  
provision	  of	  the	  
DWSS?	  
(Chapter	  7)	  
• Domestic 
water users 
• Householder 
• DWSS 
• Willingness to 
pay (WTP) 
• Ability to pay 
(ATP) 
• Trust in the 
authority 
• Household 
head 
• Domestic water 
users 
• Semi 
structured 
interviews 
• Focus groups 
• Informal talks 
• Field 
observation 
• Contrasting 
sources of 
information 
• Sufficiency of 
the water 
received 
• Water uses 
• Struggles to 
obtain water 
• WTP 
• ATP 
• Perceptions 
about the 
quality of the 
service 
• Qualitative: 
interview 
notes, 
observation 
notes, 
• Informal talks 
notes, field 
walks notes. 
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The data collection was carried out in two main stages. The first involved semi-
structured interviews, focus groups and observation, and the second focused on 
gap identification through secondary sources. The following sections explain the 
sources of information and techniques taken into account to collect data. 
3.4.2	  Primary	  data	  collection	  
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with government representatives and 
ex-representatives from water institutions, customary authorities, legislators, 
private water vendors, academics and domestic water users. This stage was critical 
to understanding the drinking water supply problems identified by official and 
customary institutions, and to understanding the water authorities’ priorities and 
concerns when making decisions about resolving DWSS problems.  
The interviews included topics related to the institutions responsible for the 
DWSS, the actors involved in providing drinking water, managerial activities, 
water tariffs, collection of payments for the DWSS, the quality of the service and 
willingness and ability to pay. At the end of the interview stage a period of data 
analysis identified any gaps in the data, which was important because it helped to 
strengthen the information required for the second stage, thus refining the 
methodology.  
The second stage investigated and analysed the relationships between the main 
aspects of community life − family life, household size, employment, community 
activities − and the use of the drinking water received for household activities. 
This information was obtained from the secondary sources detailed below. 
To have a better understanding of the robustness of the study findings the 
following table summarises the number of interviews, focus groups, informal 
conversations, groups discussions, and field observation I had with the case 
studies with the different actors involved. 
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Table	  3.6	  Information	  about	  research	  techniques	  conducted	  	  
Research 
technique 
conducted 
Participant Number conducted Date Location 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Government 
representatives 
Government ex-
representatives 
6 
October- 
November 2008, 
June 2009 
June 2009 
(3) CONAGUA 
(1) CAEM 
(1) UNAM 
(1) AyST 
Private well 
proprietors 2 
April 2009, 
June 2009 
San Francisco 
San Mateo 
Domestic water 
users 10 
February 2009, 
April 2009 
January- 
February 2011 
(4) San Francisco 
(5) Santiaguito 
(1) San Mateo 
Water committee 
member 1 August 2009 Santiaguito 
Academics 1 May 2009 UNAM 
Focus groups 
Academics 1 October 2008 UNAM 
Government reps. 1 October 2008 Legislators 
Water committee 3 July 2010 
(1) San Francisco 
(1) Santiaguito 
(1) San Mateo 
Female water users 2 June 2010 (1) San Francisco  (1) Santiaguito 
Male water users 3 June 2010 
(1) San Francisco  
(1) Santiaguito 
(1) San Mateo 
Informal 
conversations 
Domestic water user 15 January-April 2009  
(5) San Francisco  
(5) Santiaguito 
(5) San Mateo 
Private informal 
water vendors  3 
April 2009 
May 2009 
(1) Almoloya 
(1) Toluca 
(1)San Francisco 
Bombero/pocero 2 April 2009 (1) San Mateo (1) Santiaguito 
Field visits, 
unstructured 
observation, 
walks 
Santiaguito 5 January 2009 
Community and 
wells site 
San Mateo 5 March 2009 
San Francisco 5 April 2009 
Attendance of 
groups 
discussion 
Academics and 
legislators 
7 (6 with 
academics 
and 1 with 
legislators) 
October 2008 
November 2008 
Mexican 
Association of 
Hydraulic 
(AMH) 
Community 
meetings 2 January 2009 
(1) Santiaguito 
(1) San Mateo 
Source: Fieldwork 
Apart of these mentioned techniques used, I also attend 5 academic presentations 
and I participated in a 7 months water research with research members of the 
Engineer Institute of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). 
After more than two years of academic discussion of ideas, experiences, and 
research proposals about the main problems faced by the water sector in Mexico, 
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a group of academics from UNAM, in collaboration with stakeholders, students, 
researchers, representatives of different governmental levels, water users 
organisations, and civil society, have collaborated in order to generate a document 
called ‘Strategic Orientations II’. I participate with them in ‘Strategic Orientations 
II’ project. In this period there where analysed the main water problems that affect 
the appropriate development of water-related activities in Mexico, also there was 
a proposal of likely solutions and a proposal of policy implementation about water 
issues in Mexico. The following subsection list the actors and institutions taken 
into account to collect data during the fieldwork period. 
List of interviewed people5 
Semi structured interviews with employees of official government institutions 
• CONAGUA Engineer, Toluca. Retired from the National Water 
Commission. Currently he is working in the Agrarian and Livestock 
Development Secretariat (SEDAGRO) at state level. He also does some 
research about spring’s area reduction. 
• CONAGUA Engineer, Toluca. Working at the National Water 
Commission at the regional level (only in the state of Mexico) as sub-
manager of water management. 
• CAEM Engineer, Toluca. He is currently working at state of Mexico 
Water Commission in Toluca. He is working in the operation area and 
ecological perspectives. 
• UNAM Engineer, Mexico city. He is retired from the National Water 
Commission. He is currently working as a researcher in the Engineering 
Institute of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He has 
experience in urban hydraulic. His researches aim to study water 
infrastructure. 
• AyST Public Administrator, Toluca. He works on water finance, public 
policies, and rights at the Municipal level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 To protect interviewees’ safety and confidentiality their personal information is not included. I 
will only include their position and the city they are working in the list of government 
representatives, water committee members, and domestic water users. The most important 
characteristic of interviewees is their job position and the institution they represent. 
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• CONAGUA ex-employee, Toluca. Currently is a water user. He used to 
work in the Public administration of water in Toluca. He was an inspector 
and technical of water infrastructure and has been working as reader of 
water meters. He has been the one responsable of operating the drinking 
water supply service in Toluca city.  
Semi structured interviews with water committee representatives 
• Water committee president, Santiaguito. 
Semi structured interviews with domestic water users 
• Male water user, San Mateo 
• Female domestic water user, Satiaguito 
• Female domestic water user, Santiaguito 
• Male water user, Santiaguito 
• Male water user, Santiaguito 
• Female domestic water user, Santiaguito 
• Housewife, San Francisco 
• Housewife, San Francisco 
• Female water user, San Francisco  
• Housewife, San Francisco 
Semi structured interviews with local private well proprietor 
• Well proprietor, San Francisco 
• Well proprietor, San Mateo 
Focus groups with water committee representatives 
• Water committee members, Santiaguito (president, secretary, treasurer) 
• Water committee members, San Mateo (president, secretary, supplants) 
• Water committee members, San Francisco (president, secretary, bombero) 
Focus groups with academics 
• Engineer, UNAM, Mexico city 
• Engineer, coordinator of Mexican association for Hydraulic, Mexico city 
• Dr., expert in water governance, UNAM, Mexico city 
• Dr., expert in IWMS, water resources research centre (CIRA), Toluca. 
Chapter	  3.	  Research	  strategy:	  approaches	  and	  methods	  
89	  
	  
Focus groups with legislators 
• Senator and president of the water resources commission from the 
senators’ camera, Mexico. 
• Facilitator of LAN, Mexico. 
• Juridical assessor and federal secretariat, Mexico. 
• National Legislator and participant of LAN elaboration and up to dates, 
Mexico. 
Participation within group discussions 
• About Water Legislation in Mexico. Leaded by the President of the 
Senators at the Federal level. 
• Integrated Watershed Management. With the lecturers from Inter-
American Centre of Water Resources (CIRA). 
• Water Governance. With Dr Fernando González Villarreal. AMH. 
• Water and sanitation. Leaded by Dr Jorge Saavedra, Mexico city. 
• Alternatives for supplying water resources. Leaded by Engineer Jesus 
Campos López. 
• Research and capacity development to manage water resources. CIRA, 
Toluca. 
• The media in the water management. Leaded by Luis Manuel Guerra.  
3.4.3	  Secondary	  data	  collection	  
Secondary sources were required to fill in the gaps related to information missed 
between formal legislation and customary community rules. They helped in 
understanding the water governance problem in a legal plural territory and among 
administrative levels. Secondary data were obtained from official national and 
state institutions’ published and unpublished documents. Academic studies, both 
published and unpublished, were also analysed. After this refining stage, updated 
semi-structured interviews with domestic water users and water vendors and focus 
groups with customary water committee members, female domestic water users, 
and legislators were carried out which covered water needs, water sufficiency, 
service quality, water tariffs, payment for water, and actions carried out by 
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community members to deal with water shortages and the frequent lack of 
drinking water in their communities. 
Information obtained in the second stage also included data about water quantity. 
However, the main focus was on collecting qualitative information about 
timeliness and quality in the DWSS delivery. Data were also collected about 
economic issues − water tariffs, water charges, payment and collection − and 
about the relationship between domestic water users and the customary water 
authorities, for example how people approach the water committee members to 
talk about debt, lack and shortage of drinking water, and leaking pipes. 
Information about community members’ actions to obtain drinking water to cover 
their needs was also obtained. Finally, domestic users were asked what strategies 
they thought might be relevant to improving the DWSS. These data helped in 
understanding of water governance at the community level. 
Unstructured observation carried out at any time was also relevant. It provided 
information about participants’ behaviour and the environment they live in. The 
aim of using this technique was to comprehend, in detail, the factors that shape the 
problems of the DWSS and then develop a narrative account of participants’ 
behaviour.  
3.4.4	  Selection	  of	  respondents	  
The respondents selected included decision-makers and representatives of 
customary and official water institutions, domestic water users, academics, local 
water vendors and water resources professionals. The snowballing technique was 
used to identify key informants for in-depth interviews or focus groups (Bryman 
2004). Using information collected from previous interviewees, snowball 
sampling guides the researcher to find key informants able to provide unique and 
relevant information about the research topic. Using this technique it was possible 
to arrange individual interviews with domestic water users, water institution 
representatives, academics and water well proprietors.  
Focus groups were held with legislators, customary water committees, women and 
private water vendors. The number of people interviewed depended upon the 
Chapter	  3.	  Research	  strategy:	  approaches	  and	  methods	  
91	  
	  
number of key informants and the availability of water institutions personnel and 
water users. 
In order to obtain a broad understanding of water administration and to 
comprehend the roles and responsibilities of water institutions it was necessary to 
interview representatives of the following water institutions: National Water 
Commission (CONAGUA), state of Mexico Water Commission (CAEM), Water 
and Sanitation of Toluca (AyST), and customary water committees. 
The rationale behind choosing multiple actors was that data from different sources 
would help to reduce or avoid bias. The richness of information obtained from 
diverse sources and points of view created a broad understanding about the 
provision of the DWSS in the communities studied and the main problems of 
water governance and management. It also helped to make an accurate analysis 
because of the input from the different actors. Multiple sources of information 
represent strength in the sample selection because they broaden the depth of the 
information obtained. 
3.5	  Data	  analysis	  
Data analysis of documents and text was carried out using the content analysis 
technique to quantify the data in pre-established categories (Bryman 2004), e.g. 
the numbers of wells managed by the water committees of each community, 
number of households, days of service, water tariff, payment collection and so on. 
Codifying and categorising the information in variables related to the governance 
of the DWSS was carried out to do the analysis of the primary data gathered from 
the semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The data analysis focused not 
only on the water authorities’ decision making but also on domestic water users’ 
perceptions of governance of the DWSS.  
The aim of the analysis was to identify the water committees’ level of engagement 
in governing and providing the DWSS. The analysis also included practices to 
provide or to obtain drinking water not only from water committees but also from 
domestic users. The analysis included issues of decision-making, organisation and 
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operation of the DWSS, communication among water committee members and 
society, experience of water management, transparency of information provided to 
water users and the actions of domestic water users faced with the drinking water 
supply problems. Previous sections of this chapter aimed to address the methods 
and techniques used for data collection and its analysis. The following section 
concludes chapter. 
3.6	  Conclusions	  
A qualitative multiple-case study was chosen in order to obtain empirical evidence 
to understand, in detail, water governance in traditionally organised communities 
that provide the DWSS. The advantage of choosing multiple case studies is that 
they can help the researcher to understand real-life decisions and behaviours in 
order to provide solutions related to the DWSS. Using multiple case studies to do 
this research help to broadly understand the similarities and differences of 
traditionally organised communities to govern the DWSS. It also helps better 
understanding of the particularities of individual cases and then understanding 
general patterns of the customary governance and management of DWSS. These 
case studies focus on the governance of the DWSS in three communities in 
Mexico’s central highlands.  
Four techniques were used to obtain empirical data: interviews, focus groups, 
observation and documentation. Interviews were carried out to collect information 
from domestic water users, official water institutions, academics and private water 
vendors; focus groups were held with female domestic water users in the case 
study communities, water committee members, and legislators and official water 
institution representatives; and I also attend community members meetings in 
which householders discussed with the water committee issues related to the 
DWSS. These meetings were observed for an understanding of the organisational 
dynamics in a community and the water committee office to organise the DWSS. 
Advantages were found to using qualitative methods to study water governance at 
the community level. The first of these is that analysis in a community context 
makes it possible to understand and analyse regional or national dynamics because 
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there are practices and decisions taking place in upper administrative levels. 
Therefore, from a particular case could be understood general and larger water 
governance dynamics. Second, it leads on to analysing and understanding the 
wider problems faced not only in the DWSS but also in the water sector in 
Mexico and Latin America. Water problems at community level are frequently a 
mirror of similar water problems faced some Mexican and Latin American 
communities because diverse communities share similar characteristics in terms of 
property rights to use natural resources such as water. Third, it allows data 
collection from different sources in parallel, allowing triangulation and validation 
of information to support the arguments of the thesis. However, the researcher 
should be careful when analysing and interpreting not only primary sources 
interviewed but also direct documental sources in order to avoid bias or miss 
information (Pahl-Wostl 2009). 
The advantage of doing case study research on water governance is the facility 
and ability it affords to deal with a variety of sources of information because it let 
the researcher to explore different sources of information and then analyse data 
according to the particularities of the case study. I found that a main concern in 
carrying out case studies at community level relates to the kind of information 
available. For example, there might be no data generated in specific topics, or not 
up to dated and incomplete information. In my research I found there is not 
enough quantitative data available because is not generated. Neither there is 
systematic and precise information about money collected and money spent. 
These limitations are further detailed below in section 3.6.1. I collected enough 
qualitative information about the governance of the DWSS, but not enough 
quantitative evidence at the community level due to the lack of statistics. Most 
statistics are generated at the municipal, state and national levels. In interviews 
and focus groups there may be initial biases in the information collected, caused 
by the strength of personal opinion. According to Brenner (1981), obtaining 
response biases or poor answers are due to poor recall of information, poor 
formulation of the question, or because the data collection is not based on realistic 
settings (Brenner, 1981). I was aware of these concerns, and paid attention not 
only to how the questions were phrased but also to the interviewees’ responses, 
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and reduced the likely restrictions and biases to the minimum through 
triangulation of information.  
The advantage of using qualitative over quantitative methodology in this research 
is the richness of the data collected and the ability to compare, contrast and 
validate data with information from diverse sources (Lewis 1998). For more 
advantages of the use of multiple sources of evidence are found in Lewis’ (1988) 
work. In addition, obtaining data from direct sources of information was central to 
this study because it allowed access to detailed information that would not be 
available from published or unpublished documents. Nonetheless, one of the main 
inconveniences or difficulties of dealing with primary data when using qualitative 
methods and techniques is the amount of time it consumes: for example if the 
interviewee needs to change the interview date, as happens particularly with 
government representatives and members of official institutions, the researcher 
has to adapt to the change and readapt her/his schedule. The other main difficulty 
that frequently limits a research is the expense of travelling, limited funding and 
the need to finish by a specified time. 
3.6.1	  Limitations	  of	  data	  collection	  
This section describes the limitations of the data collection for this research. One 
of these was the lack of access to information about the collection of water bill 
payments. Water committees do not always hold an updated list of householders 
and debtors or know the total amount they owe, and many community water 
committees do not have a detailed database of the amount of money they should 
collect from the householders monthly, nor a record of the amount they actually 
collect.  
It was difficult to follow the budget and expenses – investment, weekly expenses, 
electricity fees, water concession title payment and money collected not only by 
water committees but also by AyST. Water committees not always keep the 
records from the previous committee administrations. Therefore, it is difficult for 
the researcher to obtain data from previous years. In addition, it was difficult 
obtaining specific information about total money collected from householders of 
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the communities because it was found that sometimes the treasurer of the water 
committee of one community had stolen domestic water users’ payments and left 
the community without previous notice. The water payments are vital as they are 
used to pay the electricity companies for the energy consumed when providing the 
DWSS. Electricity is required to turn on the pumping system that diverts water 
towards the areas from which it is distributed. When a treasurer fails to collect 
users’ payment or steals householders’ payments, the committee’s water budget 
starts again from zero limiting the provision of the DWSS. Therefore, the water 
committee commences again the actions to provide drinking water and reduce as 
much as possible further water shortages as a consequence of the lack of budget.  
Finally, another difficult challenge in this research was collecting quantitative 
information about the amount of water supplied to and consumed by domestic 
water users because there is no data generated at community level. 
3.6.2	  Ethics	  
Ethical issues were contemplated in mind throughout the research, not only when 
collecting data but also in the interpretation and processing of the information 
collected. The sensitivity of information was taken into account by protecting 
informants’ personal details and by appropriately using the information provided 
by these informants; for example, about strategic data, concession titles, well 
owners, debtors and quantity of water delivered to any of the community areas. 
All ethical issues were considered and highlighted on the ethical approval forms 
submitted to the International Development faculty committee following 
University of East Anglia regulations. 
Ethical factors in three main categories are considered in this research. First, 
before each interview with key community informants and official representatives, 
the purpose of the study was explained, the interviewee was asked if s/he was 
willing to participate, and oral consent was obtained. Second, the data were 
professionally treated when processed and analysed in order to produce reliable 
information. Finally, ethics are essential for providing accurate and reliable data 
without compromising interviewee people. Ethics is also important to make sure 
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the information presented is authorised by the interviewee. Interviewees’ personal 
information was kept anonymous to protect their privacy and security. 
As mentioned before, this chapter aimed to analyse methods and techniques used 
for data collection. Methods and techniques were linked to the research questions; 
data collected with qualitative techniques and interviewed actors. The following 
chapters analyse the data collected to answer each research question characterised 
in this chapter. Each question will be analysed and discussed in a different chapter. 
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Chapter	  4.	  The	  Rules	  Governing	  the	  Drinking	  Water	  Supply	  
Service	  	  
4.1	  Introduction	  	  
This chapter analyses the formal law and customary rules of formal and informal 
institutions in Mexico governing water resources and management of the DWSS, 
paying particular attention to the community level. This chapter also discusses the 
disjunctures between official government and customary water institutions 
regarding the DWSS. This chapter uses the term official or formal to mean those 
institutions of government whereas customary or informal to mean those 
community institutions that are not governed by an official institution but by a 
community institution through their own customary rules. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. This section introduces the chapter; the 
second introduces the national, state, municipal and community-level institutions 
that govern the DWSS in Mexico. The third section focuses on the formal law and 
customary rules governing water resources, with a particular focus on the DWSS. 
The fourth section analyses DWSS tariffs in both systems and contrasts those of 
government institutions with those set by customary institutions. The fifth section 
analyses the main inconsistencies in the legislation that affect the governance of 
the DWSS. Finally, the chapter draws some conclusions. 
The governance of drinking water in Mexico involves institutions and rules of 
different origins and legitimisation. There are formal and informal institutions, 
which generate valid mechanisms of action that are legitimised by both the 
population and the institutions. In Mexico, formal institutions and laws govern 
water resources and related services – including the DWSS. There are more formal 
water institutions governing and enforcing the laws than informal institutions and 
customary rules. However, customary institutions are also valid in communities 
that validate this governance system. 
At the national and state level, government institutions such as CONAGUA and 
CAEM are responsible for generating, approving and enforcing the laws and for 
allocating responsibilities to lower administrative levels. However, these 
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institutions are not responsible for the provision of public services such as the 
DWSS. At municipal level there are formal water institutions responsible of the 
DWSS. However, at community level there are some communities governing and 
managing the DWSS in their community. Some private institutions also participate 
in the management and provision of DWSS; especially in large cities in a few 
states in North Mexico. In the case study communities the rules are created and 
legitimised by customary rather than government institutions, making them more 
acceptable to community members. 
Two main institutions govern drinking water and the provision of the DWSS in the 
case study communities. The first is a customary institution shaped by community 
members who form a water committee. Every community case studied has its own 
water committee that manage the DWSS. The second institution is the 
decentralised government institution AyST, which works at local and municipal 
level to provide the DWSS to many communities in Toluca municipality that are 
not customarily organised. In San Mateo community, AyST is responsible only for 
collecting householders’ payments for the DWSS. It does not provide San Mateo 
households DWSS. Water prices are set by Toluca municipal city council. Only in 
Santiaguito and San Francisco the customary water committee is totally 
responsible of the DWSS, pricing water and collecting householders’ payment for 
this service. 
The main findings presented in this chapter are concerned with the disjuncture 
between the formal law and customary rules about water governance and the 
management of the DWSS. The interaction and opposite interests between formal 
and informal governance systems can result in lack of success in aspects of the 
provision of the DWSS such as the collection of payments for the DWSS. There is 
also a disjuncture in enforcement of and compliance with the law, which does not 
always match current needs to manage the distribution of the DWSS. Laws and 
customary rules work differently, not only between legal plural institutions but 
also because rules are sensible to the context in which they were created and are 
enforced. 
Chapter	  4.	  The	  rules	  governing	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
100	  
	  
4.2	  Formal	  and	  informal	  institutions’	  interaction	  regarding	  the	  DWSS	  
The interaction and involvement of the formal and informal institutions that 
manage the DWSS is an everyday relationship. Each institution fulfils its own 
responsibilities based on rules legitimised by other institutions or the population. 
This pattern of interaction among the differently-legitimised institutions that 
provide the DWSS occurs not only at community level but also at municipal, state 
and even national level in different parts of Mexico, with State, customary and 
sometimes private institutions’ laws and rules interacting around the management 
of the DWSS.  
In Mexico there are national and state written laws governing the access to and 
withdrawal of ground water. At community level there are unwritten rules to 
govern and manage the use of ground water for a specific purpose. It depends what 
water is used for the law or rule considered to legitimise its access. For example, 
there are rules that legitimise the use of water to provide the DWSS, to 
commercialise it or for industrial purposes. Thus, each water institution at every 
administrative level considers as valid a specific law or rule according their main 
purposes. Figure 4.1 displays the organisational structure of the main institutions 
governing water resources in Mexico. This is a hierarchical structure that 
encompasses not only the main institutions and its relationships but also the laws 
and regulations followed by each one. 
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Figure	  4.1	  Hierarchical	  structure	  and	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  relations	  in	  the	  
governance	  and	  management	  of	  water	  in	  Mexico	  
 
Source: self elaboration 
This figure shows the hierarchy of the State institutions and laws that govern 
water resources in Mexico. It also shows the horizontal level on which the 
customary institutions interact. The arrows show current relationships between 
water institutions and actors and also the law that is valid for every institution at 
each level. Single flow arrows connect in a unidirectional way hierarchical 
institutions and laws. Thus, in a top-down hierarchy single arrows connect the 
upper administrative level to lower administrative levels. In terms of legislation, 
the upper position of the law means the hierarchy in terms of power is higher.  
The double side arrow shows the direct mutual relationships between institutions 
and laws or between two institutions. However, two laws cannot be mutually 
related. Though, one law might be linked to more than one different institution. In 
this figure; for example, a double side arrow connect the national water law to 
three water institutions; i.e private well proprietors, water committees, or AyST. 
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The arrows also show the relations between government and customary 
institutions and the laws and regulations applied to each one.  
The figure pays particular attention to institutions related to the governance and 
control –management, operation and/or maintenance– of the DWSS. Water 
resources in Mexico can be managed by formal (official government), informal 
(customary) or private institutions. The main document and institutions governing 
water in Mexico is the National Water Law (LAN, Spanish acronym), created by 
CONAGUA (the National Water Commission). LAN is a formal written 
document regulating access to, withdrawal and use of both surface and 
underground water resources in Mexican territory. LAN complies with the 
Mexican constitutional mandate, whose 27th article states: 
“Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is 
vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit title 
thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property” (Congress 1967). 
Coming down the formal hierarchy, in Mexico every politico-administrative state 
has its own document governing water, which is usually based on the LAN. For 
example, Figure 4.1 shows that CAEM, the decentralised state of Mexico Water 
Commission, has a water law and codes governing waters within state of Mexico 
territory and is responsible for the administration of water resources at state level. 
The laws governing water at this level are: a) state of Mexico Water Law (LIII 
Legislatura del Estado de México 1998); b) LIII Legislatura del Estado de México 
1997, created by CAEM; c) state of Mexico Administrative Code (LIV 
Legislatura del Estado de México 2001), d) state of Mexico and Municipalities 
Financial Code (LIII Legislatura del Estado de México 1998b). 
At the municipal level, each municipality follows the state’s and national 
mandates regarding water resources. Municipal institutions need a concession to 
access groundwater. Though, not all written rules governing water are recognised 
by each institution at municipal level. Instead, there are some institutions that 
legitimate agreements emerged by custom that are expected to be followed either 
by population, municipal water institutions, or community institutions that 
manage the DWSS. 
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Figure 4.1 also shows the formal and informal institutions involved in the 
governance and management of drinking water at community level − State water 
institutions and laws, water committees, private well proprietors and water 
vendors − all of which have specific laws and unwritten rules that are legitimised 
by members of the community that require their DWSS. It shows the institutional 
and legal framework governing water resources and the DWSS at national, state, 
municipal and community levels in Mexico, and the levels at which water 
resources are administered by specific institutions and the their main 
responsibilities. 
Table	  4.1	  Regulatory	  institutions	  governing	  water	  resources	  
Laws and regulations Institutions’ responsibilities Level Document 
National or 
Federal 
Mexican Constitution 
• All waters are owned by the State  CONAGUA (State, centralised) is responsible: 
• For public policy (and its management) 
• For water allocation 
• For water regulation (through Official Norms – 
NOMs – for private actors) 
• For investment in water infrastructure 
National Water Law (LAN) 
• Establishes criteria by which to manage and 
allocate water resources 
• No regulations regarding water supply or 
sanitation services  
states 
state of Mexico water laws  
• Establish criteria for state water management 
and allocation 
• Establishes criteria for allocating 
responsibility for the provision of water 
services. No clear definition of users and 
operational organisations’ services, rights, or 
obligations. 
state water commissions (state, centralised) 
E.g. state of Mexico Water Commission (CAEM)  
• Responsible for public policy 
• Responsible for investment in water infrastructure 
• Operator organisation actively participates in 
water management and regulation 
Congress 
• Establish water tariffs. However there are no 
technical criteria to set water price the DWSS 
according to socio-economic characteristics of the 
community or area. 
Municipal Water service and sanitation regulations 
• Few municipalities have regulations  
Operator organisation AyST (State, decentralised) 
• Actively participated in water management and 
regulation 
• Investment in water maintenance and large repairs 
• Responsible for public policies 
City council (Cabildo) 
• Approves or disapproves tariffs. There are no 
technical criterion by which to do this 
Local level: 
decentralised 
water 
organisation 
There is no official document but such 
organisations follow municipal, state and 
federal laws and regulations 
State decentralised institution  
• Recognised by State and state of Mexico 
government but economically and 
administratively autonomous.  
• Has its own directive council of president, 
commissary, council representative, eg. Toluca 
water and sanitation.  
• Responsible for water supply, fees collection and 
infrastructure maintenance. 
Community 
level: 
independent 
water 
committees 
Customary rules only 
Customary authority.  
Organised and managed by community members. 
Even when there is no state registration the 
municipal government recognises its de facto 
existence. 
Water users Customary rules only Water users manage their own water consumption 
Source: self elaboration  
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The table above shows the formal regulatory framework and institutions governing 
and managing drinking water resources in Mexico from the national to the 
community level. The institutions that integrate this framework are the main 
authorities for the governance of the DWSS for domestic consumption. Each has 
specific responsibilities. Embracing a regulatory framework for water enhances the 
protection and conservation of water resources and its appropriate use. The water 
framework displayed in Table 4.1 contains the written legislative norms that 
institutions should follow in governing the DWSS. Accordingly, designing and 
applying policy should take this framework into account. At community level 
there is no a written regulation; however, Table 4.1 acknowledge there are 
customary rules used by customary institutions. 
As Table 4.1 shows, the national, state and municipal institutions are responsible 
for drawing up public policy and for their regulation and management. Allocating 
this responsibility at every level has consequences; for example, responsibility for 
public policy overlaps across levels, affecting how legislation and responsibilities 
allocated to lower administrative levels are enforced. An example of overlapping 
activities was observed at the national, state and municipal levels, with 
CONAGUA, the state of Mexico and municipal government all assuming 
responsibility for public policy. However, in terms of the DWSS, CONAGUA 
directly allocates responsibilities to lower administrative levels.  
In practice, there are no explicit mandates about the DWSS in state laws and 
regulations. Neither are states nor municipalities always responsible for its 
management because they delegate this responsibility to community institutions. 
In many communities in central Mexico there are self-sufficient water institutions 
in which community members, through a water committee, manage groundwater 
and provide the DWSS to community households themselves. For this reason, 
even when the LAN does not acknowledge water governance by informal 
institutions at lower administrative level, Table 4.1 includes informal institutions 
as part of the water governance and management picture at local and community 
level. This is a gap in the law and a potential knowledge problem to be analysed in 
this research.  
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This section has introduced the main written documents and institutions governing 
water resources in Mexico. The following section explains how these laws and 
customary rules are used not only by formal water institutions but also by 
informal water institutions. The section also explains how the relationships 
between official and customary institutions connect with the governance of the 
DWSS.  
4.3	  The	  formal	  law	  and	  customary	  rules	  regarding	  water	  governance	  
and	  the	  DWSS	  
In Mexico, formal written law at national level set the rules about who govern the 
access and use of water resources, who is entitled to have a formal concession to 
withdraw water and, which institutions are responsible of water management 
available to be used for specific purposes. However, there are also informal laws 
and rules carrying out these activities but at local and community level. Therefore, 
through legal pluralism theory I analyse formal water law and institutions 
governing groundwater in Mexico and those informal laws and institutions 
responsible of water management at community level. 
The Mexican Constitution is the main legislative written document that formally 
governs the country, institutions and individuals. This document allocates 
responsibilities to national, state and municipal institutions. It also gives 
institutions agency to make strategic decisions and manage their own 
administration. Additionally, it enables particular official institutions to establish 
strategies for the management of natural resources and to implement policies and 
programmes dealing with the distribution and use of these resources.  
The Mexican Constitution mandates public sector employees to provide their 
services following principles that enable improvement in the provision of any 
kind of public service (Cámara de Diputados 2010). Article 113 of the 
Constitution states:  
“Laws about the administrative responsibilities of public sector employees will 
determine their obligations – bearing in mind legality, honesty, loyalty, impartiality 
and efficiency when they are providing a service – and sanctions when official 
offences occur” (Cámara de Diputados 2010: 74). 
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According to this article, the position that a public employee holds should not 
affect the way in which they develop their responsibilities. By contrast: public 
servants should follow the rules in coordinating the provision of public services 
and the appropriate administration of natural and economic resources. Therefore, 
based on formal mandates, the DWSS should also be provided by official 
institutions according to the legislation. Therefore, if governance and compliance 
with the legislation improve the quality of the DWSS may also improve. For 
formal water institutions, the implementation of formal law might bring effective 
results. 
The Mexican Constitution mandates that formal water institutions should focus on 
three topics: a) the administration of economic resources for investing in 
infrastructure and services for achieving specific purposes; b) improving the 
efficiency of the technological infrastructure through the distribution of water, 
avoiding water loss and measuring water for accurate charging and the recovery of 
financial resources through the payment for the DWSS; and c) providing public 
administration according to the principles of legality, loyalty, honesty, impartiality 
and efficiency (Cámara de Diputados, 2010). All formal institutions should 
consider these general statements. However, in terms of water,  
Written law mandates are responsibility of specific institutions. CONAGUA, the 
State’s main water institution, seeks to assume water governance and elaborate and 
enforce a specific water law, the LAN. LAN mandates could be implemented at 
lower administrative levels through state, municipal, or community water 
institutions. Though, LAN does not include a specific formal rule only to manage 
the DWSS. 
Currently the only article of the Mexican Constitution that might indirectly include 
water supply issues is the 115. No other article mentions provision of the DWSS 
(IIJ-UNAM, 2011). Article 115 considers the states and municipalities as the 
politico-administrative composition of the Mexican federal government. The basis 
of the territorial division and politico-administrative organisation in Mexico is the 
municipality. Based on this article, there are three main principles behind 
municipalities: 1) they are administered by a council (Ayuntamiento) elected by 
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popular vote and there is no intermediate authority between the municipality and 
the state; 2) municipalities administer their own finances, composed of taxes, and 
are self-sufficient in meeting municipal needs; and 3) they have juridical 
autonomy to face legal purposes (IIJ-UNAM 2011). This gives municipal councils 
legal freedom to govern the municipality according to local needs. Decisions about 
the DWSS are made according to their municipal responsibility to improve the 
DWSS and their infrastructure, institutions and finances. Therefore municipal 
authorities make their decisions based on local needs and the budget obtained from 
federal government to implement such decisions. 
As mentioned, article 115 does not specifically include the DWSS per se but it 
allocates responsibility for the provision of public services, including the drinking 
water supply, to municipalities. However, even when municipal public employees 
work to maintain municipal functioning, municipalities have several 
responsibilities and there are not always enough public sector employees to carry 
all of them out.6 Thus some municipal governments delegate some responsibility 
to self-organised communities. One of the main responsibilities frequently given to 
communities is provision of the DWSS, by agreement between the municipality 
and the community, or according to customary rules between community members 
and a water committee. 
In a focus group carried out in October 2008 with national legislators and other 
government representatives, the legislator responsible of updating LAN mentioned 
that in Mexico there is no a specific legislation about water and sanitation. 
Legislators have not defined yet the main common variables that need to be 
regulated to govern the DWSS. Therefore, this is a problem in the provision of 
drinking water al local level because nobody takes serious responsibility about 
quality of the service. According this legislator, the lack of legislation for drinking 
water represents a limitation to the water institutions and the legislators governing 
and managing the DWSS because there are no standard rules that can be used for 
the equitable provision of drinking water, sufficiency, and quality service. Every 
institution at any administrative level follows a specific law according to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Articles 108 to 114 of the Mexican Constitution regulate public employees’ responsibilities. 
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responsibilities and targets. Its members make decisions convenient to the 
institution and framed by a specific set of rules and based on experience gained in 
the process of provision of the DWSS. However, these decisions are not 
necessarily the most convenient for domestic water users. A national legislator 
expert in LAN stated in the mentioned focus group: 
“According to my experience there is no [a specific] legislation about the [provision 
of] drinking water and sanitation [services]. Modification of the 115 article is 
necessary [to include the provision of drinking water as part of the Sate 
responsibilities to meet peoples needs]. It is necessary a national policy [in terms of 
water and self-sufficiency of water institutions] and must be regulated. The law must 
be modified and must be faced with honesty and courage. We suggest that by law 
[decentralised] water organisations should have the concession to supply the 
[drinking] water service” (Legislator expert in LAN, Mexico city, October 2008).  
Supplying drinking water has not been easy or successful for Mexican 
municipalities, firstly because they have a wide range of activities and services 
that limit their ability to provide a good-quality DWSS; and secondly because the 
municipal office responsible for water-related services usually focuses on general 
aspects of water and sanitation, together, than either drinking water supply or 
sanitation issues. Decision makers think that municipalities cannot totally manage 
their DWSS because of the lack of regulation in this matter. 
Additionally, there is a recurrent problem of non-payment of domestic water users 
for the DWSS they receive from the water institution and consequently there is a 
debt from the water institution to the federal government. Due to these problems, 
municipalities tend not to be economically self-sufficient, and in consequence any 
investment to improve the DWSS is affected too.  
Decision makers think that municipalities cannot totally manage their DWSS 
because they are not economically self-sufficient, and would not be able to 
recover the necessary investment for operation and maintenance costs from 
[domestic] water users if the law is not enforced. If there is not a clear water law 
that includes the provision of drinking water, the appropriate charges for it 
according to population socio-economic status, and cannot be properly enforced 
there might be troubles to become economically self-sufficient. The budget 
municipalities receive from federal government is not always enough to cover all 
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municipal expenses; and they still have debts with federal institutions such as the 
Electricity Company or with CONAGUA: 
“The annual budget held by [decentralised] water organisations is usually divided in 
the following way: 30 percent is used to pay debts, 30 percent is for the payment of 
workers and 40 percent would be required for water systems maintenance … maybe 
the authority tries to cover maintenance expenses, but in the short term” (AyST 
representative, Toluca, April 2009). 
In addition, water users frequently suffer from a poor-quality DWSS, and the 
vicious cycle of lack of quality in the DWSS and lack of payment for the service, 
and low level of cost recovery continuously affects the governance and 
management of the DWSS. By June 2009, in an interview carried in Toluca 
municipality, a decentralised institution representative affirmed: 
“Most municipalities are in deficit in terms of economic recovery from [the drinking] 
water service supply … taking into account that there are 125 municipalities in the 
State of Mexico, there is 60 percent economic insufficiency [in terms of water-
related issues]” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
The annual budget that municipalities receive from federal government through 
Ramo 33, a legislative norm to regulate federal budget expenditure, has to be 
invested in public services that become priorities. According to local and 
community water institutions members, the DWSS is not always a priority, even 
its importance. The budget obtained from Ramo 33 is invested in solving urgent 
issues; for example, building schools and health centres, investing in security, 
expanding the water network, paving roads, buying administrative equipment, etc.. 
Nevertheless, for the municipal authorities, the DWSS is not usually considered 
the most important service at the point of decision making or is not the top priority 
at the moment of distributing budget to improve some public services. A member 
of AyST in an interview mentioned carried out in June 2009 complained: 
“For decision makers, water is not always a priority because they know it is 
expensive to improve the infrastructure system or expand it. They would always 
prefer fixing leaks because is cheaper and it makes the idea within a community that 
they are working by improving the water network, but it is not like that” (AyST 
representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
The DWSS might not be a priority when it comes to the budget distribution. 
However, it has become a recurrent problem in political discourses that are used to 
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gain citizens’ votes in political campaigns. By 2009, in an interview a 
representative of AyST explained: 
“Water is politicised.7 The municipal president thinks about what to do the following 
year when elections come and candidates seek votes. The drinking water [supply 
service] is the first service they propose improving, because they know everyone 
needs water and this is the campaign promise that might attract people’s attention. 
Drinking water has been politicised. Water has been used as a measure for social 
control” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
Water is usually the main political campaign promise because candidates know 
that drinking water at community level represents the main problem that needs 
solution. However, water problems become only the political strategy used to gain 
votes but it is not their objective bringing solutions if their political party win the 
local election. In this sense, water is politicised but the drinking water system 
functioning is not necessarily improved. More about politisation is found in 
section 4.5 of this chapter. 
To complement the role and responsibilities of municipalities in relation to the 
mandates of the Mexican Constitution, the legislators mentioned that there is a 
misallocation of activities between the state and municipal levels, and a frequent 
overlap of responsibilities. The State still has the political and economic faculties, 
which municipalities should hold. Where drinking water is concerned, 
municipalities need the authority to set rules that directly benefit their decisions 
and population. In a focus group carried out in October 2008 a government 
representative also commented: 
“Article 115 is done in a very convenient way [for federal government because it 
protects its own interests]. This is a problematic article because it is not possible to 
have agreements with municipalities unless it is convenient for [federal government]. 
As they are today, the rules and laws are not working. We need to regulate the 
operational [water] organisations. We are in a very bad situation” (National legislator, 
Toluca, October 2008). 
According to information provided by Mexican legislators in a focus group (2008), 
the main problem with the current water governance is due to failure to clarify and 
enforce the law. These laws might not benefit those who need them most, and by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Politicising any service is understood as the voluntary or involuntary actions carried out by the 
supplier against water systems functioning (Usobiaga Suinaga, 2007). 
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October 2008 the national legislators in a focus group suggested that it is relevant 
and urgent to write a new water law. They assessed the 2004 LAN as nothing 
more than putting a patch on the first LAN, which was issued in 1992, and 
concluded that it is necessary to rewrite and update the LAN with significant 
changes: 
“There are challenges. There is agreement [among the majority of legislators]: the 
water sector needs a deep reform. The [national water] law does not work, it is 
necessary to pass another one but [the legislators] do not do that. Instead they start to 
reform other [laws], but this is not always efficient. Irrigation use and the drinking 
water [supply service] need to be regulated” (National legislator, Mexico city, 
October 2008). 
Based on the legislators’ opinions, drinking water professionals and experts need 
an overall strategic vision that takes into account the infrastructure, finance, a solid 
administrative system, participation mechanisms and governance for the water 
sector. From their perspective, the best option is to modify the legislation, 
otherwise the governance of the DWSS might be affected (Silvano 2008). 
An UNAM engineer, CONAGUA ex-representative and responsible for the 
national water programme (PNH) mentioned in an interview in 2009 that he saw 
the DWSS problems not as due to lack of clarity or enforcement of legislation but 
to the engineering and technical capacity of the water institutions to mend the 
leaks. He affirmed that 85 percent of drinking water infrastructure has leaks; the 
infrastructure is old and poorly maintained. And therefore, there are also problems 
with drainage, water treatment and governance: 
“Once full responsibility was delegated [to official government institutions] to 
supply the drinking water [service], the government lost its capacity to do it. 
Unfortunately, people do not have the power to do everything, or to make decisions. 
The problem is not the law. When it is difficult to do something [to resolve a 
problem] or enforce [the law], government institutions modify the law. There are no 
mechanisms for enforcing the law. There are aspects that can be improved, but these 
are not [important to the government]. The solution is that the State retracts to 
provide the DWSS” (CONAGUA ex-representative, UNAM, Mexico city, May 
2009). 
Another problem is the institutions’ ability to comply with the law. In an interview, 
a retired from CONAGUA representative complained about the law relating to 
drinking water management and the institution governing it: 
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“CONAGUA does not have influence regarding the drinking water. It does not have 
[in practice] real powers to regulate the drinking water. Everything CONAGUA does 
is done by bending the law” (CONAGUA representative, Engineer, Toluca, October 
2008). 
According to information provided in an interview in May 2009 by an academic 
from UNAM and CONAGUA ex-representative, the main DWSS problem is 
maintenance of the infrastructure. This is directly related to the water institutions’ 
investment in maintaining, repairing and updating the infrastructure for the 
provision of drinking water. According to this ex-government representative, 85 
percent of drinking water is lost through leaks and investment in infrastructure 
repair is low. According to academics and legislators’ opinion in a group 
discussion by October 2008, the reason for the increase of leaks is that 
“Currently there is a tendency to reduce investment in the drinking water supply 
service and for allocating water for different uses. Government pay more attention to 
water for industrial purposes or irrigation because this is part of the main economic 
activities” (Academic and Mexican legislators, AMH, Toluca, October 2008). 
Drinking water professionals see good governance in water issues as necessary to 
improving the DWSS. Water governance should consider not only compliance 
with plural legal laws and rules but also the opinions and requirements of domestic 
water users. The water sector requires the support of the legitimate water 
institutions and rules to allow official and customary water institutions to operate 
the DWSS according to local needs. Customary governance is analysed in section 
4.3.4 and Chapter 5 of this thesis. The following section analyses water 
governance according to the LAN. 
4.3.1	  Governance	  according	  to	  the	  National	  Water	  Law	  (LAN)	  
Formal water governance in Mexico is directly associated with CONAGUA and 
the way in which this institution establishes the rules and enforces the LAN to 
govern all waters available in the Mexican territory. CONAGUA uses the LAN as 
the main document for governing all water uses in Mexico. Although the LAN 
allocates the water, CONAGUA assigns responsibility to other water institutions at 
lower governmental levels and manages water resources. However, in the LAN 
there is no mention of customary institutions organisation to provide the DWSS, 
and it pays little attention to the DWSS for rural communities. 
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The LAN allocates the management of drinking water for human consumption to 
lower administrative levels, such as the municipal, to cover the local DWSS. The 
municipality is officially the lowest administrative level of public administration 
(Cámara de Diputados 2008). The LAN recognises, in article 9.XIII, that the 
DWSS and sanitation in urban and rural areas is the responsibility of the state 
government working together with the municipality (Cámara de Diputados 2008). 
The municipality, take this responsibility to provide the DWSS through the 
decentralised water operational organisations, such as AyST who provides the 
DWSS in most of Toluca communities. However, the current LAN also specifies 
that when the municipality considers it necessary it can contract or give the DWSS 
as a concession to other state governments or other actors such as private 
institutions, individuals, or community centres that have been granted a concession 
title by CONAGUA (ibid). The LAN does not pay particular attention to 
customary institutions. Actually, CONAGUA does not keep records about there 
are customary water institutions providing DWSS at community level; it mainly 
focuses on the government institutions that should provide water services included 
the DWSS at the municipal and state level. The LAN also focuses on the water 
resources required to develop irrigation, industry and urban systems’ performance 
(Cámara de Diputados 2010). 
According to the Mexican national legislators participating in the AMH and 
presenting in the group discussion in November 2008, in Toluca, the enforcement 
of LAN does not guarantee appropriate performance by the water institutions. 
They consider that official water institutions at the national level still require 
improvement in their performance in decision making, the management of 
financial resources, institutional organisation, the designation of responsibilities, 
and political will.  
Accordingly, in June 2009, a member of AyST affirmed in an interview that there 
are ways of improving and achieving specific purposes. However, some problems 
need to be solved first: 
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“There are ways of enforcing legislative norms [for example, through the use of] 
internal regulations, financial codes, even the current LAN or the penal code. But 
[the problem is] there is no political will. The problem is that government lacks 
awareness and willingness to do its job” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
By contrast, national legislations, In November 2008 suggested that improvements 
to the LAN might also improve formal institutions performance. According to the 
academic literature, these changes and improvements are expected to be 
complemented by water institutions and actors through their participation and 
communication and linked among all vertical and horizontal levels in which water 
governance, and specifically the DWSS, is involved (Mukherji and Shah 2005).8  
In a focus group carried out in October 2008, in Mexico City, legislators agreed 
that a new and updated LAN is necessary to regulate all water uses. Mexico has 
had the same national water law since 1992 with few changes, and these were not 
regulated or updated. Therefore these changes were not useful. As a consequence, 
the LAN is not fully considered by formal or informal water institutions at the 
point of decision making about what to do and how for implementing decisions 
and enforcing its compliance.  
Legislators, academics and stakeholders participating in the group discussion 
organised by the AMH, by October 2008, agreed that updating the LAN is a 
challenge because it requires considering current realities in terms of who is 
responsible of specific activities, who will be responsible of managing water 
resources, which waters can be used, by whom, when, and in which amounts. 
Also, an update should wonder what is the main purpose of updating the LAN and 
to what extent this will be different to the previous one. LAN has been modified 
several times; however, it has not had real changes or every time the writing is 
more difficult to understand, applied and enforced. Legislators participating in this 
group discussion suggested that a more appropriate option would be to create a 
new document according to the new realities and including the different Mexican 
contexts. The following section focuses on the rules governing the DWSS through 
the LAN.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Vertical and horizontal levels are administrative levels through which governance takes place. 
The vertical level includes the international, national, regional and local levels while the horizontal 
level involves civil society, private institutions and markets (Mukherji and Shah, 2005). 
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4.3.2	  Decentralisation	  of	  the	  DWSS	  in	  the	  1992	  National	  Water	  Law	  and	  water	  
reform	  
The LAN came into force on 1st December 1992 and there have been several 
reforms since then. The main reforms took place in 2004 and 2006 when the 
legislators updated it. However, these reforms did not help to improve either the 
governance or the management of water resources in Mexico.  
The concept of water reforms in Mexico has been characterized as a ‘shift from 
centralised policies … to more decentralised schemes’ (Romero Lankao 2001: 1). 
Decentralisation is conceptualised as a policy used to guarantee governance 
improvements (Badenoch 2002). The Mexican government aimed to improve 
governance in general, including the governance and management of the DWSS. 
In terms of water management, the decentralisation was regarded as a legitimate 
way of justifying the modernisation strategy of the 1988-1994 National 
Development Plan. However, studies around this topic (Lehoucq et al. 2005; 
Wilder and Romero Lankao 2006) have found that Mexico’s decentralisation 
processes have not achieved governance improvement. 
The water reform was part of a global modernisation perspective under World 
Bank guidance and funding which suggested the adoption of neo-liberal reforms 
and the acceptance of decentralised governance models (Wilder and Romero 
Lankao 2006). The decentralised models considered as important allow more 
privatisation around drinking water resources, water rights and changes to the 
water pricing mechanisms (ibid). Both the decentralisation and the privatisation 
were proposed as instruments to improve the efficiency of the irrigation and 
drinking water supply infrastructure and their services. 
The water reform did not take into account local needs or the political, 
institutional, or organisational structure, and failed to achieve the aims of 
economic, social and political development that guided the country (ibid). The 
increasing gap between demand for the DWSS and investment in provision of this 
service led scholars (Lehoucq et al. 2005; Wilder and Romero Lankao 2006) to 
suggest that the Mexican water reform has not succeeded. What is more, national 
governments sometimes prioritise other economic and political factors over social 
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development and environmental protection (McIntyre 2007), paying more 
attention to decisions that generate economic growth rather than creating social 
improvements. For state and local governments probably the provision of the 
DWSS does not represent a service that generates profits because in states from 
central Mexico the DWSS has subsidy. At community level, the operational and 
managerial cost recovered only help to provide the service but not to make a profit. 
Therefore, for most of local and community governments from the case studies, 
the provision of the DWSS has not succeed and the decision to privatise or to 
totally give this responsibility to community institutions is taking place. This 
occurs with community institutions in Santiaguito, San Francisco, and San Mateo, 
they are organised by custom and do not follow formal law; however, they assume 
not only the provision of drinking water but also the challenge of collecting water 
users payments. 
With the water reforms the LAN established water rights, allocate water uses for 
the different economic activities and domestic consumption, and management for 
all water uses and services. It also aims to manage the exploitation, distribution, 
control, use and preservation of water quality and quantity, in order to achieve 
integral sustainable development for agricultural purposes and population 
consumption (Cámara de Diputados 2008). Additionally, the LAN allows the 
federal government to grant concessions for the administration of urban and peri-
urban DWSS to lower governmental levels such as states, municipalities, and non-
state concessionaires such as the private sector and the industry. Granting these 
concessions reduces the federal government’s responsibility for direct water 
management, although water resources for all uses legally remains under federal 
government jurisdiction (Cámara de Diputados 2008). 
As mentioned before, the 1992 LAN has undergone several reforms, the largest 
being in 2004 and 2006. However, the water experts qualified these reforms as 
merely patching up the 1992 law, because the modifications to the law were not 
successful in practice. Specifically, the governance and management of the DWSS 
continued as usual with no practical improvement. In October 2008, National 
Legislators in a focus group affirmed: 
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“In 2004 the LAN was almost completely reformed; however the regulation is [still] 
the one from 1992. So, you might ask why the 2004 LAN is not used? If there is a 
reform in process, it is not worth regulating [the law] because in a short time it will 
be modified [again] … In 2006, [the LAN] had almost 80 parts modified. However, 
tomorrow [16th October 2008] there will be a discussion within the legislative camera 
[legislators] … The 2004 LAN was a disaster regarding water-related matters. It was 
a grave backward step in juridical matters for the water sector in Mexico … The 
LAN lacks clarity; each time it is more complex. Therefore, it is more difficult to 
understand it and carry out it in practice, not only for CONAGUA but also for other 
actors” (National Legislators in a focus group, Mexico city, October 2008). 
It is difficult to understand and implement a written law in Mexico; especially 
LAN, because it is complex; firstly, there is difficulty to understand the writing 
because of the vague concepts used; LAN is not an easy to follow law because the 
text is confusing. Secondly, because it has been modified several times and those 
modifications cannot always be implemented in practice. Third, LAN does not 
regulate how a good DWSS should be provided. And fourth, it does not group 
appropriate water tariffs suggested to be charged by water institutions according 
to population socio-economic characteristics, neither it regulate issues about 
payment recovery from householder water users and the reinvestment for 
improvements to the water infrastructure. Therefore, actors attempting to interpret 
and follow it may make omissions that nobody will take responsibility for. A law 
that is difficult to understand causes decision makers to avoid enforcing and 
following it, and makes users bend it for their specific purposes. This is 
recurrently occurring with the LAN. 
Modifications to the LAN have suffered ambiguity because legislators responsible 
of its creation and modifications use vague concepts and technical language and 
writing that few law experts can understand. It is important that a national law 
could be understandable for everyone, experts and non-experts in law and water 
issues. Additionally, modifications to the law are expected being implemented. 
However, LAN cannot always be practically applied due to the articles might 
confuse the reader or there might be omissions of information that might be 
required in practice. 
The problem of the reforms to the LAN and the lack of regulation affect water 
governance because the legislative norms cannot be enforced, and thus the 
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objective of providing a good-quality service also fails. The DWSS needs to be 
regulated according to local socio-economic characteristics and water availability. 
The LAN should consider social and cultural needs of population, governance 
structure and management practices in order to involve the participation of 
different water institutions and water users in the governance and management of 
the DWSS. 
Currently it is recognised by water institutions and community members that there 
are customary institutions that assume responsibility for provision of DWSSs. 
These institutions establish their own rules and ways of enforcing them, which are 
legitimised by the population, who are then willing to follow those rules. 
Furthermore, DWSS authorities require continuous economic support to provide a 
good DWSS to domestic water users.  
Currently the existence of the LAN does not guarantee a good DWSS that is 
provided with sufficiency, enough pressure, and timeliness. Community water 
committees face various difficulties, a common one being related to the full 
recovery of payment from householder water users. There are also practical 
limitations that frequently constraint to carry out successful water payment 
collection at community level. These limitations are related to the fact that many 
local municipal authorities and water committee members do not have the 
necessary professional expertise or training to act as tax collectors. They are 
community members, many of whom work in a different economic activity and 
support their community by providing the DWSS. Municipal water authorities and 
water committee members may not be trained to manage the water infrastructure, 
make decisions about maintaining it in optimal condition, or keep the team 
updated on water-related issues. 
The LAN, as the main document governing water resources and the institutions 
governing the DWSS, should take into account the drinking water management of 
formal and informal water institutions, the socio-economic status of the 
population, and community needs in terms of water consumption. LAN should 
also motivate, through incentives, water institutions at municipal and community 
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level to provide the DWSS with enough pressure and quantity and when domestic 
users need it.  
4.3.3	  Municipal	  governance	  of	  drinking	  water	  
Like federal and state government, in accordance with the LAN, municipal 
councils, seeking to reduce administrative and financial pressures, delegate some 
responsibility to decentralised organisations, private institutions and independent 
customary institutions.  
In the case study communities the only decentralised organisation is AyST, which 
assumes responsibility for the DWSS for most of communities located in Toluca 
municipality territory. Almoloya de Juárez municipality does not have a 
decentralised water organisation. However, the municipal water institution 
provides the DWSS to most of their communities. Though, in both municipalities 
there are also customary water institutions responsible of the DWSS in their 
community. Compliance of the formal law in every municipality and community 
depends on who establishes the rules to govern and manage the DWSS and if 
those rules take into account domestic water users needs and water institution 
organisation. 
When a municipality delegates the DWSS to a community institution it not only 
means that the operation is moved from the municipal level to community level; 
other specific responsibilities such as water payment collection, infrastructure 
maintenance and updating the user database may also be transferred to 
communities. This means that the community institution responsible for the 
DWSS assumes full control of water management, operation and maintenance as it 
occurs with Santiaguito and San Francisco. According to information obtained 
from fieldwork, in many state of Mexico communities water committees take part 
in the administration and distribution of the DWSS. When a water committee 
governs and manage the DWSS, neither the municipal water office nor the 
decentralised organisation interferes with the making and enforcement of rules and 
decisions unless the community allows its participation. In an interview, carried 
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out in Toluca, an AyST representative mentioned that on average in each 
municipality of the State of Mexico: 
“There are at least seven or eight independent water committees. These water 
committees are not [formally] legalised. This means that CONAGUA does not have 
a register of them. In the state only 30 percent of independent water committees are 
regulated and approximately 8 percent do not have an urbanisation permit [that 
entitle them to use drinking water from a specific well] and freely administer the 
drinking water [to provide a free DWSS in their community]” (AyST representative, 
Toluca, June 2009). 
In the state of Mexico, thus, there are water committees in every municipality that 
assume full control of the DWSS, which because they are not recognised by 
CONAGUA as formal institutions, are classified by formal water institutions as 
unregulated bodies. However, the water committees have their own rules and are 
fully recognised in the communities that they serve, which see them as valid 
authorities governing and managing the DWSS.  
In previous sections I have analysed the formal laws and institutions that set the 
rules governing water. The following section goes to the next level to analyse how 
informal institutions govern the DWSS. 
4.3.4	  Customary	  governance	  at	  community	  level:	  water	  committees	  
At the community level, the national or state legislation is not necessarily 
considered an instrument for decision making related to ground water 
management. Neither does it affect the election of water committee members. 
However, community water institutions require a formal concession from 
CONAGUA to withdraw and manage groundwater. The period of governance of 
each water committee depends of the agreements between community and water 
committee members rather than the municipality period or the law. 
Customary rules govern the DWSS that manage San Mateo, San Francisco and 
Santiaguito communities. Customary rules are taken into account to govern and 
manage underground and surface water. However, the permission to access this 
water is provided with an official written concession granted by CONAGUA, 
which is giving water institutions specific property rights to extract and use 
underground water for human consumption. The rules governing water use are 
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agreed by community members and are as valid as State law. Nonetheless, there 
are different priorities involved on the governance of natural resources at 
community level. For example, the community carries out decision making by 
social consensus, so community meetings and social agreements are legitimate at 
the point of setting the rules and decision making. Mutual trust between the water 
committee and the community is important. Further analysis of community water 
management and the responsibilities of water committees are addressed in 
Chapter 5. The following section discusses an important topic implicit in formal 
and informal institutions’ provision of the DWSS: the rules, and how water 
institutions decide on DWSS water tariffs. 
4.4	  Water	  tariffs	  for	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
According to the LAN, the municipalities are responsible for supplying and 
collecting payment for the DWSS (Cámara de Diputados 2008). However, in 
practice they are not always able to supply all users with the DWSS neither to 
collect payment from all users. A similar situation also occurs with self-organised 
communities that have a water committee responsible for provision of the service. 
This section discusses the water tariff accepted by Toluca municipal council. This 
applies only within Toluca’s urban and peri-urban area, where San Mateo is 
located. San Francisco and Santiaguito communities have different tariffs agreed 
between community members and the water committee.  
According to the information I collected during my fieldwork, official water 
authorities from national and state institutions find three main reasons for 
municipal authorities’ inability to provide the DWSS and collect payment for it. 
Firstly, municipalities still have a busy agenda with many other responsibilities 
that make it difficult for them to focus on the payment collection for the DWSS, 
and are not always able to provide an efficient service to urban and rural areas, 
and so they delegate this responsibility to the community. Secondly, the water 
user database is frequently out of date, affecting full payment collection. Thirdly, 
the people involved in collecting and administering domestic water users’ 
payments are not always experts at doing so. These factors affect the water 
finances and infrastructure. 
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Customary institutions also have difficulties collecting domestic users’ payments, 
caused by out-of-date user checklists, lack of expertise of the people responsible 
for collecting payment and sometimes mismanagement of economic resources by 
the treasurer of the water committee. Customary institutions have their own set of 
rules for governing the prices set for the DWSS. The water committee assumes 
full responsibility for pricing the DWSS and collecting user payments. The 
following section analyses the drinking water tariffs approved for households by 
both official and customary legal systems. 
4.4.1	  Water	  users	  obligations	  to	  keep	  their	  right	  to	  receive	  the	  DWSS	  
According to the LAN, all water users must pay CONAGUA for the right to use 
water resources. In general, water tariffs are divided into five main groups: 
domestic consumption with a water meter; commercial consumption with a water 
meter; industrial consumption with a water meter; domestic use without a water 
meter; and commercial and industrial use without a water meter. 
The tariff applied depends on the amount of water required by each user for 
specific activities: domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, etc. For example, 
a well proprietor pays CONAGUA for the right to extract water while a domestic 
water user only has to pay the official or customary water institution for the 
DWSS they receive at household level.  
This case study focuses only on the tariffs paid by householders for water for 
domestic consumption. The tariff paid by domestic users usually depends either 
on the quantity of water consumed and the area of residence or it is fixed price 
agreed between the community and the water committee. It depends of how every 
community is organised. For example, in San Mateo, a household in a high-
income residential area technically pays a higher rate for the DWSS than 
householders of a medium-income residential area or than householders living in a 
low-income house. Water tariffs for domestic users in a government-run water 
governance system are priced differently. Prices are normally agreed in the 
municipal city council according to the population’s socio-economic 
characteristics, geographical location and availability of water resources. 
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For example, in Toluca municipality water pricing currently depends on the 
municipal, city council and AyST, which have approved the water tariff for the 
period 2007-2012. This tariff is valid in most of the municipal communities, 
including San Mateo community, where the official decentralised institution, 
AyST, collects the payment for the DWSS. Santiaguito and San Francisco water 
committees assume not only the provision of their own DWSS but also the pricing 
and collection of payments. 
San Mateo community householders’ payments for the DWSS to AyST are made 
every two months. The payments include the DWSS and sewage service but do 
not include wastewater treatment. The charge calculated for sewage is 20 percent 
of the total payment determined for water services included the DWSS (Gobierno 
del Estado de México, 2006). The tariff that water committees charge to San 
Francisco and Santiaguito community members only includes the DWSS. Tables 
4.2 and 4.3 show the water tariffs for the DWSS for domestic use approved by 
Toluca municipal council. These tariffs are applied to the communities located in 
Toluca municipal territory. Table 4.2 shows the tariffs for houses with a water 
meter and Table 4.3 shows those approved for houses without a water meter in 
Toluca municipality. The prices are in Mexican pesos. As a reference, 13 Mexican 
pesos are equivalent to 1 USA dollar. 
Table	  4.2	  Water	  tariff	  approved	  for	  domestic	  use	  in	  houses	  with	  water	  meter	  in	  
Toluca	  municipality	  
Consumption rates Tariffs for domestic consumption 
limits (M3) Low-income house 
Lower Upper Minimum tariff  (Mexican pesos) Tariff for m
3extra 
0 15 $ 89.62 $ 0.00 
16 30 $ 89.62 $ 6.49 
31 45 $ 187.03 $ 7.01 
46 60 $ 292.24 $ 7.54 
61 75 $ 405.24 $ 8.05 
76 100 $ 526.03 $ 9.09 
101 125 $ 753.33 $ 9.24 
126 150 $ 984.31 $ 16.07 
151 300 $ 1386.05 $ 17.57 
301 500 $ 4021.43 $ 18.70 
501 700 $7761.84 $ 19.63 
700 1200 $ 11687.88 $ 19.93 
1200 2000 $ 21652.94 $ 19.93 
Source: Gobierno del Estado de México (2006). 
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The prices approved by the city council are decided for low-income houses; these 
are houses located not in high-income residential areas but in peri-urban areas 
with limited services. According to my fieldwork, urban households in San Mateo 
that are close to the city centre have water meters, which determine the total 
amount they need to pay for the DWSS.  
Table 4.3 displays the water tariffs for houses without a water meter in Toluca 
municipalities. In San Mateo there are also houses without a water meter, mainly 
in rural and peri-urban areas. Based on data collected during my fieldwork period, 
the average a householder pays for the DWSS is $300 pesos (around £15) every 
two months for the drinking water they consume and the expenses for the 
operation, maintenance and repairs of the DWSS.  
Table	  4.3	  Water	  tariff	  approved	  for	  domestic	  use.	  Houses	  without	  water	  meter	  
in	  Toluca	  municipality	  
Water tariff for domestic use (without water meter) 
Tap diameter 
(millimetres) Description 
Cost per two months 
period 
13 Operation, maintenance and net reposition  $ 76.16 
13 Low-income rural household $ 202.99 
13 Low-income urban household $ 225.28 
13 Low-income media household $ 254.79 
13 Low-income high household $ 344.91 
13 Low residential household $ 479.94 
13 Medium residential household $ 668.94 
13 Medium-high residential household $ 1229.38 
13 High residential household $ 2044.10 
19 Special residential household $ 4279.67 
Source: Gobierno del Estado de México (2006).  
Water prices are approved according to the socio-economic status of the 
residential area that received the DWSS, what it is used for, and what is the social 
status of each household. An urban household, by law, should be charged more 
than a rural household for the water service they receive. This rule is only applied 
for urban areas where the official water institution provides water services. Table 
4.3 shows the water tariffs for different types of houses. The higher tariffs are 
charged for medium- and high-income residential households. The higher prices 
probably reflect the quality of the water service provided, which includes daily 
drinking water provision, sewage disposal, infrastructure and maintenance. The 
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tariff charged takes into account whether provision of the DWSS is 24-hour, and 
its operation, maintenance, repairs and repositioning when necessary.  
Table 4.3 shows that a low-income rural, low-income residential, or medium-
income rural household receive a cheaper water supply service than urban, 
medium- and high-income households. The tariff that a householder pays also 
depends on the characteristics and quality of the DWSS provided in the area they 
are living. Usually, the municipal city council (Cabildo) approves the water tariffs 
for communities and villages that are part of the municipal territory. However, 
prices for DWSSs governed and managed by customary communities follow a 
different pattern.  
Customary water committees manage the drinking water and charge for the 
DWSS in rural and peri-urban areas. The DWSS is priced differently from official 
institution DWSS. The lower cost of the DWSS in rural and peri-urban houses is 
based on the characteristics of the service, which tends to be provided only on two 
or three days a week. The price of water in communities organised by customary 
water committees reflects the limited pressure, continuity and timing of the 
service provided. Either, official or customary the pricing and management of the 
DWSS the water tariffs should be sensitive to any social, political, economic and 
environmental requirements of the geographical space, such as it was agreed by 
Tortajada (2010) and Biswas and Tortajada (2010b). The tariffs for the DWSS 
agreed between the water committees and community members in the three case 
study communities are included and characterised in Table 7.2 of chapter 7. 
4.5	  Inconsistencies	  in	  the	  legislation:	  main	  failures	  in	  water	  governance	  
According to Bourguett Ortíz et al. (2007) Representatives from official water 
institutions, affirm that there are four main reasons for water management 
problems: 1) lack of a good legislation; 2) lack of compliance with the legislative 
norms, 3) variety of actors and water uses and d) unpaid water bills. This 
information was corroborated in a group discussion with academics participating 
with the AMH, in November 2008, and semi-structured interviews with 
government representatives from CONAGUA, CAEM and AyST in October-
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November 2008 and June 2009. Some of these difficulties are caused by the low 
enforcement of LAN because it does not specifically address the main 
consumption practices of underground water, identified in the field. Management 
problems are frequently related to financial difficulties operating the DWSS, 
collecting payment from all water users, managing and distributing drinking water 
resources, maintaining the system, recovering operational costs and reinvesting in 
infrastructure. 
Customary water management practices do not necessarily take into account 
formal laws and regulations governing drinking water because customary 
communities have their own set of rules; for example, there should be a water 
committee governing and managing ground water, water committee should be 
integrated only by community members who have to be elected in community 
meetings, and that provision drinking water is a community service rather than a 
job. Their traditional way of organising themselves involves this set of rules, 
inherited over generations, which enables customary governance and management 
of water. Traditional or customary governance practices in the three case study 
communities have been learnt from experience and from elders. Learning from 
experience enhances social improvements of most community members, who 
decide their own set of rules and how to organise themselves. These communities 
follow their own rules, agreed within community members, rather than obeyed 
from the official water law. They also have their own tariff structure and 
arrangements for collection of payments. 
Municipal water institutions receive a specific budget each year from the federal 
government to invest in and maintain the water infrastructure. However, informal 
institutions do not receive a budget because they are not included in the list of 
official water institutions. Customary communities rarely benefit from municipal 
financial resources unless the municipality assesses the need to improve the 
drinking water infrastructure, extend the system or dig a new well as urgent and 
highly necessary. 
One more failure in governing the DWSS is in the formal hydraulic planning and 
daily water management of formal and informal institutions. National hydraulic 
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planning is not developed according to water management practices. The main 
problem is that the national hydraulic programme (PNH) pays more attention to 
activities that generate a profit for the water sector, such as the use of water for 
agriculture and industry, than to providing water for human consumption. This 
disjuncture, according to information provided in focus groups with academics, 
legislators and government representatives in Mexico, is caused by the different 
interests of formal water institutions enhancing water for economic activities, the 
legislation and the current management of drinking water. Legislation is mainly 
created to defend specific projects that might generally benefit the economy or 
private companies’ investments. The problem occurs when projects accepted at 
state and municipal level are not compatible with society’s common interests. 
According to academics’ perceptions obtained from a focus group, carried out in 
UNAM in October 2008 the problem is closely related to decision making: 
“The law says one thing – how the system should be built, when [and] where; 
however, the decision makers in turn are those professionals that make the final 
decisions. They decide according to their experience and perceptions rather than 
taking into account community [members] participation and common consensus” 
(Academics, UNAM, October 2008). 
The current disjuncture between the two water governance systems is exacerbated 
by poor communication between the formal and informal governance systems and 
among administrative levels. My fieldwork identified that there is more 
communication about water-related issues between the national and municipal 
levels and between the national and community level than with the state level. A 
member of AyST, mentioned in an interview carried out in June 2009: 
“There is no communication, mainly, between the states and the municipalities. 
There is a disconnection between CAEM [state of Mexico Water Commission] and 
the municipalities. It is supposed that CAEM officially plays the role of intermediary 
between CONAGUA and the municipalities … however, this relationship usually 
occurs directly between federal government and the municipalities. Federal 
government only allocates responsibilities to [formal] institutions while 
municipalities carry out the activities in practice. Federal government creates the 
laws and municipalities execute them. Thus, CAEM, which is a state institution, 
remains relatively inactive” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
This disjuncture in the communication of information is a frequent cause of 
problems related to the governance and management of the DWSS: it is both a 
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problem at the point of creating and enforcing the rules, and affects provision of 
the DWSS in practice.  
Political changes at state or municipal level are also significant at the point of 
making and implementing decisions and policies. The information management 
among official water institutions at state or municipal level can have serious 
implications when political parties are involved. For example, during election 
periods in the state of Mexico it is common to hear political parties promises to 
solve DWSS problems if the population vote for them. Candidates’ main promises 
are to expand the water infrastructure, charge less for the DWSS and supply 
drinking water directly to households. However, after the election there is usually 
no improvement in either the infrastructure or the DWSS. A public administrator, 
representative from AyST, affirmed in June 2009 in a semi-structured interview: 
“It is necessary to leave aside political barriers. It is necessary to leave aside ideas 
such as: if this governor comes from a different political party, public information 
[for example about costs, expenses, investment] shall be restricted” (Public 
administrator, Toluca, June 2009). 
Governors and scholars have identified problems with the ways in which 
legislators and water institutions work (Béjar Algazi 2009). They raise three main 
issues: difficulty in understanding the legislation and failure to update it; lack of 
action taken by legislators and government representatives once they win an 
election; and the changes experienced every three or six years when a political 
governance period ends which affect water administration and the management of 
the DWSS.  
With regard to the first of these issues, Mexican legislators and scholars (Lehoucq 
et al. 2005; Wilder and Romero Lankao 2006) think that LAN has had problems 
with clarity, fulfilment of the implementation of the law to govern and manage 
water resources and enforcement of the law due to continuous reforms. They are 
aware that LAN is not updated, despite the reforms. Legislators and CONAGUA 
representatives, in a focus group mentioned that they see each reform to LAN as 
document they had to bring up to date without bringing depth changes. It is only 
an up to date version of the previous LAN. Each LAN version has had few yearly 
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changes to the access to water resources and has the approval of water-related 
regulations. The changes depend on the main issues legislators need to discuss 
and quickly approve. Thus, it is difficult for legislators to discuss the truly 
important issues in depth because one year is not enough time to promote and to 
do a new LAN. They only have time to do some small changes and present them 
as an up to date LAN version. They consider it is important to reform and improve 
the legislation; otherwise water governance might be affected. In a focus group 
carried out in October 2008 with government representatives at national level, a 
public sector employee suggested: 
“The option is to ask the legislators for a new water law. If we put another patch on 
the LAN today we may be making another mistake like the one in 2004. Instead, a 
clear, simple law, with few articles, with a short regulation, understandable to 
everyone, experts and non-experts, is needed. Non-experts have to become experts in 
understanding [the LAN] or the country would be going on without direction” 
(Facilitator of LAN, Mexico City, October 2008). 
This point is important because it reflects the importance of making severe 
changes to the LAN. The reforms in 2004 and 2006 were neither deep nor useful 
because they failed to improve the water sector in general and the DWSS in 
particular. These reforms were general; addressing the involvement of private 
sector, decentralisation and suggesting increased public participation in the 
governance of water. Nevertheless, in practice these changes cannot always be 
implemented because of the particularities of every community. This is the case in 
customary communities, which are not formally recognised although they govern 
and manage the DWSS at community level. The LAN reforms have constrained 
not only State institutions but also customary institutions’ improvement of the 
water infrastructure because of economical constrains, which consequently affect 
the delivery of the DWSS. Lack of payment for the DWSS and incomplete 
payment by householders generates delay in covering operational expenses also 
affecting the DWSS. CONAGUA representative, retired engineer, in a semi-
structured interview developed in October 2008 agreed that a change in the LAN 
is necessary: 
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“We can have the best legislation in the country and the most reliable. However, they 
are not followed because there is no political will. There is not an appropriate water 
management by operational organisations. Neither there are the technical capacity or 
sufficient economic and human resources to operate the water infrastructure. 
Countries that have attained high levels of improvement have done so because the 
population has asked for it. If the government continues promising but not doing it, if 
people do not insist, [Mexico is] not going to get there ... It is also a matter of a 
culture of political will. Politicians need to work: laws and regulations that can be 
followed need to be made” (Engineer CONAGUA representative, Toluca, October 
2008). 
A member of the Mexican senate commented in a focus group, in October 
2008, on this point: 
“The law should continuously be reformed. If there are technological improvements, 
the law should also be improved to enable it to adapt to the new changes” (Senator 
president of the water resources commission, Mexico, October 2008). 
The legislation needs much improvement. Legislators need to change current 
governance practices and look for common social advantages adapted to the 
continuous social requirements rather than to personal or political interests related 
to fulfilling electoral campaign promises after an electoral campaign finishes. I 
identified strong concerns by population about how politicians govern. According 
to fieldwork, community members and professionals see the political parties using 
the electoral system for personal gain and to have a chair in the parliament that 
economically favour themselves. Béjar Algazi (2009) thinks that in parliament, 
deputies and senators find the opportunity to make personal decisions even when 
these decisions cannot be implemented. 
Once political candidates have won an election they become totally uninterested in 
the common good and campaign promises are forgotten. Winning politicians focus 
on political compromises with other politicians or investors rather than on the 
good of the majority of the Mexicans s/he represents (Béjar Algazi, 2009). At the 
end of each government period, actors in civil society, academics, local 
entrepreneurs and even decision makers quickly assess the government period. 
The recurrent outcome shows low political will by parliament representatives to 
fulfil the political campaign promises and governance agreements with the citizens 
to create the water sector reforms that Mexico requires. A decentralised water 
institution employee, in an interview carried out in June 2009, stated: 
Chapter	  4.	  The	  rules	  governing	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
131	  
	  
“There are ways [of updating and enforcing legislative norms, internal regulations, 
financial codes, even the current LAN, or the penal code]. But there is no political 
will. The problem is that the government lacks the awareness and [political] will to 
do its job and to solve immediate [water] problems” (AyST representative, Toluca, 
June 2009). 
One of the main impacts of this political will failure to fulfil managerial 
agreements with community population affects the quality of the DWSS. This 
failure to improve the DWSS, affects householders’ willingness to pay for it and 
their trust in the water authority. 
Finally, the third problem is the short period of governance, which is three years at 
municipal level and six at state or federal level. The three-year period of 
governance limits management of the DWSS and investment in long-term projects 
to improve the water infrastructure. According to an official water institution 
representative, affirm in an interview that the three-year period affects the 
continuity of water projects: 
“I think government transitions are what damage water organisations most. 
Transitions have damaged the governance and management of water because 
everybody changes around after elections and nobody working with water, at the 
official level, continues with water projects. Water is politicised. Everybody goes; 
everybody is doing whatever they want … and the new governors just have three 
years of government” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
In a three-year administrative period, short-term water projects are the first to get 
attention from the water authority. Short-term projects include small repairs such 
as fixing leaks. An UNAM engineer, retired from CONAGUA affirmed:  
“Of the entire water distribution system, approximately 85 percent is likely to have 
leaks. When leaks appear, water institutions just weld the pipes. If necessary, they 
change a small piece or they cover it with a piece of inner tube …” (Retired from 
CONAGUA, UNAM, Mexico city, June 2009). 
However, some parts of the system require total replacement or major repairs. 
This is the point at which the problem becomes cyclic, because total replacement 
is a long-term project that frequently cannot be addressed due to economic 
constraints or lack of time to carry them out at the municipal level. A member of 
AyST, in an interview carried out in June 2009, complained: 
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“Repairs are, in the long term, more expensive that installing a totally new system. 
However, there is no long-term project to do this … and repairs are never finished 
because there is no financial management. So much money has been spent on the 
water infrastructure because it is very old; it is greatly damaged. However, 
governments do not like to invest huge amounts. Thus invested money is used to 
mend leaks or to change just a piece of the system; but they do not invest more 
money in improving the entire system. Every government period is the same: 
obviously we all know the reason. We know the problems that municipalities face 
due to governmental transitions …” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
The problems highlighted above increase when the political party in power also 
changes after the election. Political party change brings serious consequences for 
the formal public administration of water. In municipalities, political changes 
mainly have negative impacts because in only three years of governance the 
government has to learn, plan, and operate decisions. Compared with the state and 
the country, municipalities have the shortest governance period. This presents a 
daily challenge in terms of drinking water administration and operation, not only 
for the water authorities but also for the water users, who suffer as consequence 
water insufficiency problems. For example, it is difficult to implement rapid 
improvements in terms of water governance in a three-year governance period 
because: 
“The first year [the water authority] is occupied with learning what to do. It is also 
used to build political relationships. The second year is used to work; you work for 
just one year, because the last year is used to close the governing period. After that, 
elections start again. [Therefore] you have to stop collecting money from users and 
threatening users in debt with a reduction in the service [DWSS] if they do not pay. 
You also have to stop many administrative and practical activities because re-
election time is approaching. And you close and finish on-going activities in the 
middle of the year. Thus in this short period you realise that there is no continuity for 
long-term projects … you have to stop because you just have three years. You do 
your work in just two or three years, and there is no chance of keeping working” 
(AyST representative, interview, Toluca, June 2009). 
Taking their short period of governance into account, water authorities work only 
according to what they know they are likely to carry out during the second year. 
They do not worry about what they could do; they just do whatever they can 
according to the economic resources and period of governance available to them. 
At community level something similar happens. Customary institutions undergo 
even more frequent changes in water governance by water institutions: on average 
every water committee changes each year. The new water committee members 
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have to learn how to govern and manage the DWSS from the shared experience of 
the previous water committee members and complement it with their own 
experience and daily management practice. 
4.6	  Conclusions	  
This chapter has analysed the legal plural laws, formal legislation and informal 
rules and the instruments governing the DWSS in Mexico. Specifically, the 
analysis takes into account the set of legal rules and laws that govern water 
resources and discusses the institutions that use these laws and rules at municipal 
and community level to govern and manage the DWSS. The chapter also analyses 
the tariffs approved by water institutions for the provision of the DWSS.  
State law governing water resources in Mexico appoints CONAGUA as the main 
institution to set out the LAN. This national water law should also be adopted at 
the local levels that govern water resources. There are many issues related to the 
DWSS that the state of Mexico current water law, financial code and regulations 
do not yet consider. Specifically, legislation is needed to support water services, 
especially the DWSS supplied by customary water institutions. It is important that 
communities using customary and traditional practices of water management and 
governance – as is the case in San Francisco, Santiaguito and San Mateo – 
continue providing this DWSS to maintain the water rights to use underground 
water from the community to supply drinking water to community households. 
Legislation is needed to support these community water committees with a budget 
to enable them to improve their DWSS, tariff system and payment collection. 
Improvements to approved tariffs and collection of payments might increase 
investment in infrastructure, maintenance and repairs. In the case of San Mateo it 
is important that the law allows the water committee to share and exchange 
information with AyST as well as receiving some budget from this institution to 
improve its management practices.  
Improvements to the DWSS are needed both as a priority national strategy and as 
a local reality. Formal and informal laws, rules and regulations and how the water 
institutions of both systems operate and enforce them require updating. The 
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relevance of both systems must be recognised by the legal-plural water 
institutions in order to improve the DWSS not only at municipal but also at 
community level. In the case of the official institutions governing this service, a 
strong and updated water law is required that explicitly regulates the DWSS 
according to the population’s needs. This legislation should take into account not 
only the performance of the institutions providing the DWSS but also the quality 
of the service provided. At community level there is no written law; however, the 
customary rules are as valid as the law, and this must be taken into account by 
customary institutions when managing the DWSS and domestic water users 
receiving the service. 
A new and updated national and state law governing water resources and the 
provision of services, explicitly including the DWSS is needed. It should be clear, 
precise and understandable by everyone and should also take into account the 
differences and particularities of every administrative level, including community 
level. Finally, its use and enforcement should be sensitive to the context in which 
it is used. 
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Chapter	  5.	  Main	  Actors	  Participating	  in	  the	  Provision	  of	  the	  
Drinking	  Water	  Supply	  Service	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
Multiple actors participate in the governance, management and operation of the 
provision of drinking water at community level. My fieldwork identified actors 
related to the DWSS in Santiaguito, San Mateo and San Francisco communities 
with origins in one of three different roots: official, i.e. CONAGUA and AyST; 
customary, i.e. water committees and community members; and private, i.e. well 
proprietors and water vendors. This chapter analyses these main actors and 
investigates how they influence governance of the drinking water supply service 
in Mexico.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first introduces the chapter. 
The next, based on formal institutions, analyses who are the official actors 
participating in the governance and management of water at national and 
municipal level and how they relate with legal plural water institutions at lower 
administrative levels. The third section analyses, through community management, 
legitimate customary actors involved in the provision of DWSS to the three case 
study communities, how they make decisions and how they legitimate customary 
water authorities. The fourth section addresses local private actors who provide 
drinking water to households not only in the case study communities but also in 
neighbouring communities and the way they are legitimised. 
5.2	  Official	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  governance	  and	  management	  of	  the	  
drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
Based on article 4 of the LAN, water management in Mexico should be guided by 
CONAGUA (Cámara de Diputados 2008), which is responsible for allocating 
concessions to water institutions at national, state, municipal and community level. 
CONAGUA is responsible for creating and enforcing official laws that govern 
water at different levels. It is not involved in the practical operation and delivery 
of the DWSS as it allocates responsibility for this to local levels. In the state of 
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Mexico, CAEM represents CONAGUA and legislates and administers the 
different water uses, including the DWSS.  
National and state formal actors are not the only water institutions regulating and 
managing drinking water. There are other State-based and social actors 
participating in the management of the DWSS, for example formal local 
governments at municipal and district level, customary local authorities and user 
associations (Ribot 2004; Torres Espinosa 2004).  
Official institutions, especially both municipal and decentralised water institutions, 
such as AyST, tend to maintain close relations and direct contact with 
CONAGUA. This direct relationship is particularly required when a water 
concession at local level is required. CAEM as state water institution do not 
maintain a direct relationship with CONAGUA because CAEM only focuses on 
the approval of water legislation and the rules adopted from CONAGUA and then 
allocate practical responsibilities to lower administrative levels. The level of 
interaction among administrative levels, especially at national and state level, 
generates a disjuncture because, as mentioned by a member of AyST in an 
interview carried out in June 2009:  
“There is no communication, generally, between the state of Mexico and the 
municipality. There is a disconnection between the State of Mexico Water 
Commission (CAEM) and the municipalities. CAEM is officially supposed to play 
the role of intermediary between the National Water Commission and the 
municipalities … however; these relationships usually occur directly between the 
federal government [represented by CONAGUA] and the municipalities. The federal 
government provides responsibilities to official institutions while municipalities 
carry out the activities in practice. The federal government creates laws and the 
municipalities execute them. And CAEM remains relatively inactive” (AyST Public 
Administrator, Toluca, June 2009) 
This direct communication and coordination among the administrative levels is 
represented in Figure 5.1, below, in which the arrows show that there is direct 
communication between the federal government represented by CONAGUA and 
the municipality, CONAGUA and CAEM, CONAGUA and local private 
institutions, and between CONAGUA and customary institutions. However, there 
is no close relationship between local water institutions such as AyST and the 
water committees, or between CAEM and the water committees. According to the 
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fieldwork carried out, there is no communication at all between CAEM and AyST 
because CAEM is a state institution that does not have responsibilities of 
provision and AyST is a decentralised institution with practical responsibilities to 
provide drinking water. They both have different purposes and objectives. 
Other actors interacting within the management of the DWSS are water vendors 
and domestic water users. They have unofficial relationships; though, they get 
involved in the management of drinking water. Water vendors, have direct 
relation with local private well proprietors and community householders. 
Domestic water users, have direct relationships with water committees, water 
vendors when necessary (when they do not receive drinking water as they expect), 
and some communities with AyST, when they have to pay for the DWSS received. 
The relationships between these institutions that govern and manage the drinking 
water are set out below. 
Figure	  5.1	  Hierarchical	  relations	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  drinking	  water	  
 
 
 Source: Author 
This figure shows the main actors involved in water governance and their 
relationships. It shows CONAGUA as the main water institution with more direct 
relationships with other legal-plural water institutions and actors than other water 
institutions at lower levels. CONAGUA maintains hierarchical relations with 
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water institutions at state, municipal and community levels. The implications of 
these relations influence the quantity of water and the source each institution is 
allowed to access. For example, CONAGUA legitimises property rights of the 
state of Mexico over specific wells. Also, CONAGUA legitimises through title 
concessions the quantity of water and the wells AyST and municipalities are 
allowed to exploit to provide the DWSS within their communities. Moreover, 
CONAGUA maintain relationship with water committees of some communities 
when a water title concession is required. This title detail the characteristics of the 
well, the amount of water granted per year to only provide the DWSS and the 
water quality necessary to provide for human consumption. Section 2.7 elaborated 
about those difficulties in terms of quality and quantity of the DWSS faced in 
community water governance due to institutions relationships and their 
performance. Finally, CONAGUA also maintain direct relationships with private 
institutions to grant water concessions to withdraw groundwater for industrial or 
commercial purposes, or for providing DWSS. Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3 reflect on 
these issues later on. Each water institution adopts the CONAGUA mandates 
required for water governance and management at the level they represent. CAEM 
adopts and adapt CONAGUA’s mandates to the requirements of water 
management at state level and mandates municipalities to comply with the 
national water legislation.  
Figure 5.1 also shows the particular direct relationships that water institutions and 
actors − AyST, water committees, and private water actors − maintain with 
CONAGUA, and vice versa. These actors maintain a continuous relation with 
CONAGUA with regard to two main issues: first, updating permission to 
withdraw water, and second payment to CONAGUA for the water rights that 
enable their continued permission to withdraw underground water and manage the 
DWSS. The part of the legislation that attracts more attention at municipal level is 
related to payment for water and payments that guarantee permission to withdraw 
and use national waters.9 These payments, on paper and practically, guarantee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Water found within the national territory, also called national waters, ie water from natural lakes, 
permanent or intermittent rivers and canals (from the headwater to the end in the sea), the sea, 
lakes, lagoons, estuaries, torrential water, springs, fonts and water extracted from quarries. 
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recognition of water rights of those actors responsible of providing drinking water. 
However, it does not practically guarantee water rights of domestic water users. 
According to the Mexican Constitution, municipal government is the lowest level 
to which the official administration is divided. Because of the position of 
municipality as part of the official hierarchical structure, the municipality is 
officially allowed to administer itself and to regulate the DWSS according to 
National Constitution requirements (Cámara de Diputados 2010). 
Municipalities make decisions about DWSS issues based on formal rules 
approved at the upper hierarchical levels. A municipality has multiple 
responsibilities, which include administering and providing the DWSS to the total 
municipal population. However, providing this service is a difficult task and the 
municipal authority is not always able to do it; therefore the federal and municipal 
governments have approved the delegation of the DWSS to local institutions such 
as municipal decentralised organisations, or gives entire responsibility to 
customary institutions represented by community water committees.10  
Decentralised institutions are officially recognised by law and interact on a top-
down, hierarchical constitutional basis. Decisions made under decentralised 
schemes have to follow general national requirements; at the same time, decision-
making about the operation and payment collection of the water infrastructure is 
independent of decisions made at national and state level. Decentralised 
organisations have gained some autonomy to make and operate decisions. This is 
the case of AyST, which has managerial responsibility for water resources, and 
specifically for the DWSS.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The decentralisation of water managements aims to move it from higher (federal institutions) to 
lower governmental levels (state or municipal institutions). Additionally, the privatisation of 
resource management focuses on the delegation of responsibilities from the public to the private 
sector, including more market participation to promote economic growth. Finally, with public 
participation the need was stressed for more social actors’ involvement in state activities, such as 
water protection, to achieve appropriate use of water and help to encourage a culture of caring for 
and protecting natural resources (Wilder and Romero, 2006). 
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5.2.1	  The	  role	  of	  the	  AyST	  institution	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  DWSS	  
AyST is the official water institution and local authority. It is a decentralised 
institution with several responsibilities related to the management of drinking 
water. For example, it is responsible for providing the DWSS to different 
communities in Toluca municipality. It is also responsible for collecting water 
user payments and for maintaining the water infrastructure. 
CONAGUA expects AyST to seek to recover its investment in the water 
infrastructure and services according to the mandates of LAN that emphasise that 
water is an economic good and that its use must be priced and charged for. As an 
official institution, AyST recognises the necessity for official water rights to 
enforce water users’ duties and obligations when it comes to the DWSS. It plays 
an important role in San Mateo community, where it collects householder water 
user payments. It does not collect payment in Santiaguito and San Francisco 
communities because they are in a different municipality and are wholly organised 
by a customary water governance system. In San Mateo, AyST is responsible for 
charging for the DWSS according to the tariffs already set and approved by the 
municipal council, and for collecting user payments. However, a water committee 
runs the DWSS in San Mateo.  
The connection observed in the field between official and customary systems of 
governance in San Mateo is the coordination between these systems to avoid 
overlapping of responsibilities. For example, in San Mateo the water committee 
provides the DWSS to households while AyST collects user payments on a 
monthly, bi-monthly or annual basis. However, there are failures related when the 
DWSS depends partially on a customary and partially on an official institution. 
The failure is generated due to the disconnection between payment collection and 
reinvestment in the DWSS. Based on fieldwork information the water committee 
in San Mateo provides the DWSS but cannot charge for it or re-invest in the 
infrastructure. But AyST does it. Maintenance and small repairs depend on the 
water committee, who also solicit community support. By contrast, in Santiaguito 
and San Francisco the water committee have full responsibility for providing the 
DWSS and collecting users payment. Table 5.1 summarises the major similarities 
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and differences among the case studies in relation to the main authorities that 
manage the DWSS. 
Table	  5.1	  Similarities	  and	  differences	  among	  the	  case	  studies	  
Community 
Characteristic San Mateo San Francisco Santiaguito 
Operation of DWSS 
infrastructure Water committee Water committee Water committee 
Pricing water Official city council Water committee Water committee 
Payment collection 
from domestic water 
users 
AyST Water committee Water committee 
Reinvestment in water 
infrastructure    
Maintenance  Water committee  Water committee  Water committee 
Small repairs  Water committee  Water committee  Water committee 
Large repairs Water committee with federal budget 
Water committee & 
community members 
Water committee & 
community members 
Source: Author 
As the table shows, San Mateo is the only community with mixed official and 
customary water governance; both official and customary institutions are involved 
in the management of drinking water. AyST is involved in the collection of 
domestic water user payments, but it does not reinvest the money it collects in the 
water infrastructure for the community. The water committee provide the DWSS 
and therefore assumes responsibility for maintenance of the infrastructure and 
carries out small repairs when necessary. 
This section has addressed the official actors involved in the provision of the 
DWSS. The following section analyses customary actors participating in the 
governance and management of the DWSS at community level. 
5.3	  Customary	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  governance	  and	  management	  of	  
the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
Community management plays an important role in the provision of the DWSS at 
community level. Some communities that are organised according to custom in 
Mexico adopt management of the provision of the DWSS to community 
households. The community members organise themselves, according to 
community needs, to provide this service. This section analyses how the San 
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Mateo, San Francisco and Santiaguito communities manage their DWSS and how 
each water committee governs this service according to its own specific rules. 
As mentioned in section 5.2, customary actors − water committees and 
community members − are also an important part of water governance and 
management at community level. Water committees and community members are 
directly involved in the governance of the DWSS because they set the rules that 
govern the administration of water resources. The water committee is the main 
customary water authority that carries out agreements made by community 
members. Community institutions allocate and distribute drinking water among 
community households. The community management approach suggests that local 
government, including customary institutions, knows the common interests of 
community members as well as their needs, which must be covered, and so, might 
be better suited than a centralised structure. 
The strengths of a customary system governing and managing the DWSS is that 
as community members they know community needs and they might directly 
work with water users to solve likely problems. One more advantage is that water 
extracted and supplied in a community does not have to travel long distances 
because water well is located in the community. Also, any leak or minor 
infrastructure damage can be fixed faster than in a large community governed by 
the municipality. However, there are also weaknesses, for example, a customary 
system might not always have the economic resources to cover all expenses, 
especially large repairs. A likely disadvantage is that water committee members 
have to learn alone, by experience; though, in the beginning of the governance 
period they do not entirely know the drinking water supply system. 
By contrast, formal water institutions also present strengths and weaknesses in the 
management of the DWSS. Strength is that formal institutions might receive or 
collect more economic resources to cover water supply operation and maintenance 
because they are able to receive money from ramo 33 and collect more users 
payments. Public employees working in water institutions are trained to 
understand the functioning of the DWSS and operate it. However, a disadvantage 
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is that communities receiving a formal DWSS do not have the property rights of 
the well used to withdraw drinking water.  
Community management and property rights of communities over water resources 
is a key issue; first because of the rights and second because of the cultural 
identity of communities to manage their water resources. Therefore, even though 
the difficulties faced by customary communities to manage the DWSS it is an 
advantage keeping the possibility of managing their water resources and owning 
property rights to control them. Therefore, in the case study communities, the 
customary system to govern the DWSS is the best option for community members 
to manage this service because it allows the involvement of a plurality of actors 
when there are failures in the quality of the service. In terms of quality of the 
service a customary system is not always the best option because it has frequent 
failures. However, it is also important water committee representatives receive 
training to manage this service and improve the quality of it. In terms of 
governance and decision making, customary water governance system is the best 
option because it let water committee and community members legitimate 
common decisions according to their needs. Also, the implementation of decisions 
might be faster than at municipal level. 
There have been successful cases of community management where community 
members are organised to govern a specific resource (see Doe and Khan 2004). 
Community management allows the use of customary structures of governance in, 
for example, electing and legitimating water authorities and setting and enforcing 
the rules. Community management of drinking water is a customary 
organisational system through which the DWSS is provided to community 
households. This section discusses the customary management of drinking water 
and the rules that govern the DWSS in San Mateo, Santiaguito and San Francisco 
communities. The section is divided into two main subsections: socioeconomic 
structure and community size, and water committees. 
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5.3.1	  Community	  management	  of	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
Small communities demonstrate greater availability than large ones for 
participating in community management projects (Doe and Khan 2004). 
Specifically, self-organised communities decide whether they would like to be 
involved in particular projects. They usually select those that suit community 
needs. The case study communities maintain a customary system for the operation 
of the DWSS. Decisions are made by community members according to what they 
think is best for the majority, and the water committee. In the cases studied it is 
common not only to reach consensus but also to inform individuals about 
decisions, agreements and plans that might help them in the continuation of the 
community management of the DWSS. A water committee representative from 
Santiaguito community spoke about this in a focus group: 
“How we work is simple: every time a new water committee starts [managing the 
DWSS, the previous water committee] calls for a community meeting. In that 
meeting the rules and agreements for that year are settled. The new water committee 
is introduced, and community members know how it will work that year. The 
population can suggest things and they also ask questions about their plan” 
(Santiaguito water committee member, Santiaguito, July 2010). 
For a community-managed DWSS to succeed, as illustrated in the analytical 
framework, it is necessary to understand the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
population. The case studies are all different even though customary water 
institutions manage them all. The outcomes of their governance and management 
are also different in every community, as I discuss in this chapter. According to 
Doe and Khan (2004) the success of communities organised by custom to manage 
the DWSS is not based on the community size, that suggest small communities 
are more successful than large ones, but on the specific social and economic 
characteristics of their inhabitants, the particular legal plural community 
management and the local agreements that most benefit the majority of water 
users. These characteristics are explained in section 5.3.2 and summarised in table 
5.2 and 5.3. Scholars’ recognition of these differences is necessary in order to 
approach and understand community management taking into account the 
particular context of each one. If water authorities also approach communities and 
understand their needs and the way in which they are organised they may succeed 
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in the governance and management of the DWSS. The following section describes 
and analyses the socio-economic characteristics of the peri-urban case study 
communities.	  
5.3.2	   Municipal	   socioeconomic	   profile	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   the	   studied	  
communities	  
The municipal socioeconomic profiles shown in Table 5.2 were obtained from 
data generated by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) in 
order to explain how municipal statistics, through the years, also illustrate what 
happen at the community level. 11  This municipal behaviour approaches to 
community level dynamics. 
Table	   5.2	   Socio-­‐economic	   profiles	   for	   Toluca	   and	   Almoloya	   de	   Juárez	  
municipalities	  
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Municipality 
 
Variable 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Total 
population 84,140 488,293 96,651 560,564 110,489 654,898 126,163 747,512 
Population 
in all homes 81,471 478,568 
Inconsistent 
data  
Inconsistent 
data 104,024 633,927 120,459 707,848 
Total 
literate 
population 
56,221 380,902 67,173 451,356 76,149 513,765 92,624 589,002 
Male 
household 
heads 
72,114 411,345 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  87,648 529,818 105,432 586,750 
Female 
household 
heads 
9,357 67,223 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  16,376 104,109 15,027 121,098 
Illiterate 
household 
head 
18,977 58,598 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  19,054 51,015 14,449 41,756 
Population 
with 
incomplete 
primary 
education 
38,017 119,814 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  36,659 108,870 34,900 85,747 
Population 
with 
complete 
primary  
14,803 98,732 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  25,467 125,139 32,246 133,164 
Population. 
with 
technical or 
commercial 
studies  
406 6,657 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  76 2,612 38 1,241 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 There were limitations to obtaining information by locality from the 2005 and 2010 censuses 
because not all indicators were available by locality. Thus, in order to approch community 
dynamics it was necessary to approach and to analyse the municipal data. 
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Population 
with 
incomplete 
secondary 
education 
1,085 19,459 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  2,029 23,185 2,841 19,944 
Population 
with 
complete 
secondary 
education 
3,435 47,674 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  12,099 118,414 21,645 159,371 
Population 
with 
complete 
high school 
education 
1,499 53,382 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  4,410 89,252 7,525 119,351 
Population 
with higher 
education 
(e.g. 
university 
degree) 
1,139 66,009 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  3,059 106,703 4,368 132,433 
Source: INEGI (2011a) 
The municipal statistics show the population growth in Almoloya de Juárez and 
Toluca over the years. A growing population requires continually-growing DWSS 
provision to cover its domestic needs. At community level, population growth 
also demands more services and expansion of the DWSS network.  
Table 5.2 also shows the educational variables in both municipalities. This 
information is important because it helps to understand the populations’ socio-
economic status and consequently ability to afford and demand a good-quality 
DWSS. The education variables show the community members’ levels of 
qualification. Some of community members are water committee members and 
are the water authorities that govern and manage the DWSS at community level. 
By 2005, 72.65%, a significant proportion of Almoloya de Juárez’s population did 
not complete basic state education – primary, secondary and high school. By 2005, 
73.4%, the majority of the municipal population was literate, even though a large 
proportion had not reached the average of basic education level set by the country 
or even finished their basic education. In 2000, 31 percent of the population was 
illiterate, decreasing to 26.5 percent in 2005. In 2000 and 2005 there was still a 
large number of inhabitants with incomplete primary (27.66%) and secondary 
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education (2.25%).12 The average education of the inhabitants of this municipality 
ranges from incomplete primary to complete secondary education. According to 
field observation and informal talks, a large proportion of males are employed in 
agricultural jobs or are employees as technician in the industrial sector. Also, a 
significant proportion of the population focused on learning the technical 
activities required for the job they develop – in daily practice –. Females, 
respectively, work mainly as housewives and cleaners. In this municipality only a 
small percentage of the population has finished high school, and some even have 
higher education (INEGI 2011a).13, 14  
The population’s level of education affects the management of the DWSS. In two 
of the case study communities the education level affects more the provision of 
this service. In the studied communities, members that had not reached the 
average of basic education level integrate the three water committees. None of 
water committee members is illiterate; however, none of them has a higher 
education level. They all range from incomplete primary school to complete 
secondary school. This means, they all might be employees in a job as technicians 
or they might be peasants. This activities, consequently affect the time spent for 
the management of the DWSS, the quality of the service they provide because of 
their understanding about water issues and management issues, and quite often it 
also affects the honesty of treasurers to appropriate use householders payments for 
the DWSS for personal purposes. Additionally, water committee members’ 
education influences how they organise the operation of the DWSS and prioritise 
decisions. Water committee members are not water experts and thus have to learn 
how to operate the water infrastructure, price water, collect payments and so on, 
for which they are responsible. Something important to mention is that water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In Mexico, the 6 compulsory years of primary education are usually completed by children from 
the ages of 6 to 12. Secondary school is usually completed within 3 compulsory years, from ages 
12 to 15. 
13 In Mexico, high school education follows secondary school education and can be completed in 
three years. Students usually do high school education, also called preparatory school, from 15 to 
18 years old. Once they finish high school they have the option to study at university or to study 
for a non-university career, which is a short-term career where they learn by trades. During this 
non-university education system, students are trained to gain technician skills and start working. 
14 Higher education continues after preparatory school in institutions such as universities or teacher 
training colleges. The age at which most students start at university is 18. This education prepares 
them for work or to continue to a postgraduate degree. 
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committee members are not elected because of their understanding of lack of 
understanding about the operation of the DWSS. Community members do not 
understand water committee position as a job but as a community service. 
Moreover, the low level of community members’ education, included water 
committee members, influence the job they can find. Water committee members’ 
level of education closely relates the main work they carry out and the income 
they receive for it. Their main job is not the management of the DWSS; this is 
usually a secondary activity that they do to serve their community. Water 
committee members in San Mateo, Santiaguito and San Francisco communities 
have a main labour job as technicians rather than professionals; they have a main 
salaried job to support the family. Additionally they are also committed to provide 
their service as members of the community water committee institution. Because 
of these reasons, they might fail in appropriately manage the DWSS and price it, 
also to update water users checklist because of the time spent providing this 
community service. Additionally, they do not know how to lead the equitable 
distribution of drinking water within different areas in their community. Finally 
they are economically limited to implement novelty strategies and technology to 
improve this service.  
Education level not only affects how water committee members organises 
provision of the DWSS; it also affects how community members make decisions 
about the provision the payment for it. Decisions from community members are 
made according to basic needs expenses they have and the money they have to 
cover them. Community members spend their salary to cover basic needs first and 
then the payment of some services. According to fieldwork information obtained 
from interviews, focus groups, and informal conversations to housewives, female 
and male domestic water users in San Francisco, Santiaguito and San Mateo along 
February and April 2009 and June 2010 it was identified the main expenses 
people prefer covering. The first expenditure denotes higher importance: 1) food, 
2) bottle water, 3) electricity, 4) children school and 5) the DWSS. The main 
reasons to pay the DWSS at the end is because they mentioned that before paying 
for it they frequently do need to pay for water tankers and bottle water and that 
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paying for the DWSS is not always a guarantee to receive the service. However, 
when they receive it they use water to cover basic needs such as: washing dishes, 
showering, toilet cleaning, clothes cleaning, house cleaning, plants irrigation, car 
cleaning (if applicable), garden. The first two are a priority for domestic water 
users. 
Most of the population in the case study communities cannot always save money 
to cover events such as the frequent water shortages and cuts in the DWSS. While 
community members are willing to pay for water, they are not always able to do 
so because of financial constraints. Their willingness to pay and ability to pay are 
analysed in Chapter 7. According to female voices from Santiaguito and San 
Francisco collected from a focus group in June 2010: 
“We [domestic householders in rural communities and peri-urban areas] are 
constantly worried about how to obtain money to pay for a water service [the 
DWSS]. Sometimes our husband’s salary is spent on basic needs such as food, 
transport and the kids’ school. However, the salary is not always enough to pay for 
all services…so we have to decide what to pay first” (Female water user, San 
Francisco, June 2009). 
According to research and to the statistical data obtained from INEGI (2011a), 
low incomes in rural and peri-urban areas are frequently associated with low 
levels of education (Nyarko et al. 2007). This was identified in Santiaguito and 
San Francisco, in the fieldwork period I did, where some householders do not 
always have money to pay for the DWSS. As mentioned above, householders do 
not always have enough money to pay because they might have a variable salary 
and they also have basic-needs expenses that prefer paying before the DWSS. 
In Toluca the level of education is increasing. Between 2000 and 2005 just over 
20 percent of the population were illiterate. Most of the population have at least 
finished secondary school. The majority of the population ranges from having 
completed primary school to having a higher education degree, although there are 
still a relatively small number of inhabitants in Toluca who have not finished their 
basic education. People’s level of education influences their salary.  
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5.3.2.1 Drinking water supply service conditions 
Housing services at the municipal level are expanding due to population growth. 
However, they are not expanding as fast as the population and new housing 
development. In 2005 it was not possible to supply all houses with all services, 
especially services such as drinking water and sewage (INEGI 2011a), for three 
main reasons. Firstly, urban expansion is not homogeneous, and expanding the 
drinking water supply networks and infrastructure for a few houses calls for 
considerable investment by the government. Secondly, municipalities have many 
investment requirements and providing the DWSS is not always considered a 
priority. Thirdly, water authorities usually prefer to use money for public works 
that are observable by most of the population. According to this point a municipal 
government representative confirmed in an interview in June 2009: 
“For the [municipal] government it will always be better to invest money in 
infrastructure where there is a larger population than where there are few houses … 
[because] it is more expensive to bring the [drinking] water [supply] service to a few 
people even when [the government] can charge more for the service… This is the 
pitfall … and usually the authority will try to solve problems that people are aware of. 
And works [in larger settlements] are more visible. For example, [the government] 
might provide a sewage connection but not water treatment; it might install a water 
network in the main street, but it does not provide household connections” 
(Municipal government representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
Providing water insfrastructure involves actors differently legitimised that need to 
be coordinated other actors participating either in the governance, management or 
drinking water provision. CONAGUA acknowledges that the drinking water 
infrastructure’s coverage does not mean that drinking water is available to 
everyone. It recognises that not all households have the infrastructure to receive 
the DWSS in their properties, and nor they are supplied with drinkable water. 
Some people only receive piped water that is not considered drinkable. In Mexico 
it is common for the population to consume drinking water from different sources 
such as bottled water, boiled water, filtered water, or water bought from water 
tankers (Guardiola et al., 2010). This consumption is independent of the DWSS 
provided to households. This situation was developed because first, there was a 
historical belief that piped water does not have the quality to be drinkable; and 
second, because people in peri urban and rural areas can not rely in the timeliness 
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to receive the DWSS in the days they are expecting to receive it due to managerial 
problems.  
In Almoloya de Juárez and Toluca municipalities, DWSS coverage is increasing 
across all households. By 2005, in Almoloya 69.88% of inhabitants receive the 
DWSS within their property, either indoors or outdoors. While in Toluca 86.16% 
receive it. Toluca has 175,024 households and Almoloya 26,229 (INEGI 2005); 
by 2005, more than half of householders, a majority, were receiving the DWSS 
through their own tap installed on their property. In Toluca, 73 percent of the 
population had an indoor and 13 percent an outdoor DWSS available on their 
property. However, 7 percent of the population were still obtaining drinking water 
from other sources, only 0.25 percent access water from a public tap. By contrast, 
by 2005 41 percent of the Almoloya de Juárez population had a DWSS on their 
property but out of doors; 28 percent had drinking water supplied inside their 
house; 24 percent obtained it from various different sources and less than 1percent 
still got their drinking water from a public tap. In order to better compare these 
percentages see the following summarised table: 
Table 5.3 Municipal increase of the piped water infrastructure coverage 
Municipality 
Variable 
Almoloya de Juárez 
2005 
Toluca 
2005 
Total households 26,229 175,024 
% With indoor water coverage 28 73 
% Outdoor water coverage 41 13 
% Obtaining water from other 
sources 
24 7 
% Householders obtaining 
water from a public tap 
0.9 0.25 
Total population % receiving 
indoor and outdoors DWSS 
69.88  86.16 
Source: INEGI (2005) 
These conditions are similar to the results observed in 1990 and 2000 in both 
municipalities. Over time, the DWSS has been made available to more houses, 
either indoors or outdoors and within their property boundary. The DWSS 
coverage is improving. An increasing number of people are benefiting from this in 
Toluca and Almoloya de Juárez. By 2005, the availability of outdoor water in 
Toluca was decreasing as the indoor water supply increased because more houses 
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had indoor drinking water infrastructure. In Almoloya, slightly more households 
received an outdoor DWSS. This might be due to population growth and the self-
instalment of taps outside the houses of those who could not afford internal 
pipework. Based in the statistics, in 1990, 2000 and 2005, populations from 
Toluca and Almoloya de Juárez municipalities obtained drinking water from 
different sources included a public tap. However, through the time, there were 
improvements in the DWSS piped water network coverage letting householders 
receiving indoors DWSS. Table 5.4 shows the total municipal population 
receiving DWSS coverage under specific conditions. 
Table	  5.4	  Municipal	  populations	  advantaging	  from	  municipal	  DWSS	  
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 
 Municipality 
 
Variable 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Almoloya 
de Juarez Toluca 
Total 
population 84,140 488,293 96,651 560,564 110,489 654,898 126,163 747,512 
Population 
with indoor 
drinking 
water 
availability 
13,510 284,034 11,471 Inconsistent data 17,998 385,781 35,469 546,020 
Population 
with 
outdoor 
drinking 
water 
availability 
on their 
property 
27,672 116,238 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  44,962 158,199 52,701 98,086 
Population 
obtaining 
drinking 
water 
coming 
from a 
public tap 
4,032 11,382 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  4,436 24,810 1,232 1,885 
Population 
obtaining 
drinking 
water from 
different 
sources 
35,234 64,243 Inconsistent data  
Inconsistent 
data  34,727 60,030 30,271 55,731 
Not 
specified 1,023 2,671 
Inconsistent 
data  
Inconsistent 
data  1,901 5,107 786 6,126 
Source: INEGI (2011a) 
The municipal water statistics are reproduced at community level. According to 
information obtained by locality in 1995 (INEGI 1996) some households did not 
have a main connection to receive the DWSS. In San Mateo, 42 percent of 
households did not have piped DWSS and used a public tap to collect water for 
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domestic consumption, compared to only 4.5 percent of households in Santiaguito 
and 6 percent in San Francisco (see Table 5.5). In the following decade, San 
Mateo community experienced an increase in DWSS infrastructure coverage. In 
Santiaguito and San Francisco the drinking water supply network has also 
expanded, even where there has also been a population increase. Nevertheless, 
there are still households without a DWSS, which have to obtain drinking water 
from different sources to cover their basic needs. The municipal statistics in Table 
5.4 show that in 2000, 31 percent of the population of Almoloya de Juárez was 
buying its drinking water from different sources, decreasing to 24 percent by 2005, 
compared to only 9 percent of the population of Toluca in 2000 and 7.4 percent in 
2005. 
Table	  5.5	  Households	  with	  piped	  water	  coverage	  in	  the	  case	  study	  communities	  
(1995)	  
Municipality Toluca Almoloya de Juárez 
Community 
Variable San Mateo  Santiaguito  San Francisco  
Total number of houses 409 741 1,671 
Number of houses with 
piped water 
236 708 1,566 
% 57.7 95.5 93.7 
Source: (INEGI 1996) 
By 1995, as Table 5.5 shows, most of the houses in the case study communities 
has had water infrastructure installed, either indoor or outdoors, to enable them to 
receive the DWSS, although this did not mean that all households immediately 
received the DWSS. Because of this reason, CONAGUA mentioned that the 
installation of water infrastructure is not a guarantee households receive the 
DWSS. These results could be compared to municipal statistics summarised in 
tables 5.3 and 5.4. At community level the statistics seem to show higher water 
infrastructure coverage than at municipal level, this is because by 1995 there were 
less houses and then higher expansion of the piped water infrastructure network. 
Comparing Table 5.5 with the municipal statistics in Table 5.4 it is find there has 
been an expansion in DWSS coverage at the municipal level. Municipal 
information, then, is useful for understanding DWSS coverage at community level. 
There are some variations by community. For example, in 1995 slightly over half 
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of the total houses in San Mateo had piped water compared to all case studies but 
a small proportion of houses in the other communities did not have the piped 
water infrastructure.  
This analysis helps to provide an overview of the evolution of the DWSS 
networks in the three communities, which have had a water committees 
organising and managing the distribution of the DWSS since 1995. Each 
community has had a different experience of improving its drinking water 
network and organising its provision to community households. Therefore, 
according to municipal statistics and fieldwork information it is concluded that 
community size do not necessarily guarantee community success to manage the 
DWSS. Success depends of socio-economic characteristics, local agreements and 
the compliance of these. As a result, San Mateo drinking water supply problems 
are not related to community size but to social characteristics of water committee 
members. Additionally, San Francisco and Santiaguito drinking water supply 
problems are also related to socio-economic characteristics of both water 
committee members and community inhabitants as well as the education level of 
them. The following section focuses on water governance at the community level, 
and on how water committees organised the management and provision of DWSS 
to households in their communities.  
5.3.3	  Community	  management	  of	  the	  DWSS	  through	  a	  water	  committee	  
Members of the case study communities are organised to represent the water 
authority through a water committee that assumes control over underground water 
resources. In each community a water committee has full responsibility for and 
authority over the DWSS provided to community households. All householders 
who have installed a tap in order to receive the DWSS on their property are 
registered in the water committee’s administrative book, which also holds a 
register of monthly payments from each household. Registration of a householder 
on this list is evidence that s/he has paid the first payment required to start 
receiving the DWSS and legitimises their right to receive the service on their 
property.  
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Provision of the DWSS in San Mateo, San Francisco and Santiaguito entirely 
depends on each customary water committee. Community members do not have a 
relationship with the national water commission, and they set their own rules for 
water governance and management. This means that CONAGUA and the water 
committees are not necessarily connected in terms of the practical allocation and 
distribution of the DWSS In San Francisco and Santiaguito both the official and 
the customary institution are related in terms of the formal agreement that 
legitimates property rights over underground water (see Chapter 6 for further 
analysis of property rights). 
In San Mateo, however, there is a direct managerial relationship between the 
water committee and AyST, with the water committee providing the DWSS while 
AyST charges for the service and collect householders payment. This is not the 
case in San Francisco and Santiaguito, whose water committees assume total 
responsibility for provision of the DWSS and for collecting payments. 
My fieldwork revealed that the three case study communities entirely manage 
their own wells in order to provide their DWSS. Their main problem is the water 
committee members’ limited experience in providing this service and collecting 
user payments. They generally have to learn in practice how the drinking water 
infrastructure works, how much to pay CONAGUA for the concession and when, 
and how they can incentive householders to pay for the service. 
When the three communities decided to manage and provide their own DWSS for 
the first time there was an initial investment by the official institutions and 
community members. After that, community members were expected to 
contribute periodically, either financially or by providing labour, to installing, 
maintaining and repairing the drinking water infrastructure. 
From the 1960s, public reservoirs, taps and pipes were installed in communities in 
the state of Mexico to provide households with water (CONAGUA 2009). From 
that time onwards, community members were required to organise the provision 
of the DWSS and develop a customary governance system for its administration. 
When the water infrastructure was first installed, labour to install and connect the 
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pipes was provided by members of the community, who also have to cover 
maintenance and repair costs through periodical payments for this service. A 
group of community members elected by consensus, in each community, took on 
responsibility for the administration, control and management of the DWSS and 
for collecting payment from users, and became the main water authority, the water 
committee, representing the community regarding water related issues.  
Since 1960, the water committees in the three case study communities are 
responsible for the decision-making, operation and most of the maintenance of 
their drinking water infrastructure. The following section analyses the main 
structure of the water committees, and how they are organised. 
5.3.3.1 Water committees’ management of the drinking water supply service 
In Mexico there are still customary and self-organised communities that control 
and organise water resources resources available within their territory. 
Community population organise the management and provision of their own 
DWSS using local water resources, through water committees. The water 
committee is an institution that represents the community and administers, 
controls and provides the DWSS to community households. Doe and Khan (2004) 
suggest that this control should involve their management, operation, and 
maintenance. I found during my fieldwork that San Francisco, San Mateo and 
Santiaguito communities assume the management, operation and maintenance of 
their water resources in order to provide their DWSS.  
As analysed in the literature review and then built in the analytical framework 
there are legal plural institutions governing water resources; and informal 
institutions in some Mexican communities are still legitimised as the main water 
institution with attributions to make decisions and operate them. Informal 
institutions governance and management of water resources have been also 
identified in Latin America – in the Andean region (Beccar et al., 2002; Boelens, 
2008). In central Mexico, community-managed institutions that govern and 
manage the DWSS are self-organised through water committees. According to 
Bah (1992), self-organisation community is the key to promoting water supply 
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development because community members know their own needs. It enables them 
to make advantageous decisions for their community. Community self-
organisation is key in water governance and management because it enables fast 
communication within the community and the water committee, and therefore the 
interaction between community members is direct. If a self-organised community 
has the participation, support and trust of most of its members it is likely to 
succeed in the development of its DWSS. Nevertheless, these communities might 
also face managerial and economic troubles by organising the DWSS. These 
problems might improve if community members and water committee members 
are willing to do so by generating and complying with agreements. A male 
domestic water user from San Francisco, confirmed in a focus group: 
“We know what [our community] has to do to improve [the DWSS]. For example, 
the water committee very often calls for meetings, but people do not go any more; 
people are not interested any more. Maybe they think: ‘Well, if there is no water 
let’s see how many days there are water cuts and how many more days the [DWSS] 
is delayed. If someone calls for another meeting, some people go, but not that many 
as should go. The problem is that people do not complain, they do not say anything. 
We have apathy; we have become indifferent. With this behaviour we cannot 
succeed” (Domestic water user, San Francisco, June 2010). 
As observed, community water supply management alone does not guarantee 
community success in the provision of drinking water. The community needs to 
trust the water institution and vice verse. The generation of rules and agreements 
by both institutions – water institution and community members – and the 
compliance of these ones possibly generate a positive environment of 
responsibility, trust, and quality of the service improvements. Additionally, 
working rules for collecting users payments for the water consumed and to 
maintain financial health are required. Each water committee not only needs 
community members’ approval to control the DWSS for a specific period, but 
also they need householders’ payment in order to maintain the water infrastructure 
and technical and practical training. I found during my fieldwork that even though 
community members legitimate water committees to manage the DWSS there are 
also financial problems constraining the quality of this service and then the 
sufficiency of drinking water received per week. 
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Scholars highlight there are weaknesses in community management when water 
committee members do not have the necessary training or technical assistance to 
manage their DWSS appropriately (Leahy and Anderson 2008; Madrigal et al. 
2011). They suggest that water committee members need technical assistance to 
cope with likely problems (Matta and Alavalapati 2006; Whittington et al. 2009). 
According to my case study interviews, community members also think that 
technical assistance for water committee members is important to enable 
improvement in how they deal with drinking water supply problems. In a focus 
group, a domestic water user from San Francisco set out the changes she would 
make to the DWSS if she were member of the water committee: 
[From the water user’s perspective] “it is complicated, because from the outside 
everything looks a mess. But it might be difficult to carry out [the DWSS] ... If I 
were part of the water committee, I would first learn about the water network. I think 
all the water committee members have missed several issues. It is also necessary to 
be aware of the administrative procedures and precisely explaining how much 
householders are paying and what they are paying for. Usually water committee 
members talk and talk [about financial issues] but [we domestic water users] never 
know the true story. People say that the problem [of the DWSS] is that the pumping 
[infrastructure does not work well]. I would start by identifying the problem, and 
whether there is a solution. People say the well has good capacity to provide water 
to the entire town. So if everybody in the town could have [the DWSS] at least twice 
a week, or for only a day, with enough pressure, people would not hesitate to pay for 
the service and maybe we would not have so many problems” (Female water user, 
San Francisco, June 2010). 
Analysing domestic water users and scholars’ perspective (Leahy and Anderson 
2008; Madrigal et al. 2011) it is essential to understand not only technical aspects 
of managing water infrastructure but also to know water network; because, it 
might help water committee to better know the pumping capacity to distribute and 
allocate water in a specific timing before stopping the pumping system. It is also 
important to understand about managerial issues of drinking water at community 
level. These ones might be learnt through oral communication from previous 
water committee and improved by experience. Both, learning and practicing are 
important rather than only trusting in learning by trial and error. Additionally, 
pricing and collecting water payments from users is a key variable to operate the 
service, cover operation and maintenance expenses, and improve it. 
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Customary water committees need to be consolidated in order to perform their 
duties according to their community’s needs because water committee members 
become the main institution that community members contact when there is a 
drinking water supply problem in the community. For an understanding of 
customary management the following section analyses the water committees’ 
structure and responsibilities. 
5.3.3.2 The structure and responsibilities of water committees 
As mentioned before, a water committee is the community water institution 
elected by community members to provide the DWSS and supervise its delivery 
to households. The water committees in all three case studies are elected 
democratically in community meetings. The election takes place outside the water 
committee office, in the street, or in the main square, where the community elects 
its representatives, takes decisions about water related issues, raises concerns and 
problems and agrees the DWSS management strategy during the water 
committee’s period in office. In a focus group, the water committee president 
from Santiaguito responsible of ruling and promoting common decisions 
commented on his experience as member of the water committee: 
“This is a community service. We are happy to cooperate because there are years 
when someone else does this job. I know this committee service is only for one year. 
During this year we will try to do our best, even when we can’t be here all day long. 
However, as a team we have talked about this and have decided to come in every 
afternoon. You can see this office open every day to provide the service. During this 
time we hear about water problems, we try to resolve complaints, we collect water 
payments and we also try to contact debtors to get them to pay their debts in order to 
collect more money – even when it is not always possible” (President of the water 
committee, Santiaguito, July 2010). 
Even though it is a community service, the water committee has its own 
governance structure, its own actors and rules to guide its decision-making. Water 
committees require a minimum number of members to operate and make this 
governance system work. According to information I obtained during my 
fieldwork in Santiaguito, San Mateo and San Francisco, a water committee from 
similar case studies commonly comprises a minimum of six members and a 
maximum of ten community members, including the following: 
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a) President 
b) Secretary  
c) Treasurer 
d) Vice president 
e) Vice secretary 
f) Vice treasurer 
g) Person responsible for pumping water from the pump house (bombero) 
h) Person responsible for cleaning reservoirs 
i) One or more temporary technicians, who is paid only for a day or few days, 
to maintain the pump and water pipes. 
The three main members head of the water committee are: president, secretary, 
and treasurer. For each one it should be an extra in case one of them vacate. 
Another indispensable member is the bombero or pocero because he operates the 
pumping water system and practically manages the distribution and delivery of 
drinking water. Other members are important; however, are easily contacted when 
necessary. 
In most of customarily managed Mexican communities, the members listed above 
usually shape a water committee that provides the DWSS. Of these, four main 
members work on a daily basis: the president, the secretary, the treasurer and the 
person responsible for the water pumping. These are the main water authorities to 
whom householders turn when a new connection is required, when they want to 
pay for their DWSS, or to report failures in the water infrastructure.  
The president and secretary are responsible for planning, decision-making and 
directing how the DWSS is governed. In the three case study communities, the 
president of the water committee is the main authority and community 
representative when procedures related to drinking water management need to be 
followed. The secretary may act on behalf of the president if the latter is not able 
to attend a meeting or to be at two events at the same time. Both the president and 
the secretary are responsible for updating the water user list and providing it to the 
treasurer.
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The treasurer is responsible for organising the budget, planning strategies to 
collect user payments and administering the financial structure. The treasurer 
plays an important and responsible role in the water committee’s work because he 
is responsible for collecting water user payments and dealing with DWSS 
finances according to a tariff discussed and agreed by the water committee and 
community members. In San Francisco, Santiaguito and San Mateo communities 
the members of the water committee have always being men. 
The person responsible for operating the infrastructure system that pumps water 
from the well is called the water pumping man (bombero or pozero). Usually, the 
bombero has a day job and also works for a few hours in the afternoon or early 
morning every day operating the DWSS water pumps. The other water committee 
members cooperate through social labour – faenas or public service – in the 
community to provide this service thought they are not paid for this. The only one 
that receives some payment and frequently also some contribution is the bomber, 
who sometimes, receives from community members a monetary contribution in 
return. Everyone of water committee members perceive that providing this service 
to community households is a way of giving something back to the community.  
In Santiaguito, the water committee pays the bombero $1000 MXN pesos, 
equivalent to £50 GBP per week, although this is not the case in San Mateo and 
San Francisco where water committees do not provide any payment. If the 
bombero earn something is because population sometimes gives them tips when 
they specially ask to send the DWSS towards their community area. The 
cooperation among members of any community shows its sense of ownership to 
the community they inhabit. According to Nyarko et al. (2007), such a sense of 
ownership develops when people find in their living area or community the 
natural resources and social environment that let them learn from the community 
and grow in it, such as occurs in the case study communities. 
Cooperation is the key to the strength of community management. Community 
members are regularly responding to cooperation when community improvements 
are required. Community members’ cooperation tends to be conditioned or limited 
to the trust of community members to the authority. This was observed in San 
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Francisco where domestic water users are continuously hesitating in cooperating, 
either economically or with labour, with the water committee when money is 
required to fix infrastructure or to do large repairs because they do not know 
where their money is going to end up. For legitimacy this is a very key issue 
because after a water committee member is dishonest, community members do 
not recognise him anymore as water authority because they do not trust him, and 
community call for a meeting to vote another one. In an interview, a female water 
user from San Francisco raises her concern because of a fraud committed by a 
water committee member and the resulting lack of trust of community members in 
their water committee: 
“People from the community lack of trust [in water committee members] and they 
become debtors [because people feel the water authority lie them]. For example, 
when we realise the [water] valve located outdoors was not working anymore we ask 
a member of the water committee that fixes infrastructure and makes repairs to do it. 
All neighbours cooperate to buy a new piece. Female neighbours collected the 
money. But after we gave him the money he leaved away and took with him the 
money we gave him to buy the required valve. He said he would buy the required 
material and missed pieces. However, he did not do it. Now he did not fix the valve 
and he took the money…and again we have extra expenses…that is why I do not 
like to cooperate” (Domestic water user, San Francisco, February 2009). 
To gain the community’s trust, the water committee needs to improve its 
leadership ability and problem solving capacity continuously. It also needs to 
perform with honesty; especially when it comes to the management of financial 
resources. 
In all three communities studied, the number of committee members varies for 
different reasons, one of which relates to the population’s willingness to 
participate in managing the DWSS. Willingness to participate as a committee 
member depends on individuals’ activities. By 2010, in San Mateo and San 
Francisco, for example, the average number of members in the water committee 
was eight, while in Santiaguito the water committee had only six members: 
president, secretary, treasurer and a vice president, secretary and treasurer for each 
one. If a community member is voted as water committee member they still have 
the possibility to accept or deny the offer. Another reason that influence the 
number of water committee members is their behaviour and honesty in this 
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community service. If population is not happy with their performance they might 
ask him not be water committee member anymore or to change the full team. 
The three case studies also vary in the number of technicians responsible for pipe 
and pump maintenance and reservoir cleaning. These members of staff are usually 
temporary, and each community selects them according to the requirements of 
water infrastructure they need to maintain or repair and also the time in which a 
technician in required. In Santiaguito the president, secretary and treasurer also 
maintain the water infrastructure and clean the water well; in San Mateo the water 
committee pays someone to do this job; and in San Francisco there is a designated 
technician who, while the water committee does not pay him, receives voluntary 
tips from the community after providing his services.  
During the fieldwork I found that the water committees in San Francisco and 
Santiaguito are responsible for doing managerial, operation and maintenance 
activities, for planning, organising and collecting user payments, and for 
identifying the source of water problems, finding likely solutions and encouraging 
community consensus to solve them. In San Mateo, managerial activities are 
shared with AyST. The water committee is responsible for DWSS operation and 
maintenance while AyST assumes responsibility for pricing water and collecting 
user payments. 
During my fieldwork period I also found that the case study water committees 
worked as follows: firstly, the previous and current water committee members 
meet when there is a change of committee to talk about how the DWSS has been 
managed and discuss the main DWSS issues. The outgoing water committee 
suggest procedures for managing the DWSS to the new committee. They also give 
the new committee the domestic water user list with information on payments 
made; receipts for payments to CONAGUA and the Electricity Company; and, 
where relevant, information about the amount outstanding to be paid to these 
institutions. The new water committee also receives the title concession that 
enables it to withdraw and use underground water for domestic use and allows it 
to manage and distribute water and charge community households for the DWSS. 
Finally, the new water committee members discuss the tariff for the DWSS and 
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the costs, to date, of new connections to the network, debts and updated estimates 
for maintenance and repairs costs. In a focus group carried out in July 2010 
according to a Santiaguito water committee member: 
“We do everything. We are responsible for providing water [DWSS], maintaining 
the infrastructure, cleaning the pipes, cleaning the well, fixing the pump, doing field 
walks, checking that [the DWSS] is pumped with enough pressure, collecting user 
payments, encouraging debtors to pay … and besides all that, sometimes we have to 
deal with angry people” (Secretary of water committee, Santiaguito, July 2010). 
As mentioned, the water committees in the three case study communities are 
mainly responsible for managerial activities. However, each community also 
requires the collaboration of other community members for the operation and 
maintenance of the drinking water infrastructure, and this is delegated to a 
bombero who understands how the infrastructure works and is responsible for 
operating of the pumping system and distributing the drinking water to different 
geographical areas of the community.  
San Francisco, Santiaguito and San Mateo communities require the services of the 
bombero to open and close the valves and taps and to divert drinking water to 
different areas. When a new household needs to be connected to the DWSS for the 
first time, the water committee is responsible for installing and charging for the 
tap system. For an average water committees charge $3,500 MXN (£175 GBP). 
Charges for the DWSS are addressed in Chapter 6. Responsibility for maintenance 
is allocated to different community actors: a) the water committee as the main 
water authority, b) a bombero and c) domestic water users. The water committee 
is responsible for minor repairs such as mending broken pipes and fixing minor 
leaks, and for cleaning the wells and storage water reservoirs when the community 
have one. 
The bomberos are also responsible for cleaning and chlorinating the water to 
make it potable in all three communities. Community members, especially men 
because of their gender role within the community15, assume responsibility for 
keeping their household large water tanks in an appropriate condition to receive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As part of their gender role women are responsible of appropriately use the water. 
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the DWSS and maintain good water quality. In an interview carried out in August 
2009, the president of Santiaguito water committee explained: 
“We continuously encourage [water] users to wash water tanks [installed on the 
roof]. We [water committee members] clean the big water reservoirs [used to store 
some drinking water and chlorinate it], but if [householders] do not clean their tanks, 
the water might be dirty from the start … when we do pipe maintenance or cleaning 
we let them know that perhaps for the first 30 minutes [of the DWSS the following 
day] the water might have bits in it [and is not be drinkable]. But after that [the 
DWSS] become normal” (Water committee member, Santiaguito, August 2009). 
Cleaning domestic water reservoirs was a suggestion also shared by the secretary 
of San Mateo water committee in a focus group in carried out in July 2010. A 
housewife, domestic water user from San Francisco talks in an interview about the 
high quality of the water in her community: 
“There might be other problems, such as lack of water [from the DWSS], but the 
[water] quality is always good. We even drink tap water straight from the tap [which 
is not a common practice in Mexican cities]. Only when there are repairs we are told 
the water might contain bits of clay and might be dirty, but after some minutes water 
quality becomes normal” (Housewife water user, San Francisco, April 2009). 
In terms of repairs, community members are required to help with larger repairs 
such as to common water pipes. This kind of maintenance and repair support is 
carried out as faenas, common work by community members for a specific 
purpose at a specific time and for a specific period. The community is organised 
in this way to repair the drinking water supply infrastructure, clean the main water 
sources such as the well and storage containers and expand the drinking water 
supply infrastructure and sewage system when necessary.  
Community members mentioned in the interviews they are keen in participating in 
faenas. However, community members’ participation depends on their willingness 
to work for free to provide a community service. It may also depend on the 
population’s accepting them in faenas or on the water committee acceptance with 
responsibility for the community’s DWSS. 
Customary institutions and actors in a water governance system are central to 
decision-making and resolving drinking water supply problems. Customary actors 
have their own ways of organising the service they provide in order to obtain 
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successful outcomes. However, the provision of the DWSS brings customary 
actors daily challenges because they need to learn first about their main 
responsibilities, rights and duty that enable them to govern and manage the DWSS 
and then how the water infrastructure works. 
San Francisco and Santiaguito communities have assumed total responsibility for 
customary governance of the DWSS with each community water committee. In 
these communities, community members have decided to maintain this customary 
governance structure over the formal one. They assume total control over 
groundwater, operate the water infrastructure, and fully manage the DWSS. In the 
process, there are failures to provide with timeliness and sufficiency the drinking 
water because they need economic resources. They also fail to collect users 
payments because the water users checklist is not up to date and not all users are 
willing or able to pay. Through willingness and ability to pay is possible 
understanding the main constrains of population to pay and likely solutions to this 
problem under an informal community managed water system. Water committees 
are also trying to learn how to solve the problems according to their means and to 
the extent that community members allow them to make and implement decisions. 
San Mateo has also a customary governance system, but the decisions made in 
this community, particularly those related to the use of economic resources, are 
only partial because the water committee has no agency to use the domestic water 
user payments, which are directly collected and managed by AyST.  
According to the customary institutions analysed in this chapter, it is possible to 
conclude that the more independently the customary institution governs its own 
DWSS, the more decisions it can implement without following long 
administrative procedures to obtain permission to operate its decisions. This is 
because community members legitimate decisions made; thus, water committees 
have direct deals and agreements with their community and consequently faster 
answers to implement some decisions. The main problems for these water 
committees are financial. Decisions are frequently based on the water committee’s 
budget, which in turn influences decisions about expense priorities, infrastructure 
maintenance and the planning of large and small repairs. By contrast, a main 
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strength is community participation with ideas and faenas. Customary water 
institutions are not always able to be financially self-sufficient and to cover all 
expenses at the time of need because there are financial difficulties that affect the 
performance of water committees. According to information provided in July 
2010, in a focus groups with water committee members from Santiaguito and San 
Francisco, there are householders unable to pay for the DWSS due to their low 
and variable salary, which therefore produces the DWSS is frequently delayed. 
There are no generated statistics to know precise percentage of people unable to 
pay neither how much of their salary they might spend on water. Generate this 
data might require future quantitative research in these communities. When water 
committees are unable to collect the amount to pay for maintenance or repairs 
they usually have to ask the community for extra money and to collect the amount 
required before starting large repairs, for instance, or extending the network. The 
collection of DWSS payments and the struggles of water committees and 
community members are analysed in Chapter 7.  
5.3.3.3 The influence of water committees in water governance 
The governance of drinking water involves the organisation of the community to 
elect a group of individuals, community members, enabled to make decision for 
providing the DWSS. These individuals integrated as water committee members 
are the main customary institution providing the DWSS at community level. The 
water committee’s main water control responsibilities – managerial, operational 
and maintenance – are agreed with community members. Water committees have 
to ensure that the DWSS is provided to community households and to organise it 
according to the needs of the community. Customary water committees also make 
their own rules to govern the DWSS, which are related to the rights and duties of 
customary actors that receive the DWSS provision.  
An important part of the DWSS’ governance is a solid and trustworthy water 
committee and a financial structure that supports the decisions taken. Financial 
resources are a central variable of DWSS functioning. The water committees in 
San Francisco and Santiaguito are also responsible for collecting user payments. 
As they are customary organisations, they provide the DWSS without the need for 
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CONAGUA’s approval and do not have to report on decisions made by the water 
committee and community members to municipal, state, or national water 
institutions. 
This section has analysed two important types of customary actors participating in 
the governance and management of the DWSS at community level: water 
committees and community members. Additionally, there is a third type of actor, 
these are local private actors who participate at the community level to sell and 
transport drinking water, through water tanks, to individual households that have 
not received the community DWSS. The following section focuses on these actors.  
5.4	  Local	  private	  actors	  participating	  in	  selling	  drinking	  water	  
As illustrated in Chhotray and stoker (2009) concept, in governance there is a 
plurality of actors interacting; in the studied communities water governance there 
are also local private actors selling and transporting drinking water to households 
that urgently require drinking water. The two main types of private actors are well 
proprietors and water vendors. The difference between the two is that well 
proprietors have a special permit from CONAGUA to withdraw groundwater 
from their wells and sell it to householders or water vendors, while water vendors 
– by custom – have the approval of community members, well proprietors and 
water committees to sell water to community members and transport it in a water 
tanker. Both local private actors sell drinking water at the local and community 
level. 
Local well proprietors in Mexico usually run a private family business. Their 
main aim is to profit by providing and selling drinking water in areas with no 
DWSS, or where the DWSS is intermittent and there is frequent water 
insufficiency to cover basic needs. Well proprietors sell water to water vendors, 
who transport drinking water in water tankers, or pipas, for sale to inhabitants 
facing water insufficiency in their household in the case study communities. 
Water vendors do not necessarily own the water tanker they use, which has an 
average storage capacity of 10,000 litres, although some carry 15,000 or even 
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20,000 litres. Photographs 5.1 and 5.2 show water vendors and their pipas 
queuing to buy water from a well proprietor and withdraw it from the water well.  
Photograph	  5.1	  Santa	  Leonor	  private	  well  Photograph	  5.2	  Tanker	  trucks	  queuing	  
to	  buy	  water	  
  
Photographs: Author 
Once the tank is filled, the driver delivers the water to the household that require 
this private service and is willing to pay for it. The drinking water transported by 
water tankers is discharged from the tankers into household cisterns, open 
concrete reservoirs, roof water containers, or, if a household lacks storage 
infrastructure, 20-litre barrels. 
The private well owners and water vendors’ advantage and success rely on their 
rapid response to householders demand. They make water available in a matter of 
hours or, at most, in a day. Their objective is to provide drinking water as soon as 
they can fill the water tanker and transport the water to the client requesting their 
service. The number of tankers-full delivered depends on the number of orders 
they receive in a day and the distance they have to drive to deliver the water. Once 
the water is deposited in the cistern or reservoir, payment is collected. The success 
of this local water market is based on the speed of the response to domestic users’ 
demand.  
There are also disadvantages in the operation of these local private actors. The 
first is the price that householders have to pay for water from a private vendor. 
While householders have to pay their local water committee for the DWSS 
monthly, they also recurrently have to buy more expensive water from private 
water vendors. This extra expenditure is generated by the unreliability of the 
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DWSS. Households that frequently lack of drinking water have to adapt to 
contingencies and they develop an adaptive capacity to face water insufficiency 
problems and bring solutions to these. In the studied communities, population buy 
drinking water from the local market: as bottled water, or from water tankers, or 
they borrow drinking water from a neighbour. Despite the economic disadvantage 
to domestic water users, who buy drinking water from local private market, 
domestic water users affirmed that private water vendors allow them to access 
drinking water when customary or official administrative procedures fail to 
deliver the piped DWSS. Buying drinking water from water vendors is expensive. 
A 10,000 litres water tanker varies from the $350 MXN to $450 MXN. The price 
is set according to the living area and the season. 10,000 litres might last in a 
household in average one month. A second disadvantage is related to the cost-
recovery difficulty faced by AyST and community water committees to complete 
for the operational and maintenance expenses. A representative of AyST, public 
administrator, gave his opinion in an interview carried out in June 2009:  
“I think that piperos [water tanker drivers] should be legalised [to make them pay 
taxes]. This is a problem, because they do not pay taxes and they keep all the money 
they earn. This is a problem because in the end not all householders pay for the 
DWSS. Householders pay approximately $400 MXN [£20 GBP] for a pipa that lasts 
a month. If they cannot then also afford to pay [$50 MXP per month for the DWSS] 
to the water institution, in two-months they end up paying more for continue buying 
pipas than if they paid for the DWSS. As you can see, there are financial losses 
[from the operation of informal water vendors’ sale of drinking water] and for many 
[other] reasons” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
Formal water institution representatives affirmed that water users delay making 
their monthly payments to AyST when they have bought water from private 
vendors. AyST complained about the number of non-authorised water vendors 
who sell drinking water to domestic users, who then fail to pay for the DWSS, 
while the water vendors fail to pay taxes, causing financial losses not only for 
AyST, but also for the federal government as represented by CONAGUA. The 
water committees are also directly impacted by non-payment of domestic water 
users for the DWSS; when there are problems with insufficient DWSS 
householders tend to buy drinking water from private vendors and may not be 
willing or able to pay again for an intermittent DWSS. 
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Finally, for local communities, the option to buy water from the tankers is a relief, 
despite the price; otherwise they would be totally dependent on the days when 
each water committee provides the DWSS. While AyST considers local water 
vendors harmful to its financial stability, for the customary water committees the 
presence of local water vendors is not a problem because they do not have to deal 
with them directly; the only inconvenience is householders’ delay in paying for 
the DWSS. In general, the water committees of the three communities analysed 
perceived that buying drinking water was more of an economic problem for 
householders than for the water committees themselves. The customary water 
committee members from Santiaguito affirmed that it is more expensive for 
householders to buy drinking water from a private water service than to pay 
promptly for the community DWSS. This is a cyclical relationship. If one of the 
actors involved fails to keep its commitment, this causes financial and water 
insufficiency problems that affect not only the water management but also the 
governance of the DWSS in customarily organised communities. 
This chapter has analysed the actors involved in the governance and management 
of the DWSS. The three main actors are official, customary and private actors, all 
of which are essential parts of the administration of the DWSS. The official and 
customary institutions are involved in governance and management activities 
while private actors play an important part in the provision of drinking water in 
the three communities studied. The following chapter analyses decision-making 
regarding the governance of the DWSS. This is closely related to the property 
rights systems that enable every actor to make decisions according to their 
position in the governance, management, or use of groundwater.  
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CHAPTER	  6.	  Decision-­‐Making	  According	  to	  the	  Property	  
Rights	  of	  Actors	  to	  Access	  Drinking	  Water	  
6.1	  Introduction	  
The disjuncture in terms of the water rights held by the actors involved in the 
DWSS and its use is the main focus of this sixth chapter. As mentioned previously, 
governance concerns the rules that guide collective decision-making where a 
plurality of actors interacts. This chapter analyses decision making according to 
the rights of actors involved in the governance and management of groundwater to 
provide the DWSS. In this study, the decision making is related to the property 
rights system, which involves every actor that holds property rights over water 
resources. There are five different property rights taken into account in this 
research: rights to access, withdraw, manage, exclude, and alienate actors for the 
use of groundwater (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2001). And there are six 
main positions held by the actors concerned as identified from the literature, in 
table 2.1 from section 2.4.3.1 about the Property Rights System, and the fieldwork: 
owner, proprietor, authorised claimant, authorised user, authorised entrant, and 
unauthorised user of groundwater and drinking water. The interaction between the 
types of rights held by every actor is defined as the property rights system. This 
chapter investigates what a property rights system is and why it is important in 
decision-making. 
Politico-legal institutions involved in the governance and management of the 
DWSS and domestic water users hold property rights over water resources, and 
specifically the groundwater used to provide the DWSS. Actors involved in 
official, customary or private systems provide their services in different ways. The 
differences are mainly due to their different and often contesting interests and 
perceptions of the priorities in their performance. These differences create 
disjunctures between official and customary legal systems mainly regarding who 
holds property rights over water and how the actors legitimate these rights. 
This sixth chapter focuses on the water rights held by official, customary and 
private actors in the three case study communities selected. In particular, it 
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considers the disjuncture between the water rights held by official and customary 
institutions providing the DWSS. Official institutions are generally more 
dedicated to seeking official permission, updating payments for concessions and 
collecting user payments to legitimate water rights; while customary institutions 
have different priorities. They legitimate property rights of actors and assume the 
distribution and provision of drinking water to community households as well as 
covering operational and maintenance expenses through payments collected from 
householders.  
The actors involved in the DWSS and the use of groundwater follow specific rules 
and agreements according to the property rights they hold and the positions they 
represent in the official, customary or private legal system. The rules every 
property rights holder follows, in turn, generate a disjuncture between the official 
and customary water institutions and their DWSS activities. The source of the 
disjuncture derives from the organisational, practical and administrative 
differences between the institutions due to the specific property rights that each 
hold to allow them using water. This chapter provides empirical evidence of the 
water rights of the official, customary and private water institutions and actors and 
how these influence the DWSS at community level.  
This chapter has five main sections. The first section has introduced the chapter 
and the second defines water rights. The third section analyses the specific water 
rights granted by CONAGUA to the formal and informal institutions that provide 
the DWSS, as well as the property rights over water that are recognised by 
customary actors. Formal water rights are provided via a grant or concession title 
after the applicant has fulfilled a series of official requirements. Informal water 
rights are recognised by customary institutions. This section discusses how the 
San Mateo, Santiaguito and San Francisco communities have obtained property 
rights over water through their water committees in order to provide their DWSS. 
It also considers the property rights of individuals and local private actors that use 
drinking water. The fourth section discusses issues related to the legitimate 
recognition of property rights to access groundwater and how formal and informal 
institutions legitimate property rights over the DWSS. The fifth section focuses on 
Chapter	  6.	  Decision-­‐making	  according	  to	  the	  property	  rights	  of	  actors	  to	  access	  drinking	  water	  
176	  
	  
payment for the DWSS and groundwater permissions. Through their payments, 
individuals and institutions legitimate their property rights over water resources. 
Finally, this section draws some conclusions. The chapter uses the narratives of 
official government representatives, customary water authorities, private actors 
and domestic water users to explain the mechanisms they have used to gain water 
rights to use groundwater resources and to access or provide the DWSS. 
6.2	  Defining	  and	  understanding	  water	  rights	  in	  the	  DWSS	  
Defining water rights is important to understanding the rules that legitimate the 
use of water. As illustrated in chapter 2, section 2.4.3.2, Water rights is the 
authorised right or permission to take water from a particular source, to use water 
and/or the water infrastructure (Beccar et al. 2002: 11). In the case study 
communities, there are formal and informal water rights, formal water rights are 
obtained through official written permission that allows a water right holder to 
withdraw, distribute or consume groundwater. This permission is granted by 
CONAGUA to formal, informal, or private institutions that fulfil the requirements 
and justify their reasons for wishing to use groundwater. By contrast, informal 
water rights are legitimised by custom or convention. Customary water users 
legitimate their rights by paying a formal or informal water institution for their 
right to water. 
My fieldwork identified there are three main actors that require and hold formal 
water rights to withdraw groundwater for distribution to community members: the 
water committees of the three communities studied; AyST; and well proprietors. 
Also, there are actors (institutions and domestic water users) holding property 
rights over water. Property rights, as discussed in section 2.4.3.1, are access 
claims recognised as legitimate property by a politico-legal institution or a 
legitimate social actor (Sikor and Lund 2009: 1). Property is also recognised if 
socially legitimate institutions sanction it. Property rights of actors are usually 
informally recognised and legitimised, this means they do not hold a written 
document to certify this but recognition is also valid. In the three case study 
communities domestic water users and water vendors usually hold legitimate 
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property rights over water. Nevertheless there are also formal actors interacting 
within the PRS proposed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom (2001). 
Scholars working from a critical tradition have extensively examined official 
rights. They argue that water rights are influenced by a range of social and 
customary norms and relationships and not just by formal law (Bruns 2005; Roth 
et al. 2005, Boelens 2008; Zwarteveen et al. 2005; Derman and Hellum 2007). 
Mexican water law recognises users’ rights to withdraw and use water. Possession 
of these water rights is legally acquired through official regulatory mechanisms. 
Water rights are also acquired by custom, labour or convention (Chandhoke 2003). 
In the communities studied, both official and customary institutions recognise 
possession of property rights to use water. Official and customary institutions 
grant water rights to water committees and private well proprietors because they 
require it for the extraction and provision of water for DWSS purposes. The 
Difference between both legal systems is that official institutions recognise 
property rights of actors though a law or written document for the distribution of 
DWSS to multiple households. Customary law, on the other hand, recognises by 
custom the water rights of domestic water users and informal water vendors, who 
pay a fee for drinking water. 
Water rights, property rights and governance play a crucial role in controlling the 
access to and use of specific natural resources such as water (Schlager and Ostrom 
1992; Von Benda-Beckmann 1995; Ostrom 2001). Based on the human rights 
theory, the right to water is the right to use the resource, and is not the same as 
holding a water right. This theory states that all human beings have the rights to 
access water to cover basic human needs. A water right, confers power to an actor, 
through a permission granted by a water institution, for using specific amounts of 
water from a specific source to obtain economic benefit (Solanes and Jouravlev 
2006). Water right tenure is guaranteed not only through official written law but 
also by customary law (Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998; Roth et al. 2005; 
Derman and Hellum 2007; Boelens 2008). 
The right to use water and water rights also used to be gained through historical 
use. Years of traditional knowledge have recognised that communities such as San 
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Francisco are organised to use water from a specific source within the community 
for a specific activity. For example, in San Francisco groundwater has been used 
for domestic consumption. This decision was implemented due to traditional 
knowledge and the awareness that groundwater has the quality for human 
consumption. Scholars have studied community members organisation and 
traditional knowledge in Latin American countries and identified that surface 
water and groundwater used to be equally allocated to different regions and users, 
not only for irrigation but for human consumption (Beccar et al., 2002). San 
Francisco still maintains their water rights to manage their groundwater to provide 
DWSS to community households, but despite the national change from the 
traditional water supply method to a piped DWSS, householders continuously 
experience failure in the DWSS and lack of drinking water. The problems of 
insufficiency in the DWSS derive more from economical and managerial 
conditions than from lack of recognition of water rights or the water resource. 
This chapter only focuses on the water rights of actors involved in the DWSS; the 
following chapter discusses financial problems affecting the DWSS. 
This pattern of water allocation for the DWSS was identified in the three case 
studies. San Mateo and Santiaguito only use groundwater and their water 
committees decide how to distribute the DWSS to community households. The 
provision of the DWSS is a complex set of physical, normative, and 
organisational elements to control the provision of drinking water (Beccar et al. 
2002). Physical elements involve the water source, the places to which water is 
provided, the infrastructure to carry and distribute water; normative elements 
involve rules, rights and obligations; and organisational elements such as human 
organisation to govern, operate, maintain and sustain water resources (Beccar et al. 
2002). Therefore, actors’ rights over water, and specifically the DWSS, have been 
defined as ‘authorised demands to use part of a flow of water, including certain 
privileges, restrictions, obligations, and sanctions accompanying this 
authorisation’ (Beccar et al. 2002: 3). The authorised use of groundwater for 
providing the DWSS in Santiaguito, San Mateo and San Francisco involves 
restrictions to water use, payment obligations and economic sanctions. They all 
are related to the legal authorisation they obtained to enable their water rights. 
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As previously mentioned a water right is the ‘permission that provides its holder 
(either individual or institution) with authorization to take water from a particular 
source’ (Beccar et al. 2002: 3). The key concept to understand rights is 
authorisation. Case study communities hold a formal permission that authorise 
them using water from specific wells. Rights can be recognised when there is an 
individual or collective authority that certifies the use of water with legitimacy 
and is recognised by users and non-users (Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998; 
Beccar et al. 2002). Water rights are usually legitimised through payment for the 
concession or through social recognition.  
San Mateo, Santiaguito and San Francisco’s water rights are recognised by 
CONAGUA, CAEM and AyST. Community members also recognise that their 
water committees hold the water rights necessary for their provision of the DWSS. 
At the same time, the water committees become the authorities and main 
institutions that authorise water users to benefit from the water they provide. 
Water committees recognise and legitimise domestic water users’ water rights 
through their payment for the DWSS. Formal institutions and domestic water 
users also recognise the water rights of local private actors involved in the 
distribution of drinking water at community level through the correspondent 
payment. 
This thesis highlights official and customary water rights. Official water rights are 
statutory water rights authorised by State law and recognised by official 
institutions such as CONAGUA and AyST. Customary water rights are rights 
recognised and accepted by custom or convention. They usually enable users’ 
water extraction and consumption practices, and are accepted by individuals, 
community groups and water committees without formal legislative restrictions 
but with necessary community acceptance. 
This section has introduced and explained the conceptualisation of water rights 
and official and customary water rights held by the State and non-state institutions 
in the case study communities. The water rights granted by both official and 
customary legal systems are valid, and are recognised and accepted by the actors 
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involved in each system. The following section focuses on water rights obtained 
by the actors involved in the DWSS in the case study communities. 
6.3	  Official	  and	  customary	  water	  rights	  and	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  
drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
In the case study communities, water rights involve specific particularities 
according to the position of each water right holder as owner, proprietor, 
authorised claimant, authorised user, or authorised entrant 16  to groundwater 
resources and the DWSS. Domestic water users as well as official and customary 
water institutions have particular property rights. I have adapted Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom’s (2001) property rights system to the three case study 
communities.  
Table 6.1 shows information collected in the field. It summarises property rights 
over water held by actors involved in the DWSS who benefit either from 
groundwater or from the DWSS. The table shows each actor’s property rights 
according to how they benefit from water. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Owners: possess the right of alienation, the right to transfer a good in any way the owner wishes 
that does not harm the uses of the owners, in addition to the bundle of rights held by a proprietor. 
Proprietor: hold the same rights as claimants and the right to determine who may access and 
harvest from a resource. Proprietors develop rules to exclude non-contributors. Claimants: Possess 
the operational rights of access and withdrawal plus the right of managing a resource and the 
authority to create limits on withdrawal rights. Authorized user: Those who have both access and 
withdrawal use rights. Authorized water entrants are the payers of the entrance to use water 
resources (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
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Table	  6.1	  Water	  rights	  associated	  with	  holders’	  position:	  the	  property	  rights	  
system	  	  
Holder 
position  
 
 
 
 
 
Property 
Rights 
(PRS) 
Owner: 
Nation State 
through 
CONAGUA 
Proprietor: 
state, 
municipality, 
community, 
local private 
well 
proprietor 
Authorized 
water 
claimant:  
OI: 
Decentralised 
organisation 
(AyST), 
CI: water 
committees 
Authorized 
user: 
pipero/ 
bombero 
(water 
pumping 
man) 
Authorized 
entrant to 
groundwater 
or the DWSS: 
householder, 
domestic 
water users 
Unauthorized user: 
domestic water users 
who do not pay for 
the right to access 
and withdraw 
groundwater: middle 
men, water vendors 
Access OI/CI OI/CI OI/CI CI OI/CI OI/CI 
Withdrawal OI/CI OI/CI CI CI  OI /CI 
Management OI/CI OI/CI OI/CI    
Exclusion OI/CI OI/CI    CI 
Alienation OI/CI CI CI    
OI: Property rights to water held by official institutions and recognised by Mexican law and 
official water institutions.  
CI: Water rights recognised by customary institutions. 
Source: Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom (2001)  
The table above shows five categories of property rights: access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 
2001).17 Some actors may have the right to access and others, to withdraw water, 
but they may not have the right to manage the water resources (Boelens 2008). 
Other actors have the right to control water, exclude and alienate people from the 
use of this resource. It is also possible for a user to hold more than one property 
right at the same time (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2001). These property 
rights when combined with a right holder position allow holders accessing water. 
And each position gives the specific user a specific set of property rights to use 
drinking water or to be involved in providing the DWSS. 
6.3.1	  Property	  rights	  of	  owners	  and	  proprietors	  
As Table 6.1 shows, the nation State, through CONAGUA, is the owner of all 
water rights in Mexico. CONAGUA has the property rights to access, withdraw 
and manage water, as well as to exclude and alienate others from its use. In an 
official water governance system, where formal law regulates rights and duties, 
every administrative level has specific formal water rights. The lower the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Access: the right to enter a defined physical area or resource. Withdrawal: the right to obtain the 
resource or products of a resource system (divert water). Management: the right to regulate 
internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvement (of the DWSS). 
Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be 
transferred to others. Alienation: the right to sell, inheritance, or lease management and exclusion 
rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
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hierarchical level, the less property rights over water of water institutions are 
recognised by official institutions and their related laws. For example, the state, 
municipalities, community water institutions and local well proprietors are not the 
owners of the groundwater but simply hold property rights over water in their 
position as proprietors. The state of Mexico, municipalities, communities and 
local private well proprietors have the right to access, withdraw and manage 
drinking water, as well as to exclude some users from its use. In the case studies 
well proprietors may be local private or municipal. By custom, San Francisco and 
Santiaguito communities, through their water committee, additionally hold the 
right to alienate water to vendors or specific individuals or institutions in their 
own or neighbouring communities. By 2010, in a focus group, the president of the 
water committee from Santiaguito mentioned: 
“[In 2011] we, [the water committee members] are discussing whether we will 
provide some water [the DWSS] to the new university built between Almoloya city 
centre and Santiaguito. There is a strong possibility that we will install a tap for 
them. However, we are discussing how much we need to charge them because of 
course they are not community members and they will need more water. So we need 
to be very careful not to lose [money and property rights]. However, we also need 
community members’ approval. If they agree, we will provide [the university] with 
the DWSS; otherwise we will not” (Water committee president, Santiaguito, July 
2010). 
6.3.2	  Property	  rights	  of	  authorised	  claimants	  
Water rights of authorised water claimants’ are different to those of proprietors. 
There are formal and informal authorised water claimant institutions. For example 
AyST, the decentralised water organisation, is the official institution and 
authorised claimant that works in San Mateo. Customary institutions are also 
authorised water claimants. According to Ostrom (2001), as the authorised 
claimant, AyST has the right to access, withdraw and manage water. However, in 
San Mateo AyST only has access and financial management rights, and cannot 
withdraw water because San Mateo water committee holds this responsibility. 
AyST is neither able to exclude nor to alienate community members from the 
DWSS.  
AyST, as authorised water claimant, has the right to withdraw water in formally- 
managed neighbour communities where AyST provides the DWSS. AyST, 
Chapter	  6.	  Decision-­‐making	  according	  to	  the	  property	  rights	  of	  actors	  to	  access	  drinking	  water	  
183	  
	  
therefore is not only an authorised claimant but also a proprietor, due to the 
property rights that are legitimated for them by communities and the municipality. 
The communities that recognise AyST’s right to withdraw water are mostly those 
in Toluca municipality where AyST has full responsibility for providing the 
DWSS. The withdrawal of water by AyST or the community water committee 
depends on the DWSS agreement between the communities and AyST.  
Water committees in customarily-governed communities hold property rights as 
authorised water claimants. In San Mateo, Santiaguito and San Francisco, the 
water committees have the property right to access, withdraw and manage water; 
however, only in San Mateo AyST is responsible for charging for the DWSS. In 
these communities water committees can also alienate water from other users.  
In Santiaguito the water committee, in agreement with community members, has 
alienated rights to water of particular users such as a local university, small 
businesses and neighbouring urban developments. In San Mateo the water 
committee is not allowed to do this, as its partnership with Toluca municipality 
limits such decisions. 
6.3.3	  Property	  rights	  of	  authorised	  users	  and	  authorised	  entrants	  
There are authorised users in the three communities studied, including the 
bomberos who are the man responsible for switching on the pump to pumping 
water to different areas of each community. The bomberos in the three case 
studies have the right to access and withdraw water but are not allowed to manage 
groundwater, as this is done by the president, secretary and treasurer of the water 
committee. The bombero, as an authorised user, in each community is recognised 
by the customary but not the official institution.  
According to the official and customary water governance systems, authorised 
entrants to water such as householders and domestic water users in San Mateo, 
Santiaguito and San Francisco only have the right to access water. The right of 
authorised entrant is conferred to householders and domestic water users by both 
official and customary institutions when they pay for the entrance to use drinking 
water. 
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6.3.4	  Unauthorised	  users	  
Finally, during my fieldwork I found that both official and customary institutions 
identify unauthorised users who do not pay for the right to access the drinking 
water they consume or to withdraw water for sale, although they have access to 
water. This category includes householders and water vendors who do not pay for 
the right to access or withdraw water to the water institution concerned. For 
example, water vendors do not pay taxes or water right to CONAGUA or AyST. 
While domestic water users do not pay to the water committee or AyST their 
monthly or annual bill for the DWSS they receive. 
An interesting finding is that some users may be classified as unauthorised by the 
official water institution but as authorised by the customary institutions, based not 
on payment but on custom and convention. In addition, some water vendors may 
be unauthorised by the official water institution but may be authorised by the local 
private institution that holds property rights as the authorised proprietor. Water 
vendors pay the well proprietor directly for the right to withdraw water from the 
well. Once water vendors pay for the rights to access groundwater they are 
legitimised by well proprietors, water committees and community members to sell 
and transport drinking water to neighbour communities. Under these 
circumstances, community members recognise and accept water vendors’ role in 
the sells and provision of drinking water. 
AyST categorises unauthorised users as illegal users, while water committees 
categorise them as debtors. The unauthorised users tend to be water vendors and 
householders that have not paid for the DWSS they receive of have not up to date 
their payments. Water vendors are unauthorised because they pay AyST or 
CONAGUA neither taxes nor for property rights. Their main economic activity is 
reselling groundwater. They are middlemen between the well proprietors and 
domestic water users. Currently there is no formal mechanism to legitimate them, 
and so they cannot become authorised users. While householders who are behind 
in their payments for the DWSS they receive are also classified as unauthorised 
users, it is difficult for the water committees or AyST to apply a mechanism to 
enforce them to pay, which would be the only way to validate them as authorised 
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users. A public administrator, member of a municipal water institution, 
complained in an interview about how the operations of unauthorised water 
vendors affect formal water institutions and the consequent economic losses: 
“The problem is … there are many water tankers and wells without registration or 
permission; there are proprietors of wells that sell water and [there is] water resale 
[through water vendors]. It is complicated in terms of norms. These black market 
sales affect the performance of operational organisations [municipally decentralised 
water organisations] … The small customary water committees, small sales and 
resales are illegal because they cause millionaire [huge] losses for AyST. In San 
Mateo Atenco [community], for example, selling water from tankers is prohibited. 
However, AyST often sells water from water tankers due to economic constraints 
within the institution. It usually sells [water] on irregular settlements or where the 
water organisation knows that water will not be delivered” (Municipal public 
administrator, Toluca, June 2009). 
Water vendors do not pay the official owner of the water, CONAGUA, because 
they do not have a water concession; they skip the official law and the 
permissions granted by CONAGUA and find ways to access and withdraw water 
from regional aquifers. Unauthorised users such as water vendors might not 
manage the water but they can exclude others from using it. For example, water 
vendors may select who they prefer to selling drinking water to from domestic 
water users, builders, local businesses and municipal offices. Their decision is 
often based on the number of deliveries they can make in a day or the distance 
they have to drive to deliver their water. If the distance is great, the driver can 
decide to exclude a water user from his private drinking water service. Any other 
water tanker driver can provide this service.  
Authorised formal claimant only has rights to access and management but not 
withdrawal. By contrast, water committees have not only the right to access and 
manage but also to withdraw and alienate. The official DWSS does not have an 
authorised user in the three communities studied because this responsibility was 
entirely delegated to the customary water committee. Moreover, unauthorised 
users in an official system are able to access and withdraw water. However, in a 
customary management system unauthorised users can also exclude others from 
the service. The following table summarises the property rights held by each actor 
in the DWSS. 
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Table	  6.2	  Property	  rights	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  DWSS	  
Property 
rights 
Actors 
Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation 
CONAGUA      
Communities      
Santiaguito 
water 
committee 
     
San Francisco 
water 
committee 
     
San Mateo 
water 
committee 
  
 
(operation, 
maintenance) 
  
Water 
pumping man      
AyST (in San 
Mateo)   
 
(economic 
resources: payment 
collection, budget, 
investment, 
expenses) 
  
Domestic 
water users      
Householders 
with a 
waterwheel 
on their 
property 
     
Water 
vendors  
 
(on payment 
of a fee) 
   
Well 
proprietors      
Householder 
debtors      
Source: fieldwork. 
The main differences are that in an official system the proprietor has no alienation 
rights, while in a customary system the proprietor is allowed to alienate if 
necessary. This means, that in an official system, proprietors are not allowed to 
sell, inherit, or lease water management rights because these are owners’ rights. 
By contrast, customary institutions are allowed to sell, inherit, or lease water or its 
management to other actors because they legitimate others can also do it. 
Customary institutions recognise they are able to alienate specific water rights or 
property rights over water they have the authorisation to take. However, they are 
totally free to select or accept to whom they would like to alienate if necessary. 
Having the rights to alienate does not mean they have to do it. They are 
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legitimised to do it in case they require making a decision about it. Below I 
explain how the positions of the actors involved in the DWSS influence collective 
decision-making according to the property rights system.  
6.3.5	  Property	  rights	  and	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  DWSS	  	  
The specific property rights of holders enable them to make decisions about their 
access to groundwater. As there are multiple legitimate actors in the water 
governance systems in the study area, it is necessary to identify the wide array of 
property rights, norms and duties that guide their decisions about accessing 
groundwater resources. 
Scholars support the idea that if communities are involved in decision making, the 
community members will make collective decisions according to organisational, 
practical and administrative procedures that benefit the majority of inhabitants. 
They will take into account the characteristics of both official and customary 
practices and select the one they think is most suitable for them, as a community 
knows its own needs best (Doe and Khan 2004; Harvey and Reed 2006). For this 
reason, communities should be the ones to make the decisions about their DWSS 
allocation, distribution and delivery of water and who should take on the related 
responsibilities.  
The challenge for the case study communities and formal institutions is not 
making decisions, but implementing them once made and legitimising water 
rights in a society with diverse traditions, legal pluralism, socio-economic 
characteristics and interests. The main challenges for both water governance 
systems in implementing their decisions and legitimising the property rights of 
actors to access groundwater are related to two main actions: a) recognition of 
property rights through a formal document; b) recognition of property rights 
through the collection of payments from water user. The following section 
analyses how the official and customary water institutions legitimise property 
rights over water. 
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6.4	  Legitimising	  property	  rights	  to	  access	  groundwater	  
Water institutions involved in the provision of the DWSS in the study area have 
two main ways of legitimising property rights: 1) though a formal title concession/ 
or agreement, and 2) through periodical payment for the water rights to the water 
institution responsible. The following section addresses how actors legitimise 
water rights. It addresses first formal water rights legitimised through a title 
concession and then informal property rights held by customary institutions and 
actors.  
6.4.1	  Legitimising	  formal	  water	  rights	  
In Mexico there is a broad trend towards conditional water rights through formal 
official procedures. Formal water institutions such as CONAGUA only legitimate 
individuals’ and institutions’ water rights via formal procedures such as granting 
title concessions, allocating titles, giving official permission and charging for the 
provision of the DWSS through formal water institutions. At any administrative 
level, such bodies only recognise actors’ water rights when an official water 
institution legitimises them. An official water authority from CAEM working as 
operator of water infrastructure, at state of Mexico level, mentioned in an 
interview carried out in November 2008: 
“Federal government, through CONAGUA, has directly granted concessions to allow 
people to hold water rights. CONAGUA allows four ways of managing water: by 
municipalities, by decentralised organisations, by the private sector, and through 
concessions. CONAGUA always provides the concession. If I were a civil 
association, I could connect [people from] a settlement and ask for a concession” 
(CAEM Engineer, Toluca, November 2008). 
Legitimising formal water rights includes obtaining a permit and complying with 
the specific requirements demanded by the LAN, such as causing no harm to third 
parties, protecting the environment, using water efficiently and payment for 
operational costs and for water rights (Solanes and González-Villarreal 1999). 
These conditions are written into the LAN and aim to promote society’s beneficial 
and appropriate use of water. If the conditions are not fulfilled and the water rights 
granted do not result in continuous social-improvements use of water, or water 
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has not been used for a certain period, the water right might be rescinded (Solanes 
and Jouravlev 2006).  
In Mexico a variety of legitimate institutions hold formal water rights, including 
the case study communities and local private institutions. The main formal 
institutions holding formal water rights are CONAGUA, CAEM and AyST. 
Private institutions such as private industries located next to San Mateo 
community and private well proprietors in San Mateo, San Francisco and 
Santiaguito also hold formal water rights. Customary community institutions such 
as the water committees may also hold formal water rights granted and recognised 
by the State law. However, customary institutions might recognise by custom 
domestic users property rights. 
Holders of formal water rights for different uses included for drinking water use 
are regulated by CONAGUA. Water rights holders are aware of the specific water 
rights that they must apply for if they want to use underground or surface water 
for particular purposes. There are special concessions if water is required for the 
provision of the DWSS, for community households, irrigation, food production, 
industrial purposes, or to run a business selling water. The property right to use 
groundwater held by AyST, the case study customary communities and private 
water sellers is usually granted for provision of the DWSS.  
The different actors in the community case studies that use drinking water 
legitimate by custom the specific water rights that each requires to take water 
from a specific source. The process for accessing water, and how the property 
rights are legitimated, are different in each community. This also is also the case 
for individuals, local water markets and industries, which have to follow different 
procedures in order to be allowed to use groundwater. The following subsection 
explains how formal water rights granted to the communities chosen as case 
studies legitimate their rights to access, withdraw and manage drinking water. 
After analysing formal water rights, I discuss customary institutions’ property 
rights over water and how these institutions legitimate their actors’ access to 
groundwater. 
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6.4.1.1 Formal water rights in Santiaguito 
In 1989, CONAGUA first recognised the Santiaguito community’s right to access, 
withdraw and manage groundwater. According to the community water 
committee records, before 1989 it had a common tap and there was no charge for 
accessing drinking water from this source. Since 1989 the community, through a 
water committee, has been responsible for water extraction, control – management, 
operation and maintenance – alienation, and DWSS distribution, and pays for the 
right to access and withdraw groundwater.  
Even though its formal right to groundwater water was formally recognised in 
Santiaguito in 1989, the legal document recognising the community’s water rights 
was not granted until 1992, when the State government developed the first 
national water law. Once the community was granted a water concession it 
assumed responsibility for paying CONAGUA for it annually. The payment 
depends on the period of the concession. CONAGUA stipulates that water 
concessions titles to withdraw or use national waters cannot be granted for less 
than 5 or more than 30 years (OCAVM 2011).  
CONAGUA expects the Santiaguito community to pay on time for the concession 
that guarantees its community water rights to access and withdraw groundwater as 
well as to pay to extend the title concession. The payment is made by the water 
committee, which collects it from the community. The expense generated by 
paying the formal water concession tends to cause financial problems between the 
water committee and community householders. Financial problems consequently 
cause troubles in the operation of the DWSS due to the committee’s inability to 
collect enough money from users to pay for the concession title. 
6.4.1.2 Formal water rights in San Mateo 
San Mateo installed infrastructure to access and withdraw water in the 1960s. 
Toluca’s Adolfo López Mateos airport and certain industries agreed to provide the 
community and other neighbouring communities with wells and pipes as 
compensation for their industrial growth and land use in the 1960s (Contreras 
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Domínguez et al. 1989; Alzúa Pérez 2004). The compensation also took into 
account the industries’ environmental and social impact.  
Toluca airport and the industrial corridor assumed the full cost of San Mateo 
community’s new well and the infrastructure to pump water. The community did 
not have to apply directly to CONAGUA for formal rights to access and withdraw 
groundwater for the DWSS, as the airport and industries involved dealt with this 
too. From that date onwards, San Mateo’s inhabitants had to assume the operation 
and maintenance costs. In an in depth interview, a male householder, domestic 
water user from San Mateo commented: 
“As far as I understand, we [the San Mateo community] did not have to ask 
permission from CONAGUA to withdraw water. We did not have to pay for the 
water rights, but we were asked if we wanted a well. We just had to organise 
ourselves to install the pipes through faenas and then organise provision of the 
DWSS. We just received the well and the infrastructure, ready to be operated. The 
governor, engineers and many politicians came to the inauguration. We even 
appeared in the [local] newspapers. So now we know this water is ours and nobody 
tells us what we can or can’t do. The only issue is that we have to pay the 
municipality for the DWSS. But we do not have to pay anyone else for any kind of 
permission. I don’t know if the airport or the industries have to. [The government] 
knows this water is ours” (Male domestic water user, San Mateo, February 2009). 
According to Mexico’s urban planning legislation, industries are responsible for 
providing their neighbouring communities with drinking water. This was why San 
Mateo community was provided with a well. Most industries are granted by 
CONAGUA a formal concession to withdraw a specific amount of water called, 
called agua en bloque,18 for industrial purposes only. In order for the industries to 
provide a well in San Mateo, which could supply the DWSS, they had to apply for 
specific water rights, and now the state of Mexico and Toluca municipality 
recognise San Mateo community’s right to access and withdraw groundwater to 
provide the DWSS.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Agua en Bloque is the total volume of water allowed to be withdrawn from a well during a 
specific period. The amount is granted by CONAGUA via a concession title. If CONAGUA grants 
a concession, the actor (municipality, community, industry) that benefits must pay for the total 
authorised volume of agua en bloque withdrawn from the well for which they have obtained the 
concession. Domestic users pay for the water they receive, and the water authority pays for the 
agua en bloque granted in the concession title. Users pay the municipal or customary authority and 
the municipality pays CONAGUA. The amount of money collected by the municipality or water 
committee should be equal to the amount they pay CONAGUA. 
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While San Mateo community members have to pay AyST, rather than the water 
committee, for the right to receive their DWSS, they do not have to pay for the 
right to withdraw water from the ground, which is paid for by the industries. The 
water committee is responsible for water management and provision of the DWSS. 
And AyST pays the Electricity Company for the expenses generated due to the 
water pumping operation with the money it collects from householders. In an 
interview carried out in San Mateo, in April 2009, a male water user talked about 
this process: 
“This community owns the wells for providing drinking water because the airport 
and the industries donated them. [San Mateo community] did not pay a single peso to 
open the wells. They gave them to us as a gift. We only have to pay the municipality 
for the [drinking] water service. I do not know if the airport or the industries have to 
pay anything more. I don’t think so, because they’ve already paid to open the wells” 
(Male domestic water user, San Mateo, April 2009). 
San Mateo and Santiaguito have formal water rights, recognised by CONAGUA, 
which enable both water committees to access and withdraw groundwater from a 
specific well. Local private well proprietors also hold formal water rights, 
provided by CONAGUA, to access, withdraw and manage groundwater for 
business purposes. A central part of the decision-making in water governance 
relates to who is eligible to obtain a title concession to use groundwater. National 
government governs all property rights to water through CONAGUA and control 
the number of concessions granted, the uses of groundwater and the location of 
the main extraction sources.  
6.4.1.3 Formal rights to water of local private well proprietors 
Private well proprietors usually apply for formal water rights to sell drinking 
water. To fulfil all the legal requirements involved in withdrawing water for 
commercial purposes they must comply with LAN’s mandates. They pay 
CONAGUA for water resources granted to develop a water business in a local 
market.  
Obtaining a water concession was a relatively simple procedure for these well 
proprietors when there were no restrictions on water withdrawal. However, 
CONAGUA is currently rejecting applications for new concessions to withdraw 
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water due to intensive withdrawal by the industrial sector and Mexico City’s 
government in the past.19 Opening new wells and allowing new contracts for 
water extraction are currently banned; although the renewal of permission granted 
to well proprietors and concession title-holders, before the ban on concessions 
came into force, is still valid.  
CONAGUA also renew or accept water withdrawal concession shared between 
two actors. For example, when a water rights holder sells part of his/her titles 
granted by CONAGUA it is likely that CONAGUA will accept approving the 
new-shared concession. This process works as follows: when an applicant has an 
agreement with a water right holder who is able to transfer any spare volume of 
water, CONAGUA allows the sharing or reselling through the transfer of property 
rights of spare volume from an already-granted concession. Currently, well 
proprietors who apply to extract groundwater must first contact private well 
proprietors who hold water concessions, or the municipality, to negotiate the 
possibility of buying a portion of allocated volume of water. Once the well 
proprietor and the interested actor agree on the volume of water to be sold, they 
go through an official procedure with CONAGUA who will accept or deny the 
new grant or concession to use the spare volume of water and to open the new 
well following specific characteristics. 
CONAGUA can only validate the transference of rights from a local private water 
market user to another on condition that the water is used for human consumption, 
which includes the DWSS, rather than for industry or irrigation. When actors need 
water for activities different to human consumption they do need to follow a 
different procedure. Once the transference of water rights has been accepted and 
the concession title granted, the new right holder may open a well following the 
required engineering methods that fulfil CONAGUA’s conditions in order to meet 
the quality withdrawal standards. A private well proprietor from San Francisco 
explained in an in depth interview about the concession that CONAGUA granted 
him: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 From the 1950s onwards, Mexico City government withdrew and transported groundwater from 
Toluca’s aquifers to Mexico City and its metropolitan area, to provide the DWSS to inhabitants of 
this area. 
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“The concession we hold was granted by CONAGUA. We have an annual permit 
and we have to renew it every year. CONAGUA gives specific rights to access [and 
withdraw water] and you have to pay for those rights. For example, they authorise 
you [to withdraw] 20,000 litres. However, if you need more, you have to wait a year 
to ask to increase the extraction. You have also to change the pump and the pipes, as 
well as paying for the extraction rights, to have all the water you ask for. 
CONAGUA has total control of the permits within a little circle, thus you can’t [omit 
a procedure]. [For example, apart from the application, documents and payments], 
CONAGUA requires you to take a sample of the soil layers every metre once you 
start opening the well. So you have bags with the soil samples. You have to keep 
them all because CONAGUA might ask you at any time what material you have at 
100 metres’ depth … it is delicate; but you have to fulfil every requirement in order 
to get [formal water rights]” (Private proprietor of a well, San Francisco, April 2009). 
Once private well proprietors obtain formal property rights to access and 
withdraw water, they must legitimate these through the periodical payment for 
them (payment for water rights is discussed in section 6.5). This section has 
analysed the formal water rights held by San Mateo and Santiaguito communities 
and by local private well proprietors. The water rights held by San Mateo and 
Santiaguito water committees enable them to provide the DWSS to community 
households. However, the way in which these water committees manage the 
DWSS and legitimate householders’ property right to access drinking water is 
recognised under the communities’ own customary rules. The following section 
analyses how customary institutions and actors legitimate their property rights 
over drinking water. 
6.4.2	  Legitimating	  property	  rights	  over	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
Apart from formal water rights held by the water committees to access and 
withdraw water to provide the DWSS, there are also customary property rights 
that enable customary actors to govern and manage their DWSS. A similar 
process occurs with both community members and local private water vendors. 
Community members’ specific property rights to access the DWSS, and water 
vendors’ right to access groundwater are recognised and legitimised by custom. In 
San Francisco, San Mateo and Santiaguito, specific property rights are valid 
because customary water committees and domestic water users legitimate the 
actors’ use of drinking water. Below I analyse the property rights held by 
customary institutions and actors to access, withdraw or manage drinking water, 
or to exclude others from its use.  
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6.4.2.1 Customary property rights held in the case study communities 
Besides the formal water rights that define them as proprietors, the three 
communities studied also hold customary water rights, which are recognised by 
the members of each community and legitimised through customary mechanisms. 
The recognition of customary property rights allow them access to, withdrawal 
and management of water, the exclusion of others from the DWSS or the 
alienation of drinking water when necessary to different actors in the same or a 
neighbouring community. The three communities hold property rights to the wells 
that provide their drinking water.  
The water committees are recognised because each committee member is elected 
by community members’ common decision to entrust the DWSS and community 
decisions making related to the DWSS to them. The new water committee 
representatives form the community’s legitimate water authority for 
approximately one year. San Mateo, San Francisco and Santiaguito water 
committees also hold customary property rights legitimised by community 
members, which let them govern and manage their DWSS customarily, each in its 
own way. 
This is the case study San Francisco community water rights have also been 
gained through historical use while Santiaguito’s customary water rights have 
been also gained due to labour mechanisms. According to Boelens and 
Zwarteveen (2005) and Boelens (2008), some actors have earned water rights 
through labour or the historic of water. Santiaguito, for example, initially held the 
rights to access and withdraw water through a title concession granted by 
CONAGUA. Santiaguito has additionally gained customary property rights 
because community members have also put labour on the installation and 
management of the DWSS. San Francisco has a historical right to access, 
withdraw and use underground and surface water. Since colonial times, this 
community – and other communities in Mexico – has committed its labour to 
organizing the water infrastructure for irrigation and the provision of the DWSS. 
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San Francisco has always had customary water rights because the community 
developed in a water-rich area and used to be water self-sufficient, with most 
households having traditional wells or water wheels that covered all their needs. 
Since 1970, urbanisation and development approaches to governing water have 
promoted piped water rather than traditional water extraction methods and the 
rights to govern water and manage the DWSS have been modified in San 
Francisco. For example, before 1970 the community’s householders were the 
owners of water found on their property and the decision to use groundwater 
entirely depended on them; they also decided who they would share water with 
and for what purposes. They did not have to ask formal or customary institutions 
for permission to use water.  
After 1970, property rights in San Francisco were nationalised and the State 
through CONAGUA formally took over all water rights and made itself 
responsible for allocating and recognising communities’ specific property rights. 
As discussed in chapter four, CONAGUA currently is the only owner of water 
found in the Mexican territory. Therefore, any concession approved by 
CONAGUA entitles water users as rights proprietors. As a consequence, the San 
Francisco community became the proprietor of specific wells and community 
members elected a customary water committee annually to govern and manage the 
DWSS. Even though the water committees of the communities studied hold 
property rights, official institutions do not accept the customary institutions 
management of the DWSS. Official institutions prefer the municipality manage it. 
In an interview, a CONAGUA ex-employee that used to be working as inspector 
and technician of water infrastructure in Toluca municipality mentioned: 
“In each municipality there are at least seven or eight independent water committees. 
Those committees are not legal. CONAGUA has not registered them, maybe 
because it is a tradition, maybe because [if community members perceive that their 
traditional water rights are affected they might become violent to defend them], but I 
think CONAGUA does not have them because it [does not carry out its functions 
properly]. In the State of Mexico only 30% of independent water committees are 
regulated and 8% have no urban regulation, so they freely administer water [without 
paying for water rights neither charging community members for the DWSS]” 
(Municipal government representative, inspector and water technician, Toluca, June 
2009). 
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Community members of the three communities defend their right to access water 
resources on their territory and to organise provision of the DWSS. Although San 
Francisco and Santiaguito have the right to access and withdraw groundwater, 
they still have drinking water supply problems. The main problem is not related to 
water availability or the property rights held by the water committee and 
householders, but to how the DWSS is managed. A few San Francisco community 
members have taken advantage of this problem and have set up local private 
businesses selling drinking water. They are private well proprietors who hold 
water rights to access, withdraw and sell drinking water. The way in which they 
legitimise others access to water is also legitimised through their payment, as 
summarised in Table 6.1. 
The main difference among the water committees of the three case studies, in 
terms of water rights, is the responsibility taken to manage the finances collected 
from the provision of the DWSS. In San Mateo, the water committee leaves the 
responsibility for managing these finances to AyST. Apart from this, all three 
water committees studied have customary recognition of their rights to access and 
withdraw water and to manage the DWSS, and if required, to alienate others 
external to the community the drinking water.  
Community members in the three communities also hold property rights to access 
the DWSS that are legitimised through payment mechanisms. In order to explain 
the legitimate access of actors such as domestic water users and vendors to 
drinking water, it is necessary to discuss payment for the DWSS that the former 
receive for the latters’ access to groundwater. The following section analyses 
payments as a way of legitimating the right to access drinking water or withdraw 
it to provide the DWSS. 
6.5	  Legitimising	  property	  rights	  through	  payment	  for	  the	  DWSS	  
In the case study communities, the rights to access the DWSS or to withdraw 
groundwater are mainly legitimised through payment to the water institution 
governing and managing the DWSS or to the main actor responsible for the 
decision to allow other actor to access or withdraw drinking water. This section 
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analyses the payment provided either to a formal or an informal water institution 
or to an individual actor as a way of legitimising actors’ access to water 
(groundwater or the DWSS). 
Formal institutions generally legitimise water rights by granting an official 
concession, which enables official, customary or private water institutions to 
access and withdraw groundwater. Water institutions or individuals must fulfil the 
conditions stipulated and make the appropriate payment to CONAGUA in order 
to obtain an official document legitimating their rights. However, paying an 
official institution is not the only way of legitimising water rights. Customary 
institutions are also responsible for collecting water user payments that legitimate 
the access of actors to the DWSS. In the communities studied, payment for water 
is the main legitimate mechanism that recognises actors’ rights to access water 
and water institutions property rights to access, withdraw and/or manage the 
DWSS when applicable.  
AyST legitimates San Mateo householders’ access to the DWSS they receive on 
their property in return for payment. Not all householders keep their payments 
updated, however, and though they have access to the DWSS they are not 
legitimate users if they are in debt to AyST. In an interview, an AyST 
representative complained about users who do not pay for the DWSS: 
“In Toluca, people have to pay for water services. If they do not pay, they receive 
letters of notice. If they continue not paying, we can only restrict the service to the 
house, but we can’t cut it. So all these [missed payments] are money lost [to AyST]. 
Small sales and re-sales also represent economic losses for the official water 
institution [AyST]” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
Similarly, Santiaguito and San Francisco’s water committees legitimate domestic 
water users access to the DWSS through users’ monthly payments to them. 
Community members pay AyST or the water committee respectively. Both 
customary and official water institutions legitimate the property rights of domestic 
water users through payment for the DWSS.  
For customary water committees, legitimising the property rights of householders 
to access the DWSS depends more on users’ cash payment to the committee than 
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on their holding an official document guaranteeing access to the DWSS; and 
water vendors also have to pay the well proprietor, in cash, for the right to access 
and withdraw groundwater from their well.  
The local private water market – mainly represented by well proprietors and water 
vendors – must follow mechanisms of access to and extraction of groundwater in 
order to carry out their business. For local private well proprietors, the legitimate 
way to gain the right to access and withdraw groundwater is through paying 
CONAGUA for an official concession. Once this is obtained, the owner must 
make payments to CONAGUA every three months to maintain the right to 
withdraw water from the well. The payments begin after the well is completed and 
is ready to be operated. The penalty for not complying with these obligations is a 
temporary sanction prohibiting the withdrawal of water and a fine, which must be 
paid before s/he is allowed to continue extracting water. The sanction ends when 
the payment is complete or the penalty period ends. If the proprietor of a well 
does not pay the fine by the end of the penalty period, CONAGUA has the right to 
cancel the concession or repossess the well. In an in depth interview, a private 
well proprietor, holder of a water withdrawal permit confirmed: 
“Based on these rights we have to pay for water every three months. Actually, 
CONAGUA has a water meter, and based on this meter they charge for the water 
extracted. You pay for the water you get. However, from this business [of selling 
water from the well] you have earnings, and with these earnings you pay for 
electricity and everything you need. The payment [for water rights] works similar to 
the electricity one. You pay for what you consume [every three months]. There is a 
tariff and they charge you for the permit you hold. The water you take is the water 
you pay for. For example, if they allow you to [withdraw] 20,000 litres you have to 
pay for those litres. You can’t withdraw more water than CONAGUA allows you to 
take, nor can you withdraw less, because once the year’s contract finishes 
CONAGUA assesses it and says: ‘You know, we gave you [permission to withdraw] 
X cubic metres and we are missing some money’. Then you must check the water 
you are consuming [from the well, through the water meter]. There is no way you 
can avoid paying for water rights otherwise CONAGUA can cancel the permit” 
(Private well proprietor, San Francisco, April 2009). 
In order to make a profit from their investment with CONAGUA, well proprietors 
sell drinking water to domestic water users, builders or local water vendors. The 
latter resell the water to domestic water users from water tankers. Even when a 
well proprietor’s business is selling drinking water, this does not mean that s/he 
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distributes the water. A well proprietor from San Mateo explained in an interview 
how he operated his water business: 
“We do not have a single tanker; we sell water to water vendors. They come to the 
well to fill their tankers and they go and deliver it. The drivers earn approximately 
$260 MXN (£13 GBP). So if the price of 10,000 litres of water [transported by a 
tanker] is $460 MXN, $200 MXN remains for the well proprietor. We charge $20 
MXN (£1 GBP) per square meter of water” (Private well proprietor, San Mateo, June 
2009). 
Reselling water is the water vendors’ main activity. Besides legitimising property 
rights to access and withdraw water they must also pay the well proprietor for the 
water they take. However, even when they legitimate their access to water by this 
direct ‘pay as you go’ payment to well proprietors, formal water institutions do 
not accept these customary property rights, although they cannot stop them 
accessing and withdrawing groundwater. An AyST representative, public 
administrator, complained in an interview about water vendors’ operations: 
“Water tanker drivers [piperos] should be regulated. It is a problem because they do 
not pay taxes. They actually charge a lot. They charge $400 MXN (approximately 
£20 GBP) for a [10,000 litre] tanker and it lasts for one month. If you [householder] 
do not pay the provider [of the DWSS] for a couple of months, in the end you spend 
more on pipas [tankers of water]” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
The piperos water vendors act as middlemen between the water users and the well 
proprietors. Water vendors are authorised by customary actors but unauthorised in 
the eyes of formal water institutions. They legitimise their access to and 
withdrawal of water by paying the well proprietors. In customary systems, the sale 
of drinking water from water tankers is commonly practiced at the local and 
community level, especially when there is no sufficient water from the DWSS or 
water is scarce.20 Such water sales generate advantages for the domestic water 
user, who can buy drinking water when required, and profit for the water tanker 
operators. Other actors who directly benefit from selling water are local shops 
selling bottled water and the local water purification industry. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ‘Inadequate supply of water to meet the varied demands of humans and their environment... 
Water scarcity is not only a relative factor of the quantity/quality aspects of supply and the 
quantity/quality consequences of demand, it is also an aspect of social relations and transformation 
in the loci (community) of control over water resources’ (Johnston, 2003: 81). Johnston, B. R. 
(2003). ‘The Political Ecology of Water: an Introduction’ Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 14(3): 73 
- 90.  
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Some unauthorised users have property rights in action to access and withdraw 
water from the aquifers. This mean they manage to access water and sometimes 
withdraw water even when either a formal or a customary institution does not 
legitimise them. Authorised rights holders perceive unauthorised users of drinking 
water as problem because they do not legitimate their access through payment for 
it. By April 2009, according to a private well proprietor’s opinion in an interview: 
“There are a lot of people that are not paying for water rights. This is not convenient 
for the government because these people are only squeezing it without contributing 
anything. There are a lot of vendors [and unauthorised well proprietors] who do not 
have permission to use water. However, they do it. Once someone came to me to sell 
part of their [water] rights or cubic metres. They asked for millions [of pesos], but I 
do not know how they do that. It is supposed to be impossible. So all this represents 
losses for the government” (Private well proprietor, San Francisco, April 2009). 
In my fieldwork I found individuals classified as unauthorised users, especially in 
San Francisco. Unauthorised users are interested in obtaining a water concession 
through their social or political relationships. The narratives of some well 
proprietors that I spoke to during my fieldwork indicate that individual water 
users, land owners interested in opening a local water business and would-be 
water vendors owners occasionally approach members of CONAGUA to ask for 
hidden help to obtain a grant, permission or rights to withdraw water. This 
sometimes enables them to develop their business network at the community level. 
Such users may obtain and legitimate water rights through formal procedures but 
not legitimate their access to water with the required payment. Or they may pay 
for the right to water but not fulfil the conditions attached. In an informal chat, a 
potential unauthorised user, informal water vendor, from a neighbour community 
to San Francisco mentioned: 
“I always wanted to open a well to extract water and sell drinking water to the 
neighbours, but it is very expensive. You need to obtain a concession first, and then 
open the well. However, if you invest in the payment for that concession there’s no 
guarantee that you’ll get it. But, you know, there are always ways to do it. I think I 
will ask some friends for their help. Apparently you can’t [he took a moment to 
think about]…but you can [suggesting there are always ways to obtain a formal 
document that allows you to withdraw water]” (Private informal water vendor, San 
Francisco, May 2009). 
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While engaged in my fieldwork I found that knowledge of the law influences how 
some individuals, such as potential well proprietors, seek to obtain the formal 
right to extract groundwater, even during periods when water extraction is banned. 
In an interview, according to the opinion of a CONAGUA-regional level 
representative, obtaining a new formal water concession can be difficult and 
granting concessions might depend on the recharging and environmental 
conditions of the aquifers:  
“There are many periods when water extraction is banned. These are defined by 
region. It usually depends on how intensive the water withdrawal has been in your 
area. It also depends on how many aquifers have been exploited and damaged. For 
example, in the Toluca river basin zone there is a closed season. Water withdrawal is 
prohibited in so many places because of this intensive withdrawal” (CONAGUA 
engineer, government representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
Notwithstanding these restrictions, some unauthorised actors understand the 
procedures they need to follow to obtain formal water rights and legitimate their 
water use and the duties and obligations connected to access to, withdrawal and 
use of water. Social relations among community members are not the only ways 
of influencing this. Knowledge of the law, social and political relations and 
unauthorised use can also play a part in their access to water. I also found that 
indirect privileges legitimate the water rights of certain drinking water users. For 
example, if the potential water user has a direct political relationship with the 
person responsible of authorising water rights s/he might be informally condoned 
of the procedures and even payment and might also get permission to access water. 
Also, some people tend to intimidate water authorities to obtain whatever they 
want. Finally, power relations also play an important role because many 
politicians ‘pay favours’ by using power relations and granting some water 
concessions or legitimising property rights to access water. Privileges might be 
also gained through social relations among community members.  
I found that unauthorised users in San Francisco and Santiaguito extract and use 
groundwater without holding either official water rights or customary property 
rights. They make use of their rights in action, which are not legitimate but they 
find the way to access water; rights in action allow unauthorised users to benefit 
from groundwater resources. 
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After years of experience in the drinking water business have given authorised 
and unauthorised well proprietors and water vendors a deep understanding of the 
relationships and procedures required to get permission to withdraw water. Local 
private water businesses with deep knowledge of the legislation also have a good 
understanding of the institutions and authorities responsible for granting specific 
water rights and the type of permission they require to legitimise their access to 
groundwater. For example, they know the requirements they do need to fulfil if 
they would like to obtain a water concession for commercial purposes selling 
drinking water. These requirements are different if they need to irrigate crops or to 
use groundwater for industrial activities. 
In a customary drinking water supply system managed by a water committee, 
knowledge of the law is not the only way of legitimising the extraction and use of 
drinking water. In communities organised by custom, the water committee and the 
population are aware of the State legislation regarding water resources; however, 
for them, State law is not the main instrument involved in governing, managing, 
legitimising and recognising the water rights and property rights of actors 
involved with groundwater withdrawal, use, or the DWSS. Instead, water 
committees according to custom and convention govern and manage the DWSS 
and the valid mechanisms for making and implementing decisions are agreements 
made together with the community. 
This chapter has discussed the decisions by the formal and customary water 
institutions that govern and manage the DWSS according to the property rights 
they hold. It is important that both legal systems recognise the diverse array of 
each actor’s right to access drinking water according to her/his position. 
Understanding the property rights system helps in understanding the rights of each 
actor to water and how these enable them to access water. The following chapter 
discusses the struggles that customary institutions face in governing the DWSS 
and domestic water users in receiving it. 
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Chapter	  7.	  Community	  Water	  Institutions’	  Struggles	  to	  
Improve	  the	  Governance	  and	  Management	  of	  the	  Drinking	  
Water	  Supply	  Service	  
7.1	  Introduction	  
Both the water committees and domestic water users in the three case study 
communities face recurrent problems that affect the governance and management 
of the DWSS. The main difficulties are related to financial recovery of operational 
costs, which affects the quality of the DWSS, community members’ trust in the 
water committee, willingness to pay for the service, and consequently water 
committee decisions about the governance and management improvement of the 
quality of the DWSS. 
I identified three main problems during my fieldwork: firstly, water institutions’ 
difficulties in recovering payment for the DWSS from community householders; 
secondly, householders’ difficulties paying for the DWSS; and thirdly, a decrease 
in domestic water users’ trust in their water committee, which affects the quality 
of the DWSS. This chapter discusses the problems of domestic water users and 
water institutions related to provision of the DWSS. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first has introduced the chapter; 
the second analyses the problems faced by local and community water institutions, 
particularly water committees and AyST, in providing the DWSS and recovering 
payment for it; the third section analyses the two main difficulties that 
householders face paying for the DWSS – willingness and ability to pay; and, the 
fourth section discusses community members’ trust in their water committees.  
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7.2	  Difficulties	  faced	  by	  the	  water	  committee	  and	  AyST	  in	  providing	  and	  
recovering	  payment	  for	  the	  DWSS	  
Providing the DWSS requires the coordination of managerial, operational and 
maintenance skills to guarantee that the service is delivered with appropriate 
quality, quantity and timeliness. Coordinating the operation of the DWSS in 
customarily-organised communities requires the joint effort of the water 
committee and domestic water users. The case study communities’ water 
committees face three main problems related to the DWSS, which relate to its 
management, operation and maintenance. All three have a common source related 
to water institutions’ cost-recovery by collecting payment for the DWSS from 
householders. 
7.2.1	  Issues	  that	  cause	  difficulties	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  DWSS	  
There is a recurrent problem with the operation of the DWSS water pump. Most 
of the men responsible for the pump, the bomberos, also have another, paid, job 
outside the community, and their work supplying drinking water to the 
community is not economically remunerated because it is considered a service to 
the community. The president of Santiaguito water committee mentioned in a 
focus group: 
“We [water committee members] also have another job, we have a family and we 
are doing this activity as a way to give something back to the community. That is 
why we are not always here. This is not a full time job. We get no salary [as water 
committee members]. So we decided to organise our schedule and open this office 
every day, but after 6pm: from 6 to 9pm. And look − we never stop working 
[pointing to householders in the community water office at the time]. Every day we 
receive people who come to pay, who come to complain, who need us to fix the 
infrastructure, debtors who we are good enough to call, or users who come to ask for 
an extension to pay” (Water committee president, Santiaguito, July 2010). 
In the case of the bomberos, they are willing to serve their communities by taking 
on part of the responsibility for supplying drinking water. However, a main 
disadvantage of not being paid for this is that sometimes they neglect their 
responsibility, for example when there is a social event that they wish to attend, as 
occurs frequently at weekends. As a result some water users may not receive the 
DWSS for one or more days, while others in the same community receive it for 
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the entire day, such as a housewife domestic water user from San Mateo explained 
in an informal chat: 
“This week we heard that the bombero had a party [in the community] and he came to 
open the valve around 6 pm and we had water all night long. I went to sleep at 
midnight and we still had water. I had to turn off the tap, because I did not have more 
containers to put [water] in. But I am sure that tomorrow we will not have any” 
(Housewife domestic water user, San Mateo, January 2009). 
These kind of complain have been heard in the three case studies. The bomberos, 
like all community members, wish to attend social events. However, when they 
leave their post to go to these they neglect their responsibility as water committee 
members and may fail to open or close the water tap, interrupting DWSS 
distribution. The same can happen with other members of the water committee. 
It is a challenge for water committees to pay the bombero for opening and closing 
the main pumping system tap and it is not possible in all communities. For 
example, Santiaguito pays the bombero $1000 MXN (approximately £50 GBP). 
However, San Mateo and San Francisco pay neither the bombero nor any other 
member of the water committee for their activities in their communities. 
Payment to the community members responsible for supplying drinking water is 
optional in every community and is a measure of compensation for the time spent 
in this activity rather than a compulsory payment. The water committee members 
agree the decision about whether or not the pump operator is paid. Sometimes a 
water committee decides not to pay any committee member but rather to give 
another kind of incentive. Hodge (1991) mentions there are incentives such as tax 
exemptions, tax reductions, subsidies, permits, quotas, contracts and the collective 
interest. In a focus group with water committee members from Santiaguito 
community, the treasurer gave his opinion: 
“Economic incentives help the water committee to ensure that the bombero assumes 
full responsibility and willingness to make the water service available to households 
in different areas and at different times of the day” (Water committee treasurer, 
Santiaguito, July 2010). 
The type of incentive offered depends on each specific context. Of the case study 
communities, Santiaguito is the only one that pays its bombero monthly as well as 
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giving him incentives. However, there is no payment for any other water 
committee member. In San Francisco and San Mateo none of the water committee 
is paid for their committee work, although in all three communities they 
sometimes receive a reduction on their monthly payment for the DWSS as 
compensation. The following table summarises the types of compensation that 
water committee members receive: 
Table	  7.1	  Payment	  and	  incentives	  to	  water	  committee	  members	  for	  operation	  
of	  the	  DWSS	  	  
 Community 
Water  
supply service 
San Mateo Santiaguito San Francisco 
Payment to water 
committee members None  
None (engineers or 
technicians that 
eventually repair the 
water infrastructure 
are paid) 
None  
Payment to the 
bombero  None  
$1000 MXN (£50 
GBP) per week 
 
None, though, 
sometimes domestic 
water users give him a 
symbolic contribution 
Incentive for bombero  None Monthly fee for water is reduced  
Monthly fee for water 
is reduced 
Incentive to other 
water committee 
members 
None  None  
None  
However, domestic 
water users 
sometimes give to the 
man who mends the 
water infrastructure a 
tip as a contribution 
No. of days water 
service is provided per 
week, per household 
7 and 3 in some areas 3 1 
Source: Author, from 2010 interview data 
In San Mateo and San Francisco, the person responsible for the water pumping 
system – the bombero – does not receive a fixed payment. This work is 
considered a free community service. However, in San Francisco and Santiaguito, 
their payment for the DWSS they receive is sometimes reduced as a compensation 
measure; and sometimes bomberos receive a voluntary economic contribution 
from domestic water users, especially when they fix or repair the water 
infrastructure. Currently, domestic water users in San Francisco do not think they 
should give extra compensation to any other water committee member because of 
the argument that they are doing a community service. San Francisco community 
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members also think that, to some extent, water committee members get 
unauthorised payments from the money collected from householders’ payments. 
Payments are unauthorised because it does not take into consideration community 
members’ approval to pay or compensate water committee members because of 
their community services. Community members argue that some water committee 
members, such as the bombero or the person that fixes the infrastructure, 
sometimes take himself money without the consent of the community but with the 
consent of the water committee. Other domestic water users, in Santiaguito, think 
that the compensation provided to specific members of the water committee such 
as the bombero or the men who repair the water infrastructure should receive a 
small payment as an incentive to continue providing good-quality services. In San 
Mateo, payments to water committee members are not a problem because AyST 
manages money and water committee members have clear that they are providing 
a community service. However, when a householder decides to give them a tip, 
they are allowed to receive it. 
These cases, in which supplying water is seen as a community service, show how 
the drinking water system is vulnerable to chaos in its distribution schedule. Over 
time, any water committee member might become less committed to continuing 
this activity and fail to fulfil the DWSS provision requirements, especially when 
there is no fixed payment, as in San Francisco. As a consequence members of the 
water committee might end their service when the community decides to remove 
them from this responsibility, or when they quit this responsibility. If member of 
the water committee do not end up their service before, the water committee 
finishes when the current period ends. 
Providing the DWSS requires the coordination and management of natural and 
economic resources and the activity and time of water committee members, and 
this requires a budget and community cooperation to make the DWSS 
infrastructure work. The members of the three communities studied are aware of 
this, and householders are aware that it is necessary to pay for the DWSS in order 
that it can be organised, efforts can be coordinated and the service can be 
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managed. The following section analyses the main managerial problems faced by 
the water committees in the three case study communities. 
7.2.2	  Managerial	  problems	  recovering	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  
Recovering operation and maintenance costs for the provision of the DWSS has 
been a challenge for the water committees studied. Their members think that 
giving water a monetary value may help to provide and maintain the DWSS. They 
need to recover their operation and maintenance costs in order to continue to 
provide and improve the service. However, recovery of these costs has been 
difficult for the water committees, firstly because the committee members need to 
organise themselves to collect householder payments, and second, because water 
committees require appropriate financial administration to manage the DWSS. 
There is still a long way to go to achieve the managerial challenges in the case 
study communities, which aim to continue governing by custom the DWSS. Not 
only the community members but also the water committee members prefer to 
learn and make decisions on their own, according to common consensus, rather 
than lose their rights to control and use their groundwater resources. 
7.2.2.1 Difficulties in drinking water infrastructure maintenance  
Maintenance of the drinking water infrastructure is absolutely necessary in order 
to provide a safe and good quality DWSS. It requires economic resources, which 
water committees should recover from householder payments. Without recovering 
these costs to pay for maintenance and repairs, the water infrastructure would 
become non-functional. However, cost recovery in small and medium sized 
communities, especially those customary-organised communities tends to be poor, 
and what is collected is mainly used to cover operations and basic maintenance.  
In the Santiaguito, San Mateo and San Francisco communities, after paying for 
the continuous maintenance of wells, pumps, pipes and water reservoirs there is 
usually no budget for investment, network expansion and large repairs. For 
example, in San Mateo, maintenance of the well and the piped system is the 
responsibility of the community and the water committee. The water committee is 
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responsible for maintaining the pump house, the well, the pipelines and the water 
reservoirs, and the community is responsible for the maintenance of their own 
household pipes and reservoirs and fixing small street leakages. Householders 
also need to make sure their water infrastructure is functioning. The community is 
not totally responsible for large-scale maintenance and repairs. By maintenance it 
is understood the cleaning and basic infrastructure maintenance to make sure it 
works. By repairs mean to fix the infrastructure once it stops working. There are 
small and large repairs. 
San Mateo’s householders pay from their own economic resources to maintain the 
DWSS infrastructure. However, the municipality through AyST charges for the 
DWSS, which has specific responsibilities in the financial administration of two 
wells in the community. San Mateo water committee asks Toluca municipality for 
economic support for the maintenance and repairs of specific parts of the drinking 
water supply system when necessary. However, when the community asks 
Toluca’s municipal government for financial support to fix larger problems, such 
as replacing the pump or the old water network, for or a pipeline extension, it is 
put on a waiting list with other communities with similar problems.  
Toluca municipality tries to resolve the larger issues at the municipal level rather 
than at community level whenever possible and the financial department approves 
a payment for drinking water system maintenance. However, San Mateo 
community may have to wait a long time for municipal help to solve water 
infrastructure problems. In an interview, according to a representative of AyST, 
expert in water finance, public policies, and rights, the large projects that require 
municipal attention include: 
“updating the list of domestic water users, general and in depth maintenance, 
installation of a potable water plant, installation of a water treatment plant and 
making sure it can be operated, unification of pipes of the water infrastructure, 
etcetera” (Municipal public administrator, Toluca, June 2009). 
The water committee and community members of the three case studies perceive 
that economic support for the DWSS is not always provided. Water committee 
members think that municipal attention to community demands is provided only 
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during elections, when government institutions are looking for votes. In electoral 
periods the DWSS and water-related issues such as demand of drinking water 
become political rather than a service delivery covering basic needs (Loaeza 
2009). I repeatedly heard in the three communities that the municipalities do not 
invest in water infrastructure because they are saving money for electoral 
campaigns. In a focus group, the secretary of the water committee from San 
Francisco thought that government institutions:  
“...Want to save money for political campaigns or operating the water service in 
urban areas managed by the municipality, but they are not going to invest money in 
our community because they know we manage the water service” (Water committee 
secretary, San Francisco, July 2010). 
In group discussions, focus groups, interviews, and informal conversations carried 
out during my fieldwork it was repeatedly heard that municipalities do not invest 
in water infrastructure maintenance and services because they do need to save 
some money for electoral campaigns. This is because politicians might prefer 
influencing people votes by promising solution to a never end unsolved drinking 
water problem. Frequently, local politicians prefer investing money in visually 
appreciated water infrastructure works. Thus, more population are able to see the 
works and probably a candidate and their political party might win more votes. 
After elections, water supply promises are left aside, coming back in the following 
electoral period. I think power is a key element influencing decision making and 
its operation to improve piped water networks and the DWSS; politics regularly 
influence government position and implement measures in order to win popularity 
and positive population opinions. This behaviour usually takes place at municipal 
and community level rather than at state or national one. 
By contrast, in an interview, a representative of AyST expert in water finance and 
public policies at municipal level explained how the budget is used in formally 
organised water institutions:  
“There is no money for investing in water infrastructure or works from municipal or 
[decentralised] water organisations’ budgets, which [make up] approximately 80 
percent [of the decentralised water organisations in the state of Mexico] ... the money 
comes from user payments [rather than from a federal, state, or municipal budget]” 
(AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
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Toluca municipality attends to community demands related to DWSS 
infrastructure requirements. However, according to data provided in interviews by 
CONAGUA, CAEM and AyST representatives in October-November 2008 there 
is not a specific budget allocated to invest in either maintenance of or 
improvements to the drinking water infrastructure. This is because this 
responsibility is usually entrusted to communities and money collected is invested 
in minor repairs, water organisation members’ salary, to pay debts, payments to 
Electricity Company and CONAGUA to legitimise water rights when necessary. 
This situation has been observed in San Mateo where water committee assumes 
responsibility for providing the DWSS, maintenance and repairs. Though, the 
main control of water finances is AyST responsibility.  
In the state of Mexico it is also frequent finding that municipalities delegate not 
only the DWSS but also financial responsibility to communities aiming to govern 
and manage it. For example, Santiaguito and San Francisco, on the other hand, 
have full responsibility for maintenance of their water systems. They have to 
maintain and clean the well and reservoir and maintain the source of power to 
pump the drinking water. They also maintain the pump, pipes and water-related 
infrastructure. Water committees’ expenses in maintenance are variable. Actually, 
they do not separate a specific amount per month for maintenance or repairs. They 
spend on this when necessary and if the infrastructure is totally damaged. If 
possible, they ask whether a community member has the skills to do it in order to 
save some money. It was not possible obtaining this quantitative information from 
fieldwork because water committees do not keep these records. The water 
committee and the person responsible for the pumping system are directly 
responsible for small repairs including fixing the pipelines and leaks, seeking 
ways to increase the available budget and basic maintenance of wells and water 
reservoirs. When larger repairs and maintenance procedures are required the water 
committee immediately notify the water users to keep the community informed 
and ask for their financial support if necessary. 
If maintenance of the pipe system is necessary, the water committee asks the 
community to provide labour. Men usually play an important role in this activity. 
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When the maintenance is related to power sources or infrastructure repairs, the 
water authority asks for water users’ financial support. They cost the work, divide 
the total amount among the householders registered on their list and ask for their 
cooperation. They plan to collect the extra money within a specific period of time; 
usually more than a month, because not all householders are willing or able to pay 
in a single payment. Once the money is collected they start the repairs. 
Once the water system infrastructure in a self-managed community has been 
installed it must be sustainable. However, when a customary self-managed 
community faces large maintenance problems and cannot afford to pay for large 
repairs, the water committee has the option of asking the municipal water 
representative for financial support. Only under these conditions does the water 
committee have the option to apply for a specific federal budget. This budget to 
pay for priority issues is provided by the federal government to states and 
municipalities through the Ramo 33 norm.  
Ramo 33 gives all municipalities the right to an annual budget to improve, extend 
or resolve a specific social demand. Once states and municipalities receive this 
budget they must divide the total amount among number of communities they 
have and invest the money in resolving community problems. It should be used 
for priority demands in the municipal territory (Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas 
Públicas 2006; LVII Legislatura del Estado de México 2010). For example, the 
money provided is sometimes used for education, to build schools, pave roads, 
open health centres, install or extend DWSS network, for sanitation infrastructure, 
etcetera (Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas 2006). It is difficult to get 
access to this budget; however, especially for large maintenance and repair 
projects, because it is not easily granted. In terms of the money invested for the 
DWSS an AyST representative, public administrator expert in water finances and 
public policies at municipal level, declared in an interview: 
“Governments do not like to invest huge quantities. Thus, invested money is used to 
mend leaks or to change just a piece of the system, but they do not invest more 
money to improve the entire system. Every government period is the same; obviously 
we all know the reason. We know the problems faced by municipalities because of 
governmental transitions” (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
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Assigning a budget requires official approval and can take years, depending on 
whether the municipal government considers the requirement a priority. As 
municipal authorities only have a three-year governance period and 
representatives are frequently removed from their jobs at the end of this period, it 
is common for drinking water-related issues at municipal level to be allocated 
very low priority. For municipal governments the DWSS needs are not always 
seen as urgent. Therefore, DWSS issues become political and are raised at almost 
every election. 
The DWSS continues to function in the three communities studied because they 
have taken on the challenge and responsibility for providing it. Both 
municipalities – Toluca and Almoloya de Juárez − accept customary governance 
and management through community water committees besides their total 
responsibility for providing the DWSS to domestic users of their own 
communities. In parallel, every community is responsible for maintaining control 
over its water resources and infrastructure, charging for the DWSS and collecting 
user payments. However, even with the commitment and effort of customary 
water institutions, (Nyarko et al. 2007) suggest, customary authorities should 
strengthen their organisational skills and administrative systems to become self-
sustainable so they can better govern the DWSS at the community level.  
Strengthening the sense of community ownership through participation may have 
positively enhance community governance and management of the DWSS (Doe 
and Khan 2004; Nyarko et al. 2007). The relationship between community and 
drinking water authority requires cyclical feedback. It is important to constantly 
feed the community governance system with fresh ideas in order to improve 
decision making and management of the DWSS. Additionally, if the authorities 
gain the trust of the population it is easier to improve community participation and 
payment for the service.  
Self-governing and managing the DWSS with appropriate community 
participation and water committee commitment may enhance water infrastructure 
maintenance. Maintenance of the DWSS infrastructure by customarily-organised 
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communities requires investment and labour. Acquiring the finances necessary for 
maintaining the infrastructure depends on water committees’ successful recovery 
of the cost of operating the DWSS from domestic water users. I analyse water 
committees’ difficulties in recovering payment for the DWSS in the following 
section. 
7.2.3	  Difficulties	  in	  collecting	  payments	  for	  the	  DWSS	  
Supplying the DWSS generates expenses that must be recovered by the water 
institution in order to continue with its provision. Operation and maintenance 
include the cost of staff and administration, electricity, routine maintenance, small 
repairs and water quality maintenance and monitoring, for example chlorinating 
the water. Nyarko et al. (2007) and Whittington et al. (2009) also find this to be 
true. However, neither the water committees nor AyST totally recover payment 
from the community. Households in each of the case study communities are 
charged a specific amount for operation and maintenance of the DWSS (see Table 
7.2). 
Table	  7.2	  Tariff	  for	  the	  drinking	  water	  supply	  service	  
 Community 
Water  
supply service 
San Mateo Santiaguito San Francisco 
Monthly water tariff $70 MXN (£3.50GBP)* 
$50 MXN 
(£2.50GBP) 
$50 MXN 
(£2.50GBP) 
Days of water service 
provision per week, 
per household 
7; and 3 in some areas  3 1 
Universal Currency Converter, Available on line: [27 December 2010] http://www.xe.com/ucc/es/. 
Source: Author, from data obtained in interviews, 2010 
The water institutions do not always manage to achieve full collection of payment 
for water used and for operation and maintenance expenses. Whittington et al. 
(2009) affirm that some communities in Bolivia, Peru and Ghana are not even 
able to collect their operational costs. According to my fieldwork it is found that 
there are communities in Mexico central highlands that are not able to always 
collect operational costs per month. The money collected from each householder 
is not equivalent to the water institution’s expenditure. According to the analysis 
of information collected during my fieldwork, the amount of money collected 
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from community householders in Santiaguito and San Francisco only covered 
operational expenses, as reflected in a statement by the water committee president 
of Santiaguito in a focus group on July 2010: 
“The money we collect only helps to continue providing the service. With this 
money we have to pay for electricity and the bombero. We have to pay electricity 
bills each month: on average, a bill of ... $57,000 MXN [£2,850]. So, with the money 
we collect we can only guarantee the service but nothing else. Every house has to fix 
small leaks in their pipes. The committee cleans the well and reservoir, we also fix 
small failures in the infrastructure; we also ask if someone in the community knows 
how to do this to save some money. But if we need to pay additional costs we ask 
community members to cooperate with that” (Water committee president, 
Santiaguito, July 2010). 
Not only customary but also official water institutions have difficulty recovering 
costs and collecting payments for the DWSS. Customary water committees have 
this problem from San Francisco and Santiaguito communities whereas AyST 
from San Mateo householders. AyST’s difficulties are for two main reasons. 
Firstly, because even when community members receive the DWSS and it is 
mandatory to pay for this service, there is no payment enforcement mechanism in 
San Mateo because AyST only collects user payments and does not manage the 
operation and delivery of the DWSS. AyST might claim to limit the DWSS or the 
number of hours in which the DWSS is delivered to householders that do not pay 
for the service they receive, but the water committee cannot always limit or cut 
the DWSS. In an interview, an AyST representative expert in water finances and 
water rights at local level mentioned: 
“When we [the official water institution] face a problem of non-payment we notify 
the householder. If the householder avoids the notification, we limit the service 
[DWSS] providing little amounts of water. We cannot stop providing the service 
because is not allowed. We could limit the DWSS per house without affecting the 
neighbours, but we have to go directly to the house. We do not necessarily have to 
do it in the whole neighbour” (AyST public administrator, Toluca, June 2009). 
AyST can take drastic measures in urban areas or communities where it wholly 
manages the DWSS, but in San Mateo both a customary and official government 
manages the DWSS and both must agree decisions. In an in depth interview, a 
public administrator from AyST, expert in water finances and public policies, 
stated:  
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“The problem [for the official water institution] is its inability to collect user 
payments. The municipality could supply drinking water to 10,000 individuals, but 
if it only charges 100 [there is a problem] … there is a methodological manual of 
tariffs, but there is no way to enforce it. Therefore, there is no compliance ... and 
people avoid paying for the DWSS. Everything costs money: water, electricity …” 
(AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009). 
Householders’ failure to pay for the DWSS and the low level of cost recovery by 
official water institutions affects re-investment in drinking water supply 
infrastructure, maintenance and repairs.  
The second main reason about the difficulty in recovering user payments is the 
non-payment water culture, as discussed by Goldblatt (1999). Referring to this 
topic, in an interview carried out in June 2009 a water finance expert, 
representative from AyST, wondered: 
“But why do people not want to pay [for the DWSS] not only in Mexico but also in 
other countries, and why do people pay for other services such as electricity? I think 
this has a psychological aspect. (AyST representative, Toluca, June 2009) 
Perceptions about the importance of paying, or not paying, for the DWSS are 
personal and based on users’ experience of the DWSS they receive. Every 
householder has their own opinion and makes their own decision about paying, 
even in San Mateo, where payment is mandatory. In San Francisco and 
Santiaguito the payment is compulsory because of the agreement between the 
water committee and community members. However, there is no legislative norm 
that sanctions it but customary rules, approved by the water committee and 
householders, which ask for the payment. 
The official water institution in San Mateo have difficulties recovering payment 
for the DWSS, even though there are incentives for householders to pay; such as a 
reduction in the water bill when householders pay in a single payment the annual 
bill. However, not all householders are able to afford paying the annual water bill 
in a single payment; thus they have the option to pay in a monthly of two-months 
basis without the possibility of applying any incentive. The majority of users 
would be encouraged to pay every month or two-month period, for the DWSS if 
they could see constant improvement in its quality and clearly understood how the 
official institutions use the money they collect. Householders see the failures in 
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the management of the DWSS and the service delivered as reasons for not paying. 
These failures affect the recovery of water user payments not only at the 
community but also at the municipal level. In an interview, a public administrator 
of Toluca municipality, expressed his concern about the deficit in DWSS 
payments collection at the municipal level: 
“In the majority of cases municipalities are in deficit in terms of financial recovery of 
the water supply service... In the 125 municipalities in the state of Mexico, there is a 
60 percent financial shortfall: 60 percent of the economically active population does 
not pay its water bills. However, this 60 percent is an encouraging number, as there 
are municipalities that currently receive payment from only 5 percent of their 
population. These are really alarming numbers” (Municipal public administrator, 
Toluca, June 2009). 
In San Francisco and Santiaguito’s self-organised communities the water 
committees also have problems recovering their DWSS operation and 
maintenance costs. There are six main reasons behind this. The first is that these 
communities’ householder lists, water user databases and water payment records 
are not kept updated. Santiaguito and San Francisco water committees do not have 
up-to-date records of the total number of households receiving the DWSS. 
However, especially in Santiaguito, the water committees propose to carry out a 
new household census and then maintain it updated to make sure most households 
pay for the DWSS.  
Secondly, water committees do not have control over the total amount of water 
extracted, delivered and consumed and therefore cannot charge accordingly. 
Instead they charge a standard water tariff for every household registered. 
According to information provided by water committee members it is extracted 
and provided drinking water the water committee is not charging for, which 
represent an extra difficulty to collect more money to cover operational and 
maintenance expenses. 
Thirdly, there are no specific training, rules or incentives for customary 
committees to motivate them to provide high quality standards in the DWSS. Nor 
are there incentives for water committee members to provide reliable information, 
which affects community trust in the water committee that affect householders’ 
willingness to pay for the DWSS. Currently, though, there is consensus between 
Chapter	  7.	  Community	  water	  institutions’	  struggles	  to	  improve	  	  
the	  governance	  and	  management	  of	  the	  DWSS	  
220	  
	  
community members and the three water committees studied that information 
about payment collection, expenses and debts will be produced and made public. 
The fourth reason for the limited collection of payments is the relative lack of 
experience of members of every water committee for governing and managing the 
DWSS. This seems to be a key element in water committees’ failure to collect 
payments. The provision of the DWSS was transferred from federal to state, 
municipal and community levels in 1992, and DWSS financial self-sustainability 
at community level has not yet been reached (Molano Ruiz 2007). In some areas 
of central Mexico federal subsidies have been given for infrastructure. Domestic 
water users in the centre and south of Mexico pay a small amount for the DWSS 
they receive because central and southern states are more likely to receive 
subsidies. In northern states, domestic users pay the total cost of the DWSS 
(Bourguett Ortíz et al. 2007). Santiaguito and San Francisco received a federal 
budget only to install the infrastructure and not to maintain it. See Bourguett Ortíz 
et al. (2007) and Sandoval Minero (2007) for research on self-sufficiency at 
municipal and community level in Mexico. 
Householders in the three communities are charged according to how many days 
per week they receive the DWSS and a monthly tariff, as shown in Table 7.2. The 
low cost of the DWSS, inconsistent user payments and even householders’ refusal 
to pay for the service are understandable. The lack of willingness to pay due to the 
unpredictable periods without receiving the DWSS, as analysed by Anthony 
(2007), are also understandable. Most payment and non-payment decisions are 
based on the financial situation of both actors. However, part of the lack of 
payment problem still depends on the trust that community members have in the 
water committee. Their trust in the water committee influence householders 
willingness to pay for the DWSS they receive. 
Fifth, the water committees in Santiaguito and San Francisco would like to 
maintain their water tariffs at a reasonable and affordable level because then more 
people would pay for the service without overstretching their living expenses. 
Even when householders are charged a modest fixed amount for the DWSS, as 
detailed in Table 7.2, not all are able to pay.  
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Finally, the sixth difficulty involved in recovering operation and maintenance 
costs for the DWSS is the operation of local private water markets and water 
vendors. These markets are part of a cycle in which they sell drinking water to 
domestic users lacking enough water to cover their basic needs. As a consequence, 
some domestic users do not pay or do not promptly pay the water committee for 
the DWSS because the service is not always guaranteed even after it is paid for. 
On the one hand, buying from the water market generates extra expense for 
householders, affecting their ability to pay for the DWSS to the water committee. 
As Molano Ruiz (2007) and Herrera-Toledo et al. (2009) discuss, this cycle is a 
trigger that limits the ability of the water committee to be self-sustainable. On the 
other hand, there is a tacit consensus that water markets provide drinking water to 
users who do not have enough drinking water to cover their basic needs. 
According to Palmer-Jones (2001), water markets are crucial in alleviating 
drinking water deficiencies in rural environments and peri-urban areas. 
7.2.4	  Failures	  of	  water	  institutions	  to	  collect	  payment	  from	  domestic	  water	  
users	  	  
In addition to the low level of payment collection, I found that in rural and peri-
urban communities there are three frequent administrative failures of water 
institutions, such as AyST and the water committees in the case studies, to collect 
sufficient payment for the DWSS. In an in depth interview, a municipal authority 
AyST representative and expert in water finances affirmed: 
“It is difficult to collect money because if nobody asks for or insists on that payment, 
people do not pay. Users in rural or peri-urban areas are not always willing to pay for 
services if there is no one asking for that payment. The payment has been 
politicised … we have a culture of non-payment for water services as well as a 
culture of ‘I do not collect your payment’. The problem is not just the tariff system, 
but also the inability to collect payments” (AyST authority in water finances, Toluca, 
June 2009). 
First, the official and customary water authorities’ inability to collect payments is 
a key failure because it means there is neither capacity to encourage householders 
to pay nor rules to make them pay. Community members have learnt ways to skip, 
avoid or delay payment. Sometimes water committees argue that it is not a matter 
of inability but fear of collecting money from relatives or even friends of a 
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politician. Water committee members think that some water users make use of 
power relations to react with violence and loud comments against the water 
committee to avoid being charged. A few violent situations were identified in 
Santiaguito and San Francisco communities. For example, according to a narrative 
carried out in August 2009 from the president of Santiaguito water committee, a 
debtor community member once got angry because the treasurer explain to him 
about his responsibility to collect householders payments and insisted to him to 
update his payments. This person become angry and threatened the treasurer to 
leave him alone or he might react physically fighting against him or any other 
water committee member. 
In San Francisco, the situation was extreme because a specific community group 
recently inhabiting this community killed a water administrator of a well. A 
housewife domestic water user from San Francisco explained in an interview: 
“In a new housing development in this community some people killed the well 
administrator. He had a lot on money because he was always collecting people 
payments. He used to charge $100 MXN [£5 BP] per month and people from this 
place used to have water everyday. However, people did not precisely know what he 
was doing with the money, and he used to insist in charging and collecting 
payments… One night, he was killed” (Housewife water user, San Francisco, April 
2009). 
The second problem is linked to treasurers who frequently and unpredictably 
overlook the total payment from some users completely. Sometimes the water 
authorities in Santiaguito and San Francisco charge the same household 
consumption price to householders with a small business on their property that 
requires more than the average amount of water. In Santiaguito water committee 
members sometimes prefer not to collect payment for the DWSS when their safety 
is involved in order to avoid problems with community members. All the 
outstanding payments represent a high loss that could be spent on Electricity 
Company payments or infrastructure maintenance. If the water committees were 
to collect the total payment owning from all householders they could obtain long-
term advantages for the DWSS. 
The third failure of the water committees, and especially of the treasurer, is the 
mismanagement of householders’ payments for the provision of the DWSS. This 
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also occurs in official water institutions. Money collected from householders in 
the communities studied is not always properly used. Some water authorities keep 
the money for personal purposes rather than using it to maintain or reinvest in 
water-related issues. The total amount collected is not always registered or re-
invested, and this affects community members’ willingness to pay. 
The communities studied hold meetings at which the water committee informs the 
community members about the financial status of the DWSS. However, apart 
from this the committees do not have to provide any more information unless 
community members ask for it. This facilitates community treasurers’ recurrent 
mismanagement of water users’ payments. San Francisco was the only 
community in which community members expressed awareness of this, and they 
did not know what to do about treasurers suddenly leaving town with their money. 
In an interview, sub-manager of water management from CONAGUA at regional 
level, wondered: 
“Where is this money collected by the independent water committees? Just in a few 
hands” (CONAGUA sub-manager of water management, Toluca, November 2008). 
The above is also the thought of formal local water institutions representatives as 
AyST. Paying for the DWSS means that money collected can be reinvested in 
planned aims. However, when money, at least for the operation and maintenance 
of the DWSS is not recovered, the water committee cannot reinvest. If money is 
not reinvested or used to meet other DWSS purposes, social distrust generates a 
cycle of non-payment, non-reinvestment, water shortages, lack of service, lack of 
infrastructure maintenance and mismanagement of collected financial resources 
(Usobiaga Suinaga 2007). Non-payment also generates problems in the 
management of the DWSS, because customary water committees do not have 
money to implement decisions. Customary governance of the DWSS is also 
affected, due to community members’ lack of trust in the water authorities.  
In Santiaguito and San Francisco, the treasurer of the water committee’s has 
repeatedly used householders’ payments inappropriately to his own personal 
advantage. As a consequence, users stop paying the water committee their 
monthly quota for the DWSS. Non-payment prevents the resolution of DWSS 
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problems such as the need for infrastructure repairs, water shortages, non-
provision of the DWSS and outstanding bills for electricity to power the pump. 
Such problems require rapid attention to improve not only the operation and 
delivery but also the quality of the DWSS. When water committees cannot pay for 
electricity to pump the drinking water, delivery to community households is 
affected (for more information on the delivery of water services see Nyarko et al., 
2007 and Biswas and Tortajada, 2010b). 
Payment for the DWSS depends on users’ willingness and ability to pay and their 
trust in the water committee to administer the payments correctly and supply 
drinking water. Paying for water is not easy, because besides the fact that not all 
users are willing to pay for it, many cannot pay. Willingness and ability to pay for 
the DWSS are analysed in the following sections. 
7.3	  Willingness	  and	  ability	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  DWSS	  
Householders’ willingness and ability to pay their water bills affects improvement 
of the DWSS. Not all householders in the communities studied are always willing 
to pay for water. Some pay only to avoid water shortcuts or stop receiving the 
DWSS. However, in some communities, such as San Mateo, while people may 
not always be willing they have to pay for water on time, otherwise they are fined 
and the water committee temporarily suspends the DWSS to their property. The 
service is reinstated when the user pays the bill and a fine. See Babel et al. (2010) 
for more on willingness to pay. Another finding in the communities studied was 
that while some householders are willing to pay for the DWSS, they are unable to 
do so. This section analyses both willingness and ability to pay for the DWSS in 
the communities studied. 
This analysis supports the argument that householders are willing to pay for a 
DWSS that is delivered when they need it. Householders do not like paying for 
the DWSS and not receiving it; therefore if it is delivered with sufficient quantity 
and pressure to cover domestic needs, domestic water users are willing to pay for 
the service on time. 
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7.3.1	  Willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  DWSS	  	  
‘Willingness to pay’ refers to the maximum amount that individuals are willing to 
pay for a good service (Nyarko et al. 2007; Biswas and Tortajada 2010b). In this 
thesis a good service refers to a supply of drinking water suitable to cover 
domestic users’ biological, personal and domestic needs. Water has a financial 
value (Savenije 2002) which makes it tradable at the point of providing a service. 
If a domestic water user regularly receives the DWSS at home, this service should 
be priced and paid for because the DWSS is a commodity. Nyarko et al. (2007) 
divide domestic water users into four main categories: those willing to pay the full 
supply cost of the DWSS; those willing to pay more than the existing tariff but not 
the full supply cost, which in the three communities studied is not precisely 
known because it includes labour; those who want to maintain the existing tariff; 
and those who wish for a reduction in the existing tariff. In the case study 
communities it was also found that some householders are willing but unable to 
pay in cash; however, they are willing to contribute with their labour (faenas21) if 
necessary (see Kyessi (2005) for more about ability to pay). 
In San Mateo, where AyST collects domestic user payments, the municipal 
council approves a fixed quota for the provision of the DWSS. At community 
level, the DWSS is priced according to operational and managerial expenses. The 
water committee agrees the price with the community. The charge usually 
depends on the number of days and hours on which the service is provided to 
individual households, the total number of households in the community and the 
monthly expenditure of the water committee on operations and maintenance. I 
found that the price of the DWSS varies across communities.  
Even though water is priced, there is no a guarantee that all households will pay 
for the service they receive. In my fieldwork I found water users who pay more 
than others, even when the monthly charge is the same for all domestic water 
users. Yuling and Lein (2010) report that some communities are not charged for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Faenas are contributions of physical labour from some community members (Kyessi, 2005) It is 
a community practice to carry out group works. For example, through a faena community 
members fix pipes, clean the well and the streets, etcetera. 
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their DWSS. The reason each householder has to pay or not depends on 
willingness and ability to pay for the DWSS received. 
Taken into account total inhabitants data for 2005 census for the communities 
studied (INEGI 2011a) times the current price charged for the DWSS show that 
San Mateo should have collected $270,760 MXN pesos, equivalent to £13,538 
GBP, from all community households; Santiaguito should have collected $61,450 
MXN (£3,072 GBP) and San Francisco, $151,750 MXN (£7,587 GBP); but 
according to the water committees, the amount collected is frequently less than the 
total owed. According to the experience shared by Santiaguito water committee 
president in a focus group by July 2010: 
“We [water committee members] are currently collecting only the amount required 
to pay monthly operational expenses, which reach, on average, $55,000–$60,000 
MXN pesos [£2,750-£3,000] per month. The problem is that the water committee 
has not been able to collect payment from everybody” (Water committee president, 
Santiaguito, July 2010). 
In San Francisco people are not always willing to pay for the DWSS and it is 
difficult to find out the monthly average collected or spent by the water committee. 
Community members argued that there are inconsistencies in the DWSS and that 
paying is no guarantee of receiving the service. By April 2009 in a semi-
structured interview carried out in San Francisco, in the words of one householder: 
“There is a committee to which we have to pay $50 [MXN pesos] monthly. This is a 
small quota, but not everyone pays. Not everyone is conscious of the need. For 
example, we didn’t pay because at least three times a year we didn’t have water. I 
don’t know what problem the committee has with the Electricity Company because 
they say the bills are very high. So they pay, but the next month they don’t have 
money to complete the payment and then soon they stop the drinking water [supply] 
service. For example, I particularly have been a debtor. Before, an old man came to 
collect the water payment. I used to pay on time because he came every month. But 
once he told me that there were people owing five [years-worth of bills] and the 
[water] committee was condoning two or three years [payment] if people would be 
willing to pay two years in a single payment. So I told him I didn’t want to pay and 
he got angry. I thought, that is so funny; it will be better not paying for the water for 
years and after that I only have to pay for water for two years. But this was just my 
whim. Anyway, apart from this payment we have to buy a water tanker-full … and 
even if people pay on time they might not get the water service [DWSS] for three or 
four months. Older people are more conscientious. They pay early in the year. All 
payments are promptly made, even though they don’t have a discount. This isn’t fair 
[that debtors get discounts as incentive to pay while people promptly paying do not 
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have discounts in their water bill], because they have already paid for the entire 
year…” (Female water user, San Francisco, April 2009). 
Willingness to pay varies according to domestic users’ perception of the quality of 
the DWSS they received each month. It also depends on the number of days and 
hours they have received water, and their trust in the water authority. Three 
female domestic water users commented on their willingness to pay for the DWSS. 
The first is a user from San Francisco. The second and the third are from 
Santiaguito: 
“I am willing to pay $50 pesos [£2.50]. I think paying $50 MXN pesos is fair 
because there are enough people in this town to pay. Maybe, this price is even a bit 
expensive. I say, it is only $50 pesos, but it would be ok if the service [DWSS] is a 
good one. What also happens is that we don’t see all the expenses the committee has 
because we are outside the committee. So we don’t understand how it works” 
(Female water user, in depth interview, San Francisco, April 2009). 
“We pay $720 MXN pesos [£360] for the entire year; this is $60 MXN pesos per 
month [£3]. I would be willing to pay for a better service. Currently, I am fine paying 
for the service because even when it is limited I somehow ensure that I get it. I know 
if I pay I will look to receive the service [DWSS]. I am willing to pay for water. I 
think the current price is adequate. In Toluca, people pay thousands. As a user, I 
would be willing to pay individually for a good service … I think each family should 
pay for water. Each house should pay. But I would not be happy paying extra money 
for the infrastructure. However, Only a few people pay, and this always happen, So, 
this [extra] payment would not be useful to pay for infrastructure, but because not 
everybody pays, I am not willing to pay more” (Female water user, focus group, 
Santiaguito, June 2010). 
“I pay for the service [DWSS] because I know it requires maintenance. I believe the 
amount I pay is appropriate. But it is well known that there are very negligent people 
who should pay for the service [DWSS] and they refuse to pay … there are many 
who have not been willing to pay for years. I would only be willing to pay a bit more 
if I knew I would always get a good service” (Female water user, focus group, 
Santiaguito, June 2010). 
In the first quote, the domestic water user is willing to pay the tariff agreed 
between community members and the water committee because she thinks the 
amount is fair. The second case shows how water users might be willing to pay 
more if the DWSS were to improve and provide sufficient water to cover their 
needs. However, this user realised that her payment for the DWSS she receives 
can only guarantee that drinking water is delivered to her house. Once she realised 
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that not all householders pay even for the DWSS they receive, without including a 
payment for infrastructure repairs, she considered not making any extra payments.  
Finally, the third case also considers that paying the current amount charged per 
household is fair. However, she would only be willing to pay more than she does 
now – around $20 MXN [£1 BP] – if the water committee committed to 
improving the DWSS. According to San Francisco and Santiaguito householders’ 
opinion, community members would be willing to pay a small amount extra once 
they see improvements in the DWSS; otherwise they would not pay in advance. 
This statement, and the accuracy to represent the population of these communities, 
is delimited within the limits of error of the methodology and the boundaries to 
obtain quantitative information in this research. In interviews in the field I found 
that no one is willing to pay their share of the full cost of the DWSS, which 
includes infrastructure installation, maintenance and small and large repairs. 
The 35 domestic water users interviewed in San Francisco and Santiaguito were 
willing to pay to receive the DWSS but mentioned that they would like to receive 
a good service, which they saw as people receiving enough drinking water to cover 
their needs. Interviewees mentioned they think other community members would 
do the same if the community would receive a good DWSS because it would mean 
not generate extra expenses such as buying water from tankers or bottled water 
(see Bourguett Ortíz et al. (2007); Usobiaga Suinaga (2007); Babel et al. (2010); 
Nayar and James (2010) for more about payments for the DWSS). The accuracy to 
represent the entire population of these communities is also bounded within the 
limits of error of the methodology. San Mateo inhabitants are willing to pay 
because they currently have to pay; there is no chance they do not do it because it 
would mean a 90% reduction of the amount of water supplied. 
Kyessi (2005) affirms that in Tanzania about 90 percent of community households 
are willing to contribute to the operation and maintenance costs of water supplies. 
Kyessi’s research was done in community managed water supply projects. 
Therefore, this outcome might be relevant to understand that community members 
from community managed DWSS in the Mexican case studies, are also willing to 
contribute to the operation and maintenance costs under condition of receiving the 
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service. The 90% outcome in the case study communities is circumscribed to 
apply quantitative techniques in further researches. In the case study communities, 
most of the domestic water users interviewed were willing to pay for the operation 
of the DWSS. They also agreed to maintain the existing tariff, whether or not they 
receive the DWSS on the number of days agreed with the authority. A few are 
willing to pay a little more, though not the full supply cost, and only if they know 
and experience that the DWSS is guaranteed.  
In San Francisco and Santiaguito, reduction of the amount that some householders 
owe for the DWSS has been offered as an incentive to pay. For example, they can 
pay only two or three rather than five years’ outstanding bills. Debtors and users 
that do not receive the DWSS on the agreed days are willing to pay if their water 
committee offers reductions. The few householders receiving the DWSS, those 
who do not recurrently have problems with the DWSS they receive, feel 
comfortable paying the amount suggested. This is the case of a domestic water 
user from the San Francisco neighbourhood who talked about this in an informal 
chat: 
“I am willing to pay for the service because it is so cheap. We pay $60 MXN pesos 
per month, $720 MXN pesos per year. If we buy a water tank of 10,000 litres we pay 
$480 MXN pesos. Those who don’t have a cistern, where can they store it? I think 
what we pay for water is moderate, and also the increase [in the water bill], when has 
been necessary, is moderate. It has always been moderate” (Female domestic user, 
San Francisco, April 2009). 
However, some householders are not willing to pay at all, and these are generally 
domestic water users from the community who do not receive the expected water 
at all – because of water committee lack of skills to distribute the DWSS to all 
community directions – or receive it on only a few days per month. This situation 
has been frequently heard in San Francisco. Under these circumstances they 
refuse to pay and become debtors. According to Usobiaga Suinaga (2007) most 
domestic water users are not willing to pay for a low-quality service, even when 
they have covered they basic needs expenses and have the money to pay for the 
monthly DWSS bill. 
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Analysis of the total amount of fees that water committees expect to collect, and 
of the fees actually collected from nearly 50 percent of householders’ receiving 
the DWSS, reveals that the water committees are unable to meet their operation 
costs. This problem affects the delivery of drinking water to the community. The 
water committee is frequently in debt to the Electricity Company, which 
constrains provision of the DWSS and its improvement. If every householder 
were to pay for the DWSS, water committees could recover their operation and 
maintenance costs. However, more than 50 percent of water users are not willing 
to pay for the DWSS, or their payments are incomplete. Some householders who 
would be willing to pay are not able to do so. I discuss ability to pay in the 
following section. 
7.3.2	  Householders’	  ability	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  DWSS	  	  
Inability to pay for water is another reason constraining householders’ payment 
for the DWSS. Their ability to pay is defined by comparing household water 
consumption expenditure with monthly household income (Nyarko et al. 2007). 
This should be related to total household expenditure per month. At the 
community level, where a large proportion of inhabitants are in low-paid 
employment, people are subject to variable incomes. This can be reflected in poor 
ability to pay for the DWSS. Households might concentrate their financial 
resources on basic needs such as food, education, payment of other metered 
services and cultural events such as community celebrations, after which there is 
not always enough remaining to pay the monthly DWSS bill. In an interview, a 
housewife domestic water user explained her inability to pay for the drinking 
water service to the water committee: 
“I don’t know how to do it because I don’t have a job. My husband gives me money, 
but sometimes it is not enough because I also have to cook for my family, and there 
isn’t enough money [to pay the DWSS bill]. If I pay, I can’t eat. Sometimes my 
husband is not paid on time, and sometimes we have other expenses … you can cut 
the service if you want, but I can’t always pay. I’ll make an effort to save some 
money to pay something when possible” (Female domestic water user, Santiaguito, 
April 2009). 
According to householders domestic water users from Santiaguito and San 
Francisco communities with a variable income, the monthly water tariff of $50 
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MXN [£2.50BP] in their community is not excessive; however, some housewives 
from these communities cannot pay their DWSS bill because they spend their 
family monthly income on food, electricity service, transportation and 
contributions to community celebrations and then might not complete to pay for 
the insufficient DWSS. Householders and domestic water users with a low and 
variable income have to decide where their payment is best invested. If they 
consider the cost of a good or a service reasonable, they save some money to pay 
for it. However, payment for the DWSS is not always a priority, because users are 
aware that the service is unreliable and some prefer to save money to buy bottled 
water and sometimes water from tankers. Bottle water is used for drinking and 
cooking whereas water from tankers is also used for domestic activities and 
hygiene. Willingness and ability to pay are often closely related. Some users are 
not willing to pay for an uncertain and unreliable service and prefer to limit their 
expenses in order to be able to pay for alternative sources of drinking water. 
Most householders in the case study communities are able to pay, although there 
are cases where they have to decide which service to pay for first. However, in 
Santiaguito and San Francisco a small percentage of householders are unable to 
pay for the DWSS. When the water committee identifies these individual 
householders they try to negotiate the amount of money they can manage to pay. 
The water committee suggests paying whatever the householder can afford each 
month, which can be as low as 20 pesos (£1). In a focus group, a female domestic 
water user from Santiaguito stated: 
“I do not always have money. Sometimes my husband gives me [money] but other 
times he prefers drinking and I do not have enough even to eat. So how can I pay? I 
do not have the chance to pay. But I went to see the [water] committee and I told 
them that if I manage to save $20 pesos I will bring them this money. If I have more 
I will bring more…they agreed” (Female domestic water user, Santiaguito, June 
2010). 
Domestic users’ uncertainty about whether the DWSS will be provided on the 
allotted days and the mismanagement of payments collected by some water 
committee members has generated caution in some water users about paying and 
entrusting their money to the water committee. The following section discusses 
communities’ trust in their water committees. 
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7.4	  Community	  trust	  in	  the	  water	  committee:	  a	  main	  difficulty	  
As part of the difficulties faced by domestic water users and water institutions 
regarding the provision of the DWSS this section discusses about community trust 
in the water committee members and the resulting outcome to avoid paying or 
having overdue in the payments for this service. This section helps to answer the 
fourth research question. Trust in the water authority is important not only for 
domestic water users but also for the water committees governing the DWSS 
themselves. If water committees have community members’ trust they have also 
their support in making decisions about improving provision of the DWSS, 
without which they would not be able to make and implement decisions, and a 
vicious cycle of difficulties in the operation, distribution, maintenance and 
payment collection could affect the DWSS. 
Domestic water users’ trust in their water committees in the communities studied 
depends on water committee management of the DWSS and the ability of 
committee members for collecting payment for the DWSS which helps to pay for 
the operation and householders can receive the drinking water service. However, 
not every domestic water user trusts the members of their water committee, for 
two reasons, which became clear during my fieldwork. The first is that the water 
committee does not always comply with agreements made with the community, 
resulting in its not always providing sufficient drinking water as agreed; the 
second reason is that water committee treasurers, especially from San Francisco 
community, consistently steal community members’ DWSS payments with the 
result that users no longer want to pay. 
In terms of the fulfilment of agreements between water committees and 
community members, interviews with members of the populations of San Mateo 
and Santiaguito revealed that they receive the DWSS three days a week on 
average. This is because even when the DWSS is operated every day, the water is 
delivered to one area of the community for three days and to another for three 
days a week per five hours in average. The hours of service provided per day 
varies in the three communities. San Francisco should receive the DWSS five 
hours but householders do not always receive it. Santiaguito water committee 
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tried to provide the DWSS the agreed number of hours. And San Mateo 
householders receive the DWSS almost 12 hours per day. Only a few households 
receive the DWSS every day, or all day long on a limited number of days. The 
problem with receiving water all day long is that not all domestic water users have 
storage facilities in which to store the surplus of water received over a whole day, 
and thus it is frequently wasted because householders do not always know they 
will receive it a whole day and they might not be at home to turn off their taps. 
However, even the provision of water for three days a week is not always kept up 
because water committees make decisions to change the pattern without notifying 
domestic water users, or because financial constraints limiting provision of the 
DWSS. In an informal chat, a female domestic water user from San Mateo that 
was complaining because she did not received the DWSS in her property argued: 
“In this community we are supposed to receive water three days a week. But this 
week I just had water for two days ... Usually I don’t have water problems, but this 
week we heard the bombero had a party and he came to open the valve at around 6 
pm and we had water all night long … But I’m sure that tomorrow we won’t have any. 
They think that because they open the tap for an entire day we are not going to need 
more water later on in the week, but this is not true” (Female domestic water user, 
San Mateo, January 2009). 
Some community members receive water on variable schedules and store as much 
as possible in small containers or tanks in case of unexpected changes in the 
supply. Variable and unreliable schedules also generate lack of trust in the water 
committee. Of the three case study communities, San Francisco is the most 
worrying case. There, provision of the DWSS by the water committee varies from 
that in the other communities in terms of trust in the water authority. Community 
members have lost trust in the water committee due to lack of commitment to 
comply with their obligations on the part of members such as the bombero and the 
treasurer. The domestic water users think that their DWSS is not going to improve 
in the short term if water management procedures are not renewed when a new 
committee first takes over the water administration.  
In San Francisco, householders receive water on average once a week. This is not 
the only problem: there is also uncertainty about whether water will be delivered 
at all. A female domestic water user in San Francisco commented in a focus group: 
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“We should be receiving water every day, because it comes from a common well. 
But the [water] committee distributes it [to different areas of the community] a 
different day. I receive it once a week. For example, today water is sent to the hill, 
tomorrow it goes towards the other road, on Thursday it is for the other street or 
neighbourhood, and so on. But the service is badly administrated by the committee. 
For example, here we have 12 hours of [non-stop] [drinking] water [supply] when we 
have the service, which is regularly during the night. We [family household] have 
cisterns, but people that have not built a large cistern (to hold 10,000 litres or more) 
suffer because they do not have anywhere to store it. Now we haven’t received water 
for over a month since. There is no water coming from the network. Last week we 
bought a water tank [and] with a full cistern we have water for only 15 days. Water is 
not arriving when we need it. We never know. I would be happy if water was 
[delivered] regularly one day a week but with a good service” (Female water user, 
San Francisco, June 2010). 
San Francisco’s drinking water supply problems are closely related to the water 
committee’s managerial skills and honesty. In particular, householders believe 
that the lack of honesty erodes water users trust in the committee. Community 
members demand transparency from their water authority. They want to know not 
only general but also budgetary information – incomes, expenses, any leftover 
money, etcetera. They also wish to be informed about water committee decisions. 
Additionally, they request appropriate use of their payments for water, which are 
frequently not administered honestly. A female key informant who has lived in 
San Francisco since childhood spoke in an in depth interview about how trust in 
the water committee has been lost since the community received a piped DWSS: 
“There are two or more meetings per month on average because the drinking water 
problem is severe. We have been almost a month without water. But it is always the 
same. When the community [elects] the new committee, it already has debts brought 
forward from the previous committee’s administration. Then people get desperate 
because they see that the new [water committee] members do the same as the old 
ones. And the previous committee takes the money and does not come back. People 
do not see them again. So one who was part of the committee, the old man that used 
to repair the pipes, disappeared: he has run away with the money, he did not come 
back. Nobody knows how much he took; people just know there is no money 
again … so how are people going to pay for water yet again? ... For example, 
yesterday there was a meeting. The community chose some people to be 
representatives of the committee and the community started to say: the previous 
committee did x, y, z and now we have this debt. The community brought everything 
to the board and called [for the election] of another [water] committee. Only the 
president of the previous water committee was present. But the person who collected 
the money did not appear. This senior [member] has not yet given information about 
the finances … nothing” (Female key informant, domestic water user, San Francisco, 
April 2009). 
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One reason that community members do not trust the water committee is that 
many treasurers have quit the community without notice, stealing users’ DWSS 
payments. This happens over and over again. The lack of trust also relates to lack 
of transparency in the information provided to domestic water users. Sometimes 
the water authority does not tell domestic how their payments have been used, 
who they have to pay or how much they have collected or spent on providing the 
DWSS. This lack of transparency leads domestic water users to suspect that the 
water committee may be concealing information biases or hidden business. 
Dishonest practices out not only by water committee members and formal water 
institutions and the householders not willing to pay for it, have a negative effect 
on community trust. Trust is reflected not only in community participation in 
common activities but also in water users’ confidence in continuing to pay for the 
DWSS. Low community participation affects the management and governance of 
the DWSS. Community members react to the water governance system’s actions 
and try to adapt to the challenges of an inadequate DWSS 
Money and power are the causes of most dishonest practices. At the community 
level, water committee members’ dishonesty is regularly associated with the 
administration of payments for the DWSS. San Francisco treasurers often take this 
money for their own personal use. In San Mateo, householders mentioned that 
AyST does not necessarily report how much money it has collected to the 
population of San Mateo or to the official water institutions with transparency. 
Neither is money reinvested in infrastructure improvements. Yuling and Lein 
(2010) also report such behaviour. Some representatives of the water authorities 
commit fraud and take users’ payments without community permission or other 
water authorities permission. In depth interview, a key informant community 
member from San Francisco raised a frequent problem with water committees: 
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“The problem we [community members] have had with the majority of water 
committees is that they spend our money for personal purposes. The worst thing is 
that many people from the community would like to become part of the water 
committee because they know where the money is. People know that water [the 
DWSS] generates a lot of profit, because a lot of money can be collected. However, 
we have never had improvements because every water committee period is the same. 
Community members want to be part of the committee because is a way for them to 
improve their house or buy things they need” (Female water user, key informant, 
San Francisco, April 2009). 
Despite the concerns, and identification of the problem by not only community 
members but also water committee members, dishonest practices such as stealing 
money from users’ payments are somehow socially and politically forgiven. 
Currently there is no way to prevent this practice. In the communities studied 
there is no legal or social punishment for dishonest water authorities, even when 
the community does not agree with their behaviour and does not condone it. 
I have identified that a community trust in its water committee is necessary to 
facilitate the water authority’s collection of household payments for the DWSS. In 
San Francisco, for example, where there is no trust in the water committee, which 
directly affects householders’ willingness to pay for the DWSS, the community 
still aims to maintain its customary water governance system because the 
community owns the well and the drinking water. Community members do not 
want to lose their right to control underground water. This community is afraid to 
share its drinking water with other communities because they are aware that their 
water rights property rights over water will be either shared or given to other 
water authority. Community members have the worry that by sharing their 
drinking water with other neighbour communities consequently might suffer from 
more frequent water insufficiency than currently occurs.  
Governing the DWSS is a complicated activity in customarily organised 
communities. Water committees, official institutions and community members 
need to be coordinated if the DWSS is wished to succeed. However, coordination 
between authorities and domestic water users may be difficult, especially where 
issues of water rights, pricing and payment collection are involved because of the 
diverse interest of the actors and institutions legitimated either by an official or 
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customary institution. Actors would like maintaining their property rights to 
control management of the DWSS. 
At community level, community members and the water committees both believe 
that charging for the DWSS is necessary to improve the service. However, 
according to domestic water users’ perspective water is not necessarily an 
economic resource per se, but the DWSS needs to be priced to ensure the 
functioning of the infrastructure for providing, maintaining and repairing the 
drinking water supply infrastructure. However, while they may understand this 
perspective, not all domestic water users pay for it. The two main reasons behind 
non-payment are that householders are not willing to pay for a poorly-delivered 
DWSS and that not all domestic customers are able to pay for the service, due to 
financial constraints. 
The rationale behind analysing water institutions and domestic water users’ 
difficulties with collecting user payments or paying for the DWSS has been to 
reveal the differences between the official and customary governance systems and 
explain the failures in provision of the DWSS to domestic users in the three 
communities studied. The following chapter concludes this thesis by summarising 
the main issues of community governance and management of the DWSS. 
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CHAPTER	  8.	  Conclusions	  
8.1	  Introduction	  
The research process that this thesis illustrates implied a comprehensive and 
extensive review of theoretical issues of governance and community management 
to understand the drinking water supply service (DWSS) at community level. 
Given the need to illustrate empirically the analytical framework designed, the 
research is based on the analysis of empirical information provided by the case 
studies selected. It is notable to remark that these case studies demonstrated to be 
illustrative of the theoretical implications imbrocated in the analytical framework 
designed. Hence, this research has two main contributions. The first contribution 
is theoretical, following the design and implementation of an analytical 
framework that illustrates the process of water governance and community 
management in Mexico and its closer relationship with legal pluralism, rules and 
property rights over water resources. The second contribution is empirical, since 
the case studies selected contribute to a better understanding of the involvement of 
customary water institutions in the governance and management of the DWSS at 
community level.  
This research investigates the governance and management of the DWSS in three 
customarily organised communities in central Mexico: San Francisco, Santiaguito 
and San Mateo. The DWSS investigated is provided through a piped water 
network and is governed and managed by water committees which represents the 
water authority within each community. Water committees are customary 
community-managed institutions, legitimised by community members and social 
groups, organised to control the management, operation and maintenance of the 
DWSS. Therefore, this thesis approaches to the DWSS through the lens of 
governance, legal pluralism and community management. 
This research situates my work on commnity-managed drinking water systems in 
Mexico. My research acquires relevance due to the integration of water 
committees as community management compensation for decisions carried by 
government institutions about the provision of a networked DWSS. This thesis 
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contributes to better understanding of governance of the DWSS at community 
level as the rules, decision making and plurality of actors and institutions – i.e. 
public sector, civil society, private institutions, customary authorities, and 
individuals – involved in the development and management of the DWSS, 
recognition of water institutions and its authority, and their decisions about the 
management, operation and maintenance of drinking water and its infrastructure 
to provide a public service, specifically the DWSS. It highlights the importance of 
the legal pluralism involved in the governance of water. The thesis is rich in 
substantial empirical information collected through semi-structured interviews, 
deep interviews, focus groups, groups discussions, observation and informal talks 
with domestic water users and vendors, and water institutions representatives. It is 
especially abundant in qualitative data collected during my period of fieldwork. 
The thesis develops analytical and empirical conclusions within the nine main 
sections of this chapter. These conclusions respond to the research questions 
elaborated to answer how do customarily-organised institutions address water 
governance to manage the DWSS at community level? and will be explained in 
each section accordingly. The next section addresses the analytical findings; the 
third deals with methodological conclusions; the fourth section develops the 
empirical findings; the fifth sets out this thesis’ contribution to development 
studies; the sixth section explains about further research; the seventh section 
offers difficulties found in this research; the eight section offers some concluding 
remarks and the final section offers policy recommendations. 
8.2	  Analytical	  conclusions	  
One of the main concerns of the thesis was to illustrate that the research design 
responded to the analytical framework. In other words, the management of 
empirical information responded to the theoretical requirements of the thesis. In 
this sense, the first analytical conclusion this thesis finds is that the analitical 
framework was properly illustrated empirically by the selected case studies. 
Therefore, the research questions were also answered in a separated chapter; each 
theoretical concept used in the analytical framework responds to one research 
question. Below are included the main conclusions responding to these questions. 
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To answer the main research question about how do customarily-organised 
institutions address water governance and management of the DWSS at 
community level, it was essential to engage with issues of legal pluralism, 
community management, and governance. Legal pluralism was useful to 
comprehend there are formal and informal legitimate institutions and rules that 
might interact within the same governance and community management system.  
This study extended the discussion about the importance of recognising customary 
institutions in the governance of water resources at community level where there 
were insights from Von Benda-Beckmann (1995); Helmke and Levitsky (2004); 
Matsinhe, Juízo et al. (2008). In this research customary institutions were studied 
to explore the responsibilities they assume at the moment of governing and 
managing the DWSS from the extraction source (water well) to the final user. 
This study took into account both, Chhotray and Stoker’s (2009) governance 
concept and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) (2003: 2) water governance 
concept to understand the governance of the DWSS at community level as stated 
in section 2.4. and 8.1. Community management concept was also important to 
situate my work on community-managed drinking water systems in Mexico. It 
was also analised society’s participation, customary and official actors, and local 
water markets involved in the water provision. 
There are multiple and different legitimate institutions and actors interacting and 
influencing a drinking water governance system, especially at community level. 
Thus, the second analytical contribution arrived at in this study is the utility of 
informal/customary institutions at community level to legitimate legal plural ways 
of governance and management of drinking water, and to legitimate property 
rights of actors over water resources. This thesis acknowledge the participation of 
legitimate informal water insitutions and individual actors at community level 
with authority to make and implement common decisions.  
In the case study communities I have investigated, water committees represent the 
customary water institutions recognised by commununity members as legitimate 
authority responsible for the DWSS, as I discussed in Chapter 5. They are 
responsible for governing and managing activities such as the operation, 
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distribution and maintenance of the DWSS. In customarily organised 
communities, both formal and informal actors might be involved in the 
management of water; for example, in the communities studied there is a close 
and frequent relationship between water committees and community members to 
make decisions related to the DWSS, and between official water institutions and 
community members to collect users payments.22 There are also direct managerial 
relationships between official water institutions and customary water committees. 
My analysis also finds that besides formal and informal institutions, other actors 
such as local private well proprietors and informal water vendors should also be 
taken into account when it comes to the provission of drinking water. As 
discussed in chapter 5, in postcolonial countries, such as Mexico, the wide array 
of actors influence the decision making and the implementation of such decisions 
with legitimacy.  
Through a literature review about governance, water governance, legal pluralism, 
community management, water rights, property rights, and willingness and ability 
to pay; and the empirical analysis of the performance of formal and informal 
water institutions governance and management of the DWSS, this thesis finds that 
the recognition and legitimacy of community managed water committees help to 
theoretically strength legal pluralism and customary water governance systems at 
community level. Additionally, it helps to reduce the potentially negative effects 
of formal institutions’ unilateral decision making.  
Governing water resources by plural legal institutions at different administrative 
levels generate disjunctures in the rules governing and the responsibilities 
allocated to each water institution and its representatives, such as analysed in 
chapter four. When it comes to the management of the DWSS the main 
difficulties are related to decisions about who has to invest in infrastructure 
maintenance. 
The plurality of actors involved in the governance and community DWSS in 
Mexico, the adaptive capacity of community members and common decision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The literature also refers to official and customary authorities as formal and informal or as state 
and non-state institutions (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2005). 
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making bring advantages to domestic water users in issues related to the access to 
drinking water. In general terms, this study highlights the importance of the 
participation of legal plural institutions and actors in the governance and 
management of the DWSS at community level. For example, it is relevant the 
involvement of community members, water committees, and local private markets 
in the control of specific groundwater sources. This study analysed the 
involvement of legal plural water institutions at community level; it concludes 
that even though the participation of legal plural legitimate water institutions and 
actors, a reduction of central government involvement is necessary for successful 
management of the DWSS when community members agree to assume the 
corresponding governance and the managerial responsibilities.  
By contrast, in terms of community members’ involvement in the governance and 
management of the DWSS it is found that community management plays an 
important managerial role. Community management is a customary governance 
system that allows a community to manage its resources, according to a common 
set of rules, to provide this service to its households. 
Following discussions in the literature of property and water rights, as developed 
in chapter six, this research agrees that every actor has the right to access and use 
specific water resources. These water rights are recognised by the legitimate water 
authority or society and let actors make decisions about the provision or use of 
groundwater. Every water user holds specific property rights according to their 
position an owner, proprietor, authorised entrant, authorised claimant, authorised 
or unauthorsed user in the water governance system, see Table 2.1 in section 
2.4.3.1, and the way they have used to legitimate their right, such as defined in 
Chapter 6. This means that every position of every actor affords them specific 
property rights to access and use groundwater resources for specific purposes such 
as access, withdrawal, management, or the exclusion or alienation of water rights 
to others. 
This thesis agrees with the general classification of water rights as collective and 
individual rights recognised by Von Benda-Beckmann et al. (1998); Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan (2005); Roth et al. (2005); Boelens (2008). Collective rights are 
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the group of rights held by users of a water system: in the study area, communities 
and water committees hold them. Single water users such as water vendors, well 
proprietor, or a single household hold individual rights. Based on information 
obtained from interviews, this research finds that the recognition of collective and 
individual rights of community members by those actors involved in the 
governance of water strengthens the letters’ participation in water governance, 
community management, and decision making about the DWSS. 
Additionlly, the institutions involved in the governance of the DWSS have to 
define which actors have property rights to manage and maintain control over 
water resources. Every actor has specific property rights. The extent of the rights 
held depends on their position in the water governance and management system. 
Each actor has access to a specific amount of groundwater for specific purposes. 
Based on the literature, it is necessary to promote the recognition of authority to 
the lowest governance level for governing and managing water resources 
(Gregersen et al. 2007). Recognising the authority of customary institutions 
integrated and legitimated at community level is important, because community 
members are the ones who know their community’s water needs. Customary 
community institutions can understand their communities’ needs and take them 
into account when finding solutions without having to follow complicated 
bureaucratic procedures.  
This study shows that local formal governments such as the municipality are not 
the bottom-most authorities at the local level. There are also customary authorities 
responsible for governing the DWSS at the community level, managing the water 
resources and assuming full responsibility for DWSS management, even when 
they are not part of a formal governance system. 
The rationale behind calling for the recognition of authority at the community 
level is that community actors have a greater understanding of the physical and 
social community context and its particularities, which means that they can 
allocate, use and operate drinking water resources appropriately, such as 
suggested by Gregersen et al. (2007). Customary water authorities play an active 
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role in decisions about and operation of the DWSS and actively face and resolve 
its challenges. 
One of the main difficulties o domestic water users and water institutions 
encounter regarding provision of the DWSS relates to the quality and quantity of 
water. To be able to provide quality and quantity in the DWSS, water committees 
need to cost the service appropriately, as explained by Kumar and Managi (2010). 
Based on this argument, this study supports water committees pricing their DWSS 
according to their community’s operational, managerial and maintenance costs. It 
is important that the community water institution – whether official, customary, or 
private – considers the population’s social needs and socio-economic situation 
when deciding the price to be paid for the DWSS. Pricing water does not 
immediately guarantee its successful distribution and delivery. It is also important 
that the water institution collects householders’ payments for the DWSS.  
Scholars who recognise water as an economic good suggest that it is necessary to 
price it because the costs of the DWSS include its management, transport and 
delivery (Goldblatt 1999; Nayar and James 2010; Tian 2010). This study agrees 
that the operation, management and maintenance of the DWSS generate costs 
must be recovered in order to be able to continue providing this service. Pricing 
water contributes to improving the DWSS and water use. However, it does not 
totally guarantee improvements for two main reasons; first, water is not always 
priced according to the population’s socio-economic status, generating difficulties 
in paying for the DWSS, and second, water committees have difficulties in 
collecting householders’ payments. 
As argued in section 4.4 about water tariffs for the DWSS, specifically in section 
4.4.1, this thesis agrees with the contributions of Tortajada (2010) and Biswas and 
Tortajada (2010b) that the price of water should be sensitive to the social, 
political, economic and environmental requirements of the geographical space in 
question and to every relevant context. Water pricing must be decided on a case-
by-case basis, rather than accepting one general tariff for communities, cities or 
regions. In this sense, this thesis agrees with the thought that community members 
and community water institututions better know community needs and therefore, 
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they make decisions according to population needs. When water pricing does not 
take socioeconomic context into account, domestic users’ willingness to pay may 
be affected (see Kaliba (2003); Nyarko et al. 2007; Snowball et al. (2008); 
Echenique (2009); Nallathiga (2009). 
In the water governance system, official and customary institutions are organised 
differently to manage the DWSS. Both need to be strengthened to improve the 
way they collect payment from water users in order that they can become 
economically self-sufficient; and both systems need to manage the distribution 
and quantity of drinking water better to provide community households with a 
good-quality DWSS with enough pressure, quantity and timeliness. The first 
challenge is recognising the failures of each legal water institution, working with 
their differences, and agreeing a minimum basic requirement for the provision of 
the DWSS. Both official and customary systems require reliable information, 
training and/or guidance on issues related to water resources, water management 
and the service provision, and the freedom of water institutions to make decisions. 
The recovered running costs of the service can be reinvested in infrastructure, 
operational costs, maintenance and minor and major repairs. This section has 
addressed the main analytical conclusions. The following section presents the 
main methodological conclusions. 
8.3	  Methodological	  conclusions	  
The rich methodology used for this research included a variety of different 
techniques for collecting information and obtaining evidence from a wide array of 
sources. The use of multiple research techniques allowed me to contrasting 
information to better understand the DWSS distribution process in a customary 
governed and managed water regime.  
The multiple techniques used for collecting data – semi structured interviews, 
focus groups, deep interviews, groups discussion, and documental sources – 
allowed exploration of not only primary but also secondary sources of 
information. Use of the snowball technique helped in identifying key informants 
who could provide key empirical data. The advantage of using qualitative 
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methodology is reflected in the amount of detailed information about customary 
practices for providing and obtaining drinking water from groundwater sources. I 
was able to obtain this information from the key informants interviewed and from 
focus groups. Using of qualitative methods allowed me to collect reliable, deep 
and detailed information.  
Qualitative methods are essential in water governance research in order to 
understand the information gathered; for example, government representatives’ 
opinions and domestic water users’ perceptions, and to obtain oral evidence from 
water committee representatives, well proprietors and water vendors. Information 
about the quality of the infrastructure used to provide the DWSS was gathered 
through direct observation in the communities studied. Focus groups provided 
deep information from small groups of four or five people who shared similar 
characteristics such as gender, occupation, age and so on. Finally, deep 
interviewing yielded detailed oral evidence from key informants who are well-
informed on the evolution of the DWSS. The qualitative information obtained was 
analysed through the lens of water governance, community management and legal 
pluralism. The following section presents the empirical findings and main 
conclusions of this research. 
8.4	  Empirical	  findings	  
This section addresses the main empirical findings and conclusions that 
empirically answer the research questions that guide this study. These coclusions 
regard the management, operation and maintenance of the DWSS in Santiaguito, 
San Mateo and San Francisco communities, where community members, through 
their water committee, assume total or partial responsibility for providing 
households with drinking water. When the water committee, assumes total 
responsibility, as in Santiaguito and San Francisco, it organises, operates, 
distributes and charges for the DWSS to householders of the community. 
However, when the water committee assumes only partial responsibility, as in San 
Mateo, it operates and provides the DWSS. However, AyST as the official 
decentralised institution collects water user payments. 
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Provision of the DWSS in the communities selected is governed and managed by 
a customary system that works for small and medium-sized communities. As 
water committees are also community members they are familiar with domestic 
water users’ needs and concerns. Despite this, however, certain aspects of the 
DWSS need to be improved in order to provide a better service.  
According to empirical analysis of the data collected, as described in Chapter 4 
about legal pluralism, there are disjunctures in the current relationship between 
official and customary institutions providing the DWSS in the case study 
communities. These are mainly about two issues. The first concerns official and 
customary actors’ property rights to obtain and use drinking water. Legal plural 
institutions legitimised by either custom or State law have specific property rights 
according to their position in the property rights system. Therefore, differences in 
decision-making implementation by official and customary institutions are also 
differently recognised; the second disjuncture occurs in the success of payments 
collection from the water institution responsible for manage them. These 
disjunctures between official and customary water institutions reflect a weak 
relationship between the LAN and water committees’ actual customary practices 
in the organisation, operation and distribution of drinking water to the community.  
8.4.1	  Property	  rights	  recognised	  in	  the	  case	  study	  communities	  
Empirical analysis of the three case studies has shown that in customary water 
governance systems, actors legitimate their claims to property rights by custom or 
convention or through formal law. Customary and official water institutions also 
recognise the water rights of domestic water users, water vendors and well 
proprietors; municipal water institutions also recognise some customary property 
rights. Property rights in the communities studied are mainly recognised by 
custom, convention or statutory law, as discussed in Chapter 4. Recognition of 
actors’ property rights enables them to access and use drinking water.  
The recognition of water rights and property rights by non-state institutions has 
been proved to be valid, such is the case of community members recognising their 
water committee’s rights and vice versa. Community members’ right to access 
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drinking water is legitimised by customary water committees, usually through the 
payment for the DWSS to the water institution. The distribution of drinking water 
by local private vendors is legitimised by informal institutions and actors, such as 
community members and water committees, because they recognise water 
vendors as an alternative water source in which water users find options to solve 
insufficiency of drinking water problems in a water rich area. These problems are 
mainly caused due to managerial practices and limited economic resources of 
water committees to pay for the operation costs of providing drinking water. 
Buying drinking water from informal water tanker vendors is recognised as a 
valid and legitimate common practice in customarily organised communities that 
often lack the DWSS. Nevertheless, formal institutions do not legitimate water 
vendors’ performance because they do not hold an official permit.  
Official water institutions only recognise as valid water rights granted by 
CONAGUA, the main official water institution. However, a water committee 
recognises as valid not only property rights gained through State law but also 
historical rights acquired by community members through labour, custom, use and 
convention. 
My fieldwork in the three case study communities identified that the water 
committees and most community members have specific property rights over the 
drinking water they use. The property rights that every actor holds depends on 
other actors’ recognition of the legitimacy of their rights, gained either through 
their historical use of water or their payment for it. In the communities, actors 
legitimate property rights in different ways. Households receive a monthly, two-
monthly or annual bill, payment of which legitimates their consumption of 
groundwater and allows them to receive the DWSS. Water committees make 
formal payments to CONAGUA, which validate their access to groundwater, its 
withdrawal, and provision of the DWSS to community households. Private well 
proprietors payments to CONAGUA legitimate their property rights to access 
groundwater and profit from it. However, they sell water to local private water 
vendors’ who legitimate their access to water through the payment they do to 
water well proprietors. Community members also recognise water vendors’ 
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property rights by custom because when necessary they require their service. 
Additionally, the property rights of specific community members to extract water 
from their water wheels, access water from other sources such as neighbours’ 
facilities, or buy water from local markets can be recognised by others community 
members.  
8.4.2	  Rules	  and	  decision	  making	  about	  the	  management	  of	  drinking	  water	  
The governance and management of the DWSS by official and customary water 
institutions produces different rules and decision making and therefore different 
outcomes. The rules and decision making cannot be the same in both systems, as 
each has different origins, rules and actions, and decision making is carried out 
according to its own particularities. State institutions are frequently responsible 
for enforcing norms and rules; for instance under the national water law, 
CONAGUA expects the DWSS to be provided, charged for, maintained, repaired 
and improved by official institutions at the local level. However, community 
institutions expect the water committee to be self-sufficient in organising and 
providing the DWSS to the householders of the community, despite knowing that 
this is not an easy task. Community members see the main cause of DWSS 
problems as the result of mismanagement of financial resources.  
Indeed, water committee members’ mismanagement of financial resources is the 
main cause of drinking water supply problems at any administrative level, 
especially on the ground in the community. Difficulties in recovering consumers 
payment for the DWSS and the on-going mismanagement of payments collected 
also result in unsuccessful delivery of the DWSS in the communities studied. 
These failures have generated community members’ distrust in the water 
institution, and many domestic water users withhold payment as a result. When 
domestic user payments do not even cover operation and maintenance costs the 
water committee finances to pay for operation expenses, such as electricity, is 
affected and the water pumps cannot be operated; therefore, there is consequently 
a lack of drinking water. 
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An additional issue concerning community trust in the water authority relates to 
public information generated and provided by the water institutions. The amount 
of oral communication between water institutions and householders at community 
meetings is an important factor in gaining or losing community members’ 
confidence and trust in the water institution. Community members expressed a 
desire for receiving detailed information about the money collected, spent and 
reinvested in the DWSS by the water committee.  
In terms of communication between administrative levels of both official and 
customary institutions, direct communication occurs between the national and 
municipal water institutions. Customary institutions communicate directly with 
national and sometimes municipal official institutions, especially about issues that 
legitimate community water institutions formal water rights to access and 
withdraw groundwater. By contrast, customary water committees maintain direct 
communication with their community members, and vice versa. Community 
members, when necessary, take their DWSS problems directly to their water 
committee rather than with upper governmental water institutions.  
Disjunctures regarding decision making among administrative levels and between 
the official and customary institutions governing the DWSS have been also 
identified. Decisions made by the federal government in terms of the DWSS 
management has no always direct relation with decisions made at state level, and 
the state of Mexico government has little to do with its municipalities’ decisions 
about the distribution and management of the DWSS. However, there is more 
communication between the federal and municipal levels than federal and state or 
municipal levels in relation to groundwater use.  
8.4.3	  Pricing	  and	  collecting	  payment	  for	  the	  DWSS	  
Answering the fourth research question, the provission of drinking water involves 
difficulties between water users and institutions or between official and customary 
water institutions’ decisions about pricing the DWSS at community level. These 
difficulties might consequently affect collecting payments from water users, as 
discussed in chapter 7. In Mexico, formal and informal institutions at national, 
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municipal and community level set the prices for the use of groundwater 
resources. The rights to legitimate access to water are paid either though 
concesions of agua en bloque or through the DWSS (CONAGUA 2008c); prices 
varies according to region or customary agreements. In some parts of the country, 
particularly in the north, the user pays the real cost of the DWSS, while in some 
states, particularly in central and southern Mexico, users pay just a small amount 
for their drinking water because it is subsidised as scholars have also identified 
(Bourguett Ortíz et al., 2007; Sandoval Minero, 2007; Biswas and Tortajada, 
2010; Wilder, 2010). In the communities studied, householders pay for the 
operation and maintenance of the DWSS. The total amount to be paid is mainly 
agreed between customary water institutions and community members or formal 
water institution through the city council; this depends of who is reponsible of 
collecting users payments.  
The main coincidence identified in the case study communities is that both official 
and customary systems charge all water users for the provision of drinking water. 
The differences between the these systems are based on how they perceive the 
challenge of setting a price for the DWSS and then collecting water user 
payments. 
The customarily-organised case study communities agreed that the price for 
drinking water should be decided according to the expenses generated by 
provision of the DWSS and householders’ financial status. In the official system, 
the price of the DWSS depends on the regional socio-economic characteristics of 
the population and the tariffs approval by the municipal council’s financial 
department. There are also differences in the extent of community members’ 
involvement in water-related activities. In customarily-organised communities 
community members involvement in decision making, operation and maintenance 
of the DWSS and infrastructure is more frequent and they engage more than in an 
official water governance system. 
Community members whose DWSS is financially managed through an official 
system are not usually consulted about the cost of water or payment collection 
methods. They are only informed of decisions taken by the municipal authority 
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and how these decisions are to be implemented. This practice was observed in San 
Mateo community, where AyST notifies the community of pricing agreements 
made by the cabildo (local county council decision makers). Householders have to 
obey and comply with their obligations to pay for the water services, including 
sewage, DWSS and treatment, in order to have the right to access. They monthly 
pay AyST for the drinking water, even though the community owns the wells 
from which the water is withdrawn, and the customary water committee organises 
and distributes the DWSS, from the pump house to the households.  
Water cost in urban, peri-urban, and rural settlements is an indicator of the quality 
of the DWSS provided. Usually, in urban areas the DWSS is reliable in terms of 
being delivered everyday/24hours/sufficient pressure. However, in peri-urban and 
rural areas the DWSS tend to be intermitent and the quality of the DWSS and 
water quantity also varies. At community level, social and power relations and 
community decisions legitimate property rights over water while in urban areas 
formal water institutions and decisions are legitimised throug formal law. In peri-
urban communities, at community level, social networks help community 
members to find diverse ways to access drinking water when the DWSS is 
insufficient. Nevertheless, this might also generate more expenses to water users. 
Though, in urban areas, with a formally governed DWSS, dometic water users 
tend to access drinking water every days. The price the pay cover all possible 
expenses and population right to access. According to the findings, this thesis 
concludes that peri-urban comunities organised by custom pay more money for 
accessing drinking water receiving less, and to face these contingencies they adapt 
and find more options to obtain water. In urban areas, people might pay less 
money and have continuous access to the DWSS. 
Interaction between the two legal systems about water governance can strengthen 
and improve the quality of the DWSS if the tasks for each institution and actor are 
well defined. However, financial resources are required in order to implement 
decisions, which should be collected from water users. Investment in maintenance 
and repairs of the water infrastructure is required as well as successful collection 
of householders’ payment to cover operational, maintenance and repairs costs. 
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In a customarily managed DWSS community members are more involved in 
decision making on pricing and participation in aid of the service. Also, 
community actors participate in the DWSS more than in officially managed 
communities at municipal level. In general, in self-managed communities, 
householders agree to pay for the DWSS because they trust that paying for it will 
ensure that water is delivered to their property; it allows their DWSS to be 
financially self-sustainable and keep working. If people do not pay, the water 
committee is not able to absorb the operational or maintenance costs necessary to 
continue providing the DWSS. Paying for their DWSS makes householders feel 
included in the community, since their payment enables them to participate in 
community meetings and put forward proposals to improve the service.  
Community members consider it is good practice to keep their DWSS payments 
up to date. Otherwise, the DWSS might be interrupted. When a member of the 
community requires any other community service, such as a burial ceremony and 
funeral service in the community cemetery, the response of other community 
institutions such as social groups or members of the church might depend on their 
previous payment not only for the DWSS but also for religious festivities and 
services. This was identified in Santiaguito and San Francisco communities but 
not in San Mateo. 
Differences among legal water institutions regarding methods of communication 
and making decisions also create difficulties in collecting payment for the DWSS. 
Water committees’ struggles to collect householders’ payments and householders’ 
struggles to pay for the service. According to empirical information presented in 
this research, two main issues frequently affect payment collection: willingness to 
pay and ability to pay. These difficulties are addressed in the following section.  
8.4.4	  Difficulties	  in	  collecting	  payments	  for	  the	  DWSS:	  willingness	  and	  ability	  
to	  pay	  
According to empirical findings, householders’ willingness to pay is frequently 
affected by their ability to do so. According to the findings of this research, 
householders receiving an insufficient and intermittent DWSS are not willing to 
pay for it, or at least not promptly, and therefore some become debtors. On the 
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other hand, the ability to pay of some householders, especially from rural areas 
and medium sized communities is constrained by their income. Their salary is 
frequently insufficient to maintain their payments for the DWSS they receive. 
Therefore, less economically favoured householders are not always able to pay for 
the DWSS. These householders with a variable income are consequently less 
willing to pay for the DWSS. 
Formal water institutions are usually interested in achieving economic 
sustainability through cost recovery, while informal water institutions are mainly 
interested in recovering their operational and maintenance costs. From the water 
committee members’ perspective, major repairs may be carried out with the 
community cooperation that might vary from faenas (contribution of physical 
labour), to an extra payment for specific repairs, which require to using money 
from the monthly payments received to make minor repairs. 
8.4.4.1 Willingness to pay 
Analysis of the communities selected made it possible to identify three of the four 
main categories of householders’ willingness to pay that Nyarko et al. (2007) 
propose, and which I detail in order of importance below. 
First, those who wanted to keep the existing tariff. 45 householders domestic 
water users were interviewed in Santiaguito, San Francisco, and San Mateo 
communities. From the total, 35 domestic water users, from Santiaguito and San 
Francisco, were willing to pay only if the current tariff for the DWSS is retained. 
Based on municipal statistics for Toluca and Almoloya de Juárez, approximately 
60 percent of householders pay for the DWSS. San Mateo community members 
submitted the most payments (to AyST), followed by Santiaguito and finally San 
Francisco, paying to their customary water committees. 
This first category of ‘those who want to keep the existing DWSS tariff’ in the 
communities studied includes domestic self-employed water users or those who 
earn a variable monthly income. They want to maintain and pay the current 
DWSS tariff because they calculate that the payments likely to be collected from 
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all householders water users cover all the expenses generated in pumping water 
from its source to the community houses. 
In San Mateo, paying the fixed DWSS tariff is compulsory. The service can be 
temporary stopped for defaulters, who are also fined by AyST who is responsible 
of payments collection. In San Francisco and Santiaguito communities, 
householders who pay for the DWSS do so because they hope that paying will 
ensure the timely delivery of the DWSS to their homes and because it supports the 
community-managed DWSS in becoming financially self-sufficient, allowing the 
water committee to continue providing drinking water to community members.  
The second category consists of users who are willing to pay more than the 
existing tariff, but not to the extent of covering the total supply cost, which 
includes operation and maintenance expenses, infrastructure installation and large 
repairs. Santiaguito was the only community in which (approximately 10 percent 
of) householders were willing to pay more for the DWSS. However, these 
financially stable households mentioned they would only pay an extra $20 
MXNpesos [£1] a month if they first saw improvements in the DWSS. This was 
also on condition that they would receive the DWSS according to the agreed 
schedule.  
Third, 5 percent of householders, approximately, in San Francisco and San Mateo 
were willing to pay if the existing tariff was reduced. These householders are 
usually debtors who would be willing to pay if the DWSS improves but not the 
current tariff but a reduced one, or if they have a reduction in the overdue amount. 
San Francisco householders’ argument was that it is not fair to pay for water that 
does not come when it should because they also necessitate buying bottled 
drinking water or water from tankers. In San Mateo, those asking for a reduction 
were not householders but proprietors of family businesses or small shops who 
receive big bills due to their high consumption of water. 
In the three communities studied, the most frequent expenditure is on drinking 
water because householders monthly pay for the DWSS, bottled water, and 10,000 
litre tankers of water from water vendors. Some domestic water users have also 
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invested in constructing cisterns in which to store drinking water when water is 
being supplied and thus avoid extra expense when they do not receive it. In water-
stressed periods some domestic users ask neighbours or relatives for water, which 
they usually transport in 20-litre containers. Nevertheless, even if the water 
committee does not supply drinking water on schedule, householders do not 
receive a reduction of their bill.  
Users from San Francisco who are behind in paying for the DWSS would like a 
discount in order to be able pay their debts to the water committee. Domestic 
water users from San Francisco who are up-to-date with their DWSS payments 
also consider themselves eligible for a reduction in their monthly or annual 
payment, arguing that if debtors get a discount as an incentive to pay, they too 
should be entitled to an incentive since they pay regularly. Some domestic water 
users mentioned that the fact that there are no reductions for users who promptly 
pay only encourages them not to pay for a year or more in order to become 
eligible for a discount. 
The only category not found in the three communities studied was users willing to 
pay for the full supply cost of the DWSS. Domestic water users are not willing to 
pay this because they assume that the infrastructure is already in place so they do 
not have to pay for it. However, they may be willing to cooperate in paying for 
large repairs if necessary such as analysed in Chapter 7. 
There are householders that receive the DWSS and are not registered in the 
community user book. In the three case studies, according to water committee 
representatives, approximately 20 percent of the inhabitants of Santiaguito and 
San Francisco are unauthorised users; while they do not pay for the DWSS they 
manage to access it. 
In general, community members agree to pay for the DWSS. However, it is 
important to keep the water tariff affordable according to the population’s socio-
economic status to support people in managing their living expenses. ‘Affordable’ 
means that community members can pay without compromising their living 
needs. To keep the water tariff affordable, users must pay their water bills. 
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Frequent maintenance of the water infrastructure is also important to prevent the 
need for expensive, long-term and large repairs.  
This study has found that domestic water users, especially those in rural and peri-
urban areas, spend more money on obtaining drinking water than urban 
inhabitants because when they do not receive the DWSS as expected they buy 
bottled water or water from tankers from private local sellers, and are not willing 
to pay extra money if the service does not improve first.  
According to information collected during my fieldwork, willingness to pay 
involves the desire to cooperate only if customary water institutions improve the 
current DWSS or can guarantee that householders’ payments will be used to 
improve the service. However, willingness is no guarantee that users will pay, as 
not all householders are able to pay. Willingness was identified as a conditioned 
wish to pay only if community members identify improvements in the DWSS 
first. The following section addresses the main conclusions about ability to pay 
for the DWSS in Santiaguito, San Mateo and San Francisco. 
8.4.4.2 Ability to pay 
This research highlights the importance of payment for the operation and 
maintenance of the DWSS. Receiving the DWSS is a commodity the generate 
expenses when provided, thus it is associated with the payment of water users for 
this service. However, sometimes householders cannot afford to pay; in San 
Francisco and Santiaguito, payment for the DWSS is frequently constrained by 
householders’ ability to pay. After paying for their basic needs and, often, for a 
DWSS not provided by the water committee, they cannot afford to pay their 
DWSS bill. Ability to pay was discussed in Chapter 7. 
Community members’ education plays an important part in their ability to pay for 
services. According to the findings of this research, a low educative level often 
corresponds to an intermittent or low salary, which is reflected in payment or non-
payment for public services such as the DWSS. This pattern was identified in San 
Francisco, San Mateo and Santiaguito. 
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Registered householders users who are unable to pay for the DWSS are usually 
registered with the water institution to receive it. They become debtors and may 
also be classified as unauthorised users because they cannot pay for the property 
right to access drinking water unless they directly contact the water institution to 
explain their main reasons for not paying.  
There are some users that are not able to pay for the DWSS to the water 
committee because they previously bought water through water tankers. The more 
water householders buy from water tankers, the less they are able to pay for the 
DWSS; and the fewer payments the water committees collect, the more 
intermittent is the DWSS. Even though the DWSS costs less than water purchased 
from water vendors, the water committees cannot always collect enough to pay 
the operational costs.  
Additional findings from empirical analysis conclude that incentives to pay for the 
DWSS are important, making it financially viable and affordable for domestic 
users with financial constraints. Water committee members also thought that 
offering incentives to householders who are unable to pay is important because 
they encourage householders to make the effort to pay part of their debt to their 
community’s water committee. 
Householders with a higher income and able to pay build cisterns to collect and 
store drinking water on the days they receive the DWSS. Storing water ensures 
access to drinking water at home when not receiving the DWSS. Fieldwork 
observation found that most of the houses in the three communities studied have a 
water tank on the roof for storing drinking and making it available with enough 
water pressure to use it when needed for showers, toilet facilities, kitchen use.  
Having a cistern or rooftop tank helps householders to solve their basic needs 
without worrying about regular delivery of the DWSS. However, Bourguett Ortíz 
et al. (2007) mention that the presence of cisterns and rooftop tanks is a reflection 
of the low quality of the DWSS received. Findings during my fieldwork suggest 
that storing drinking water not only helps domestic water users to save money but 
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also means they have water when they need it. However, not all households in the 
three communities studied could afford tanks or cisterns.  
According to analysis of the data collected for this research, the presence of water 
tanks or other storage facilities are not necessarily evidence of a low-quality 
DWSS. However, they do reflect differences in households’ financial situations 
that sometimes constrain their ability and willingness to pay for the DWSS. In the 
case studies, the presence of cisterns, rooftop tanks, and ground water containers 
is as a collective action of householders implemented to deal with the changing 
and insufficient DWSS they receive daily, on three days a week, weekly or 
monthly. This is a collective action and adaptive capacity because even when 
householders did not organise to build all cisterns together, is a way to face the 
difficulties caused by the variable provision of the DWSS. 
Water committees’ management and governance of the DWSS are affected when 
householders are unwilling or unable to pay for a DWSS that is not delivered. By 
contrast, householders have the expense of constructing water reservoirs in their 
household, paying for the DWSS monthly, and purchasing water from water 
vendors. In addition, if provision of the DWSS is inconsistent and householders 
do not know how the water committee spends their payments, their trust in the 
water institution’s rules and decision making is affected too and a cycle of non-
payment-no-service-no-trust causes problems for DWSS governance and 
management. 
In the water governance process it is important that water committees understand 
the needs of domestic water users and domestic water users understand the effort 
and requirements of the water committee governing and managing the DWSS. 
Both institutions, community and water committees, need continuous 
communication and trust to maintain an active customary water governance 
system. 
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8.5	  Contribution	  to	  development	  studies	  
The comprehensive and extensive review of theoretical issues of governance, 
legal pluralism, and community management and the empirical analysis of data 
about the DWSS at community level responded to the theoretical requirements of 
the thesis. The management of empirical evidence was useful to respond to the 
analytical framework requirements and its findings contributes to development 
studies. 
Drinking water is required to cover basic human needs as well as social, cultural 
and economic activities. The importance of water resources to the survival and 
development of societies makes water-related research an important element in 
development studies. Thererefore, the provision of safe, clean drinking water has 
become a core international development topic discussed in international 
conferences; such as the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development in 
Dublin, the 2000 Second World Water Forum in The Hague, the 2001 
International Conference on Fresh Water in Bonn, the 2006 Fifth World Water 
Forum in Mexico, the 2009 Sixth World Water Forum in Turkey, etc., where 
debates about drinking water provision and sanitation have been at the 
international forefront. 
Water governance and community management concepts are approached from the 
field of development studies and legal pluralism. This research has explored how 
customary communities are organised to govern and manage the DWSS at 
community level. In order to make a community water system work it is important 
to know the cultural context and socioeconomic characteristics of the population. 
Being sensible to communities context and commit with the community according 
to their needs might enable successful administration of a customary DWSS and 
achieve positive outcomes.  
In development studies, sensitivity to context is important to approach 
communities, especially regarding the governance and management of water 
resources and the DWSS. The study of water governance and community 
management in development studies contributes to understanding common 
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decision making in the interface between official and customary institutions. 
Community management of groundwater is an example of a legitimate customary 
water governance where multiple actors are organised to manage their water 
resources and an provide a service. For better management of the DWSS this 
study finds that community members should control the DWSS in small and 
medium-sized communities. 
This research aimed to understand water governance and management of the 
DWSS through water committees in three Mexican communities. Therefore, 
community management, legal plural institutions, and water governance studies 
related to the DWSS, are important for literature in development studies by the 
understanding of different legal rules, decision making, and actors interacting 
within the water system.  
In a legal plural water regime both official and customary actors let actors decide 
how water resources are to be managed, and by whom, according to their own 
rules. In a customary system, recognition of actors’ rights to access and manage 
specific water resources is legitimated by its members through consensus or 
through payment for property rights over water, and customary water institutions’ 
management of the DWSS is recognised and validated by its members. 
Understanding and acknowledge the existence of these practices are a relevant 
contribution in development studies. 
8.6	  Further	  research	  
In future research, statistics involving a) groundwater extracted not only at 
regional but at community level; b) the number of litres of water delivered at 
household level and c) an updated list of the total householders of the 
communities, would help to bring quantitative evidence per community to the 
research. Further research is also suggested to obtain up-to-date information about 
the total amount collected by water committees in payments for the DWSS per 
month and year, and a record of the expenses generated monthly and yearly in 
providing the DWSS. The use of diverse qualitative and quantitative techniques is 
recommended, including focus groups and in-depth interviews. Questionnaires are 
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recommended, to allow contrasting qualitative and quantitative evidence and 
findings.  
Based on scientific information about community management, further research 
about community management is suggested to understand how communities 
organise themselves and make decisions, specifically regarding issues related to 
DWSS provision. Further consideration of community management of the DWSS 
in relation to water governance studies is required to learn more about customary 
rules, with particular focus on the structure and internal organisation of the 
community, the responsibilities allocated to each social actor and interactions 
among them, such as internal (community) and external (government institutions, 
well proprietors and water vendors) actors and other, non-state institutions. 
Understanding water institutions’ financial resources and water infrastructure for 
providing the DWSS to community households might be approached through the 
lenses of community management. It is important to seek community actors’ 
recommendations on how provision of the DWSS may be improved and what do 
an improvement represents for them.  
The academic literature suggested for further research includes explorations of 
user satisfaction issues in officially governed communities with all the facilities to 
distribute the DWSS from source to end user; however, more input about 
domestic water user satisfaction at the community level is required. Moreover, the 
quality of provision of the DWSS has not been deeply explored in the literature 
about water governance and water supply, and it offers enormous potential for 
further research. 
Further effort to understand the governance of drinking water could be enhanced 
through the use of quantitative data about user satisfaction with the DWSS, the 
authorities’ performance, and the price of water and water committees’ provision 
of the DWSS. The literature about governance and community management offers 
no significant outcomes of water committee performance or how community 
members perceive such performance. This is relevant for development studies 
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because it is another way of understanding community participation in issues 
related to the DWSS within their community. 
Further research about the sale of drinking water by local private water vendors 
and the purchase of drinking water from domestic water users at community level 
is also required to understand private local water markets and the contribution 
they make to community development by providing an alternative option for 
accessing drinking water. It could be helpful to know the extent to which local 
water vendors and well proprietors can join in partnership with water committees 
to provide drinking water when the water infrastructure requires medium and 
major repairs and it cannot be operated to provide this service. Water vendors 
have a network of contact-relationships with other water vendors that help them to 
maintain communication about the communities that require water through water 
tankers as well to offer a faster and efficient service for water users in terms of 
timing to deliver the service and distance. This network of relationships help 
water vendors to sell and distribute drinking water when official or customary 
water institutions are unable to provide enough through the DWSS and 
community members cannot obtain the drinking water they need. Local water 
market actors have created private local dynamics in the distribution of water, not 
only at community but also at municipal level, which are worth investigating in 
depth. Furthermore, research into the property rights held by informal water 
vendors would help to fill the gaps in the literature and research about water 
governance, the DWSS and sales of drinking water.  
Finally, domestic water users’ adaptive capacity for dealing with water 
insufficiencies caused by customary or official water institutions’ DWSS at 
community level requires further investigation. 
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8.7	  Difficulties	  for	  this	  research	  
I experienced difficulties with the use of semi-structured interviews to collect 
specific data. Using semi-structured interviews generate difficulties to carry out 
enough interviews for the data gathered to be representative of the large number 
of water users across the three communities studied. The hardest part of the data 
collection was obtaining interviews with government representatives, due to their 
last-minute cancellations.  
It was also difficult to obtain quantitative information about community finances. 
Obtaining access to records of the money collected by the water committees from 
the householders of the communities studied and to information about expenses 
generated in the provision of the DWSS was not easy. The difficulties were also 
caused firstly by the lack of updated records; secondly by the fact that newly-
elected water committees do not always keep the records from previous 
administrations; and thirdly, customary water authorities do not always keep a 
record of the money they collect or of all their expenses. 
8.8	  Concluding	  remarks	  
Based on theoretical and empirical evidence I suggest that through their water 
committee, communities should hold ownership rights over the water extracted or 
stored within the community. This would allow the community to own the access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation of drinking water involved in 
provision of the DWSS. 
It is necessary for the customary water committee to interact with official water 
institutions to some extent in order to generate continuous mutual feedback. 
Training for water committee members about the physical characteristics of the 
water cycle and financial management of payments for the provision of the DWSS 
collected would help members to understand the aquifer recharge process, acquire 
managerial skills and so on. It is important that the water committee does not lose 
its autonomy. 
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Customarily organised communities face some limitations when managing 
drinking water and might require guidance from water experts to improve 
management skills not only on the technical aspects of DWSS distribution but 
also regarding the administration of payment collection. Such guidance can help 
water committees to maintain the DWSS as a self-governed and self-managed 
customary institution. It is important that the community does not have to adopt 
all mandatory requirements established by official institutions for receiving 
guidance. However, it is important they attend the guidance workshops to raise 
their main concerns, exchange ideas, and discuss or find solutions to the problems 
they face in the DWSS provision in their community. Sometimes when 
communities receive some guidance from formal institutions, especially from 
government institutions, they have the commit to exchange or give them back a 
payment, change its methods of charging and collecting user payments, or to 
report its income and outcome and administrative procedures to an official 
institution. These extra activities are a distraction from the main DWSS activity 
and might cause other administrative problems that consequently affect the 
delivery of the DWSS. 
This thesis suggests as is necessary not asking water committees for a payment 
back. Neither, compulsory providing CONAGUA reports about their income, 
outcomes, expenses, water system requirements, etc. because it might implies 
attending administrative procedures rather than providing an appropriate DWSS. 
It is also important not to generate bureaucracy between official and customary 
institutions to make decisions related the financial management, operation, 
maintenance, and repairs of the DWSS.  
Community members should continue to be responsible for the DWSS and 
decision making about it through a water committee. In order to succeed, 
communities organised by custom need the support of community members; and 
the water committee needs to be recognised and legitimised by both the 
community and municipal government in order to gain and maintain property 
rights to freely operate the DWSS in their communities. Water committees need to 
win the trust of the community regarding not only their provision of the DWSS 
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but also their collection and handling of payments, decision making and 
management of finance for improvements related to the DWSS. 
The DWSS need not be provided on a daily basis in the three communities 
studied. According to data collected in San Francisco, San Mateo and Santiaguito, 
domestic water users mentioned as important that drinking water is not delivered 
daily and 24 hours service because not all households have the facilities to store 
the extra water provided. The problem is not receiving 24 hours DWSS. The 
problem is that currently, not all households have a well-installed tap system that 
allows them turning it off when they are not in the property. According to 
fieldwork data for domestic water users it is more important that the drinking 
water comes regularly and when expected than receiving 24 houses DWSS. 
Besides this, the water committees have neither the infrastructure to provide a 24-
hour daily DWSS nor sufficient financial resources to pay for the electricity 
needed to pump and distribute a continuous service. In addition, if the DWSS in 
the three communities would be provided 24hours daily, the fee for the provision 
of the DWSS would have to increase, putting pressure on users’ willingness and 
ability to pay for the DWSS. 
It is strongly suggested that the DWSS should be provided on the days agreed 
between the water committee and householders. My fieldwork revealed that 
Santiaguito, San Mateo and San Francisco would benefit from provision of the 
DWSS to every household on three days a week. Delivery of the service in 
accordance with the timing agreed between the water committee and householders 
is also important. 
Improvements to the DWSS, not only as a national priority strategy but also as a 
local reality, require constant effort from the water institutions, water authority, 
water users, legislators, local private actors, engineers and water technicians, 
academics and decision makers. It also requires the will of domestic users and 
water institutions to improve this service. 
Currently there are no specific policies in Mexico with an emphasis on DWSS 
matters. It is important that legislators update and adapt national water law to the 
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current situation of the country in general, the particular social and economic 
issues in the different regions and the particularities of small and medium size 
communities.  
Finally, it is also important that the national water law acknowledge the existence 
of customary regimes providing the DWSS at community level in order to 
legitimate community management and water committees authonomy to 
administer ground water for a social purpose. It is relevant mentioning that formal 
aknowledgement does not necessarily mean that customary water governance and 
management regimes have to be formalised. It is suggested CONAGUA provide 
formal and permanent, rather than temporary water title concessions to those 
customarily organised communities, through water committees, to manage the 
DWSS. Permanent formal water rights to communities might generate advantages 
to water commitees to sistematically provide the DWSS without stressing their 
economic possibilities to pay in a year or five-year basis formal water rights to 
CONAGUA. Therefore, water committees only would have to pay operational 
and maintenance costs. The recognition of customary management practices by a 
formal institution might bring advantages to communities in terms of receiving 
federal funds to maintain, repair and improve their water infrastructure. It could 
also be beneficial to withdraw communities’ obligation to pay for the official 
water rights to manage community wells from which water to provide the DWSS 
is withdraw. If customarily organised communities are not obliged to pay 
CONAGUA annually for these water rights they might manage to provide a 
continuous DWSS according to population needs. Customary committees could 
also provide maintenance and improvements to already existing drinking water 
infrastructure when necessary.  
Water governance and community management of the DWSS should be inclusive 
and supportive of community members’ customary ways of organising their 
DWSS. Based on the idea that the state should give communities total 
responsibility to manage their water resources, it makes room for informal 
institutions to govern and manage the DWSS. The following section offers some 
policy recommendations. 
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8.	  9	  Policy	  recommendations	  
The recommendations offered here, based on the analysis presented throughout 
this thesis, are concerned with improving decision making in the governance and 
management of provision of the DWSS.  
Self- organised communities governing water resources should be responsible for 
organising and managing their own groundwater or surface water for providing 
the DWSS; especially, when these communities aim to control operation, 
management and maintenance of water resources available in the community.  
Frequent feedback between national and customary water institutions about 
provision of the DWSS is important in order to improve it. Where required by the 
customary water committees and official water institutions it is also important to 
provide with training or guidance from professionals about specific water-related 
topics that help them to improve the DWSS; for example, to improve managerial 
and financial skills of the members of the water institutions to recover operational 
costs that let them re-invest in the provision of this service. 
Customary water institutions, such as the community water committees, should 
maintain communication with municipal and federal government about 
improvements required in the drinking water network and management of it to 
consequently improve the DWSS. Government should respect customary 
institutions’ performance in terms of their organisation, distribution and control to 
provide drinking water. In addition, municipal and federal institutions, through 
CONAGUA, should maintain communication with water committees in order that 
they are aware of the communities’ strengths and weaknesses in supplying the 
drinking water service.  
Currently, water committee members provide their services voluntarily as social 
labour and in cooperation with their community. Some of them receive an 
economic incentive that encourages them to improve their participation in DWSS 
activities. It is recommended that community members and water committee 
members readdress the possibility of paying a fixed salary, agreed between water 
committee members and community members, to every member of the water 
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committee rather than only the bombero, with the aim of motivating them to 
provide a reliable DWSS. A salary might reduce mismanagement of 
householders’ payments by some committee members.  
If water committee members are paid for their service to the community, they 
might not be helping themselves from householders’ payments for the DWSS. 
When a water committee, rather that the official institution, manages DWSS 
financial resources and the reinvestment in the operation and maintenance of this 
there are consequently improvements to the drinking water infrastructure and the 
quality of the DWSS provision might be made more rapidly. 
Policy development is needed about allowing official and customary water 
institutions a federal budget for maintaining and repairing the water infrastructure, 
which would allow not only small but also medium size and large communities to 
keep their drinking water supply infrastructure in good order and able to provide 
the DWSS to every household, so that people do not lack drinking water. 
It is suggested that communities be allowed to hold property rights as owners 
rather than as proprietors to manage groundwater for the provision of the DWSS. 
As owners, water committees would not have to pay a tax to any government 
formal water institution, such as CONAGUA, for a water concession title. This 
measure should guarantee the supply of drinking water to cover basic needs 
without facing constraints to pay the Electricity Company for the electricity used 
for pumping the drinking water infrastructure. However, it should only be applied 
to water institutions such as water committees or municipal and public water 
institutions that provide the DWSS to for domestic use at community level. 
Institutions that sell or resell drinking water for obtaining private revenue should 
not be included in this category. Recognition of community water committees as 
owners of the water resources found in their community should be legitimised by 
the LAN, public water policy at state and municipal level, as well as by customary 
water institutions.  
This thesis encourages the payment for the DWSS. Taking into account domestic 
water users thoughts obtained from fieldwork I suggest that the DWSS in the 
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three communities studied should be priced. I recommend a fixed monthly tariff 
of $70 MXN pesos for most of households receiving the DWSS. However, this 
amount should be modified and adapted to householders demonstrating to receive 
a lower and variable household income and/or the montly household expenses. 
This tariff is suggested to provide a good DWSS in accordance to community 
needs and common water committee-community members agreements to avoid 
waer insufficiency. If the DWSS is provided accordingly, domestic water users 
might be willing to pay the tariff. Payments collection would enable the water 
committee of the communities studied to pay the electricity bill and maintain 
regularly the drinking water infrastructure in good order. Maintenance of the 
drinking water supply infrastructure also includes cleaning of water reservoirs, 
water well, pipes, and chlorinate drinking water and to keep the infrastructure in 
appropriate functioning conditions. 
I suggest that in customarily organised communities the price for the DWSS is 
agreed between community water institutions and community members 
considering the socio-economic conditions of the community. I suggest each 
community designs and use the tariff for the DWSS that better suits their needs. It 
is also recommended that the water committee charges and collects payments for 
the DWSS and decides how the income is best reinvested. 
While both official and customary water institutions need to provide greater 
commitment and engagement to provision of the DWSS, domestic users also need 
to participate by paying promptly for the service. 
This research encourages the provision of the DWSS with sufficient water 
pressure, quantity, quality and timeliness. Good-quality DWSS and water 
committee performance will also improve the governance and management of the 
DWSS. This high quality in the DWSS should be reflected in the provision and 
delivery processes. To achieve quality it is necessary that customary water 
institutions, through the water committee, are autonomous in their governance, 
management and operation of the DWSS. According to the empirical analysis, 
this should provide communities with the recognition what they are the authorities 
in decision making and managing of the DWSS. This can only happen if the 
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community decides to take on the governance and management of the DWSS. 
When communities do not decide to govern and manage this service it is 
necessary to respect their decision otherwise the water committee and community 
members would struggle to achieve successful DWSS outcomes. 
Finally, transparency of the information provided to water users is crucial. 
Reliable and clear information available to everybody in the community and at 
any time will generate community trust. This should include an up-to-date list of 
householders receiving the DWSS, the amount of money owed and payments 
collected. Data about the total amount of payment collected and costs of the 
DWSS operation, maintenance and repairs, the service’s main failures and water 
committees’ difficulties in providing a good-quality service should also be made 
available. This information will be useful when seeking to improve the DWSS 
with community participation. 
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Annex	  1.	  Sample	  of	  semi	  structured	  interviews	  design	  
Fieldwork stage in peri-urban communities 
Household information 
Women/men 
How many people live there? 
How many babies 
How many children? 
How many teenagers? 
How many adults? 
How many elder people? 
Personal hygiene 
How many people live in this house?  
How many members of the house do take a daily shower?  
In average, how many days per week do you take a shower? 
Socioeconomic situation: 
Rich 
Middleclass: high, medium, low 
Poor 
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About the drinking water supply service 
Do you have water supply service? (Yes) (No) 
If yes, how many litres per hour/day?  
- Number of hours of water service per day 
- Number of hours of water service per week 
- Number of days in a month they receive the drinking water supply service 
If no, how do you solve water problems? 
__ Borrow water from neighbours 
1. If borrow from neighbours, how often? 
2. How much water do you borrow? 
3. How is this favour reciprocated? 
4. In case you pay for it, how much do you pay? 
__ Buy water tanker trucks 
1. How often?  
2. At what price? 
3. Do you think is cheap of expensive? 
4. Who provides the service? 
__ owns a well 
1. For how long have you had a well? 
2. Does it have a legal concession? 
3. How often do you withdraw water from it? 
4. Is this well for a household consumption, do you share it with neighbours 
or it is used for a business purpose?  
5. Do you know if there is a community well? 
6. What are the rules governing access to ground water? 
__ Store water 
1. Where do you store it 
__ top reservoirs 
__ outside reservoirs 
__ cistern 
__ kegs 
2. For how long have you stored drinking water? 
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What is the average of money you invest in buying water? 
-­‐ bottles. How often? 
-­‐ Water tank trucks. How often? 
-­‐ others 
Do you receive water when you need it? (Yes) (No) 
If no, how often would you like to receive water? 
Does your house have: 
Cistern:  (Yes) (No) 
Top reservoir:  (Yes) (No) 
Please tick the appropriate 
Do you drinking water from: 
__ Tap. Do you boil it before previous consumption? (Yes) (No) 
__ Bottle water 
__ Water tank trucks 
__ Own well 
Do you think you receive the piped water service with enough quantity? (Yes) 
(No) 
How often do you receive water? 
__ Daily  
__ Twice per week 
__ Tree times per week 
__ Four times per week 
__ Five days per week 
__weekends 
__monthly 
For how long do you receive it each time? 
__ All day 
__ Intermittent 
__ Few hours but continuous 
__ how many hours? 
Do you think is adequate the service provided? 
When there is no sufficient water, how do you save water? 
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What of intra-household activities do you prefer to sacrifice when water is not 
sufficient water? 
When you receive more water, do you use more water? Or do you maintain the 
level of consumption you have? 
Quality of the service 
How do you describe the quality of the drinking water supply service you receive?  
__ Do you receive the drinking water service with enough pressure? (Yes) (No) 
__ Is the flow of water continuous? (Yes) (No) 
__ Is the water clean? 
Can you and your family meet your basic needs with the water you receive? (Yes) 
(No) 
Which of the next activities can you carry out with the water you receive? 
__ Cooking 
__ Cleaning clothes 
__ Cleaning house 
__ cleaning dishes/kitchen 
__ Water for drinking 
__ Water for showering/ bathing 
__ Water for sanitation/Discharge toilet 
__ Irrigation or homestead land 
__ Animals  
__ Irrigating trees 
__ Plants 
__ Others 
Do you have any other water requirements? Water for industrial use, commercial 
use, growing crops, homestead land) 
Do you think the drinking water service in your community is well managed? 
(Yes) (No) (Why?) 
Do you agree with the way in which the drinking water service is distributed? 
Do you recognise/agree with water authority? (Yes) (No), why? 
Do you know if there are water lost between the source and the end user delivery 
due to infrastructure failures/leaks? (Yes) (No) 
Do you waste water? (Yes) (No) Here I will compare with my own observations. 
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Are you satisfied with the drinking water supply service you receive? (Yes) (No) 
Is there something that you might change from the service? (Yes) (No) (what?) 
General 
Do you save water in some activities to allow using it in others? (Yes) (No) 
When you have water problems, who do you talk with? 
__ Municipal government 
__ Local authority 
__ Community organisation 
__ Nobody 
__ Write a claim for an official authority  
• If you write a document, what is the response elicited from complaints? 
__ Neighbours 
Do you know who actually repairs water infrastructure when necessary? 
Does the answer of water authorities to solve the client demand is fast? (Yes) (No) 
Does repairing water pipes infrastructure, when necessary, are fast? (Yes) (No) 
What do you do when you do not receive the drinking water supply service? 
(adaptive capacity to access drinking water) 
Do you think the drinking water supply service is efficient? (Yes) (No) 
Which of the following characteristics apply to the DWSS you receive? 
-­‐ Quantity 
-­‐ Quality 
-­‐ Timeliness 
-­‐ Sufficiency 
-­‐ Cost recovery through bills collection 
-­‐ Governance compliance 
-­‐ Pricing 
-­‐ Frequency 
-­‐ Access  
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Payments for the DWSS 
Are you willing to pay for the DWSS? (yes) (no) 
What are you willing to pay for? 
A) Water 
B) Infrastructure 
C) Service 
D) Electricity 
E) Quality of water 
F) Quantity of water 
G) Timeliness 
H) Others 
How much are you willing to pay for these issues? 
How are you willing to pay for the above issues? (individually) (collectively) 
Do you pay for the drinking water service? (Yes) (No) 
If yes, how often do you pay water? 
In which range of payment are you in: 
__ Less $50 pesos 
__ Between $50 and $100 pesos 
__ Between $100 and $200 pesos 
__ Between $200 and $300 pesos 
__ Between $300 and $500 pesos 
__ Between $500 and $1000 pesos 
__ between $1000 and $1500 pesos 
__ more than $1500 pesos 
__other 
Do you have water meter? (Yes) (No) why? 
Who take the measure? 
Management of the drinking water supply service within the communities 
Who is responsible of the DWSS? 
Who operates water service? 
Who claim water payment?  
Is water priced? 
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Who is responsible of water bill collection? 
Is money recovered re-invested? 
Are there water markets? 
How community adapts to solve water problems? 
Are there social relations to solve water short-cuts? 
Important 
• What do water users are willing to pay for? 
• What people do get for free? 
• What the suppliers need to supply for free? 
• Do water institutions consider water supply as an economic good?  
• Does people see water or the water service as an economic good? 
Extra information needed from interviewees  
-­‐ The drinking water consumed comes from the tap, is it boiled, water 
bottles, tankers?  
-­‐ Number of households that receive water through well installed taps? 
-­‐ Are there householders that have to bring water from other sources? 
-­‐ Do householders that receive water through well installed taps 
-­‐ Money expended in drinking water supply? 
-­‐ Average of money households invest in buying water (bottles, water tank 
trucks)? 
-­‐ What water is used for in a house? drinking, bathing, cleaning clothes, 
cooking, washing dishes, cleaning house, irrigation, animals, growing 
vegetables, irrigating trees, plants? 
-­‐ For cleaning the shower and toilet, how much water do you need to do it? 
How many kegs do you need? 
 
